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General abstract
Social learning is ubiquitous among animals and humans and is thought to
be critical to the widespread success of humans and to the development and
evolution of human culture. Evolutionary theory, however, suggests that
social learning alone may not be adaptive but that individuals may need to
be selective in who and how they copy others. One of the key findings of
these evolutionary models (reviewed in Chapter 1) is that social information
may be widely adaptive if individuals are able to combine social and asocial
sources of information together strategically. However, up until this point
the focus of theoretic models has been on the population level consequences
of different social learning strategies, and not on how individuals combine
social and asocial information on specific tasks. In Chapter 2 I carry out
an analysis of how animal learners might incorporate social information into
a reinforcement learning framework and find that even limited, low-fidelity
copying of actions in an action sequence may combine with asocial learning to
result in high fidelity transmission of entire action sequences. In Chapter 3
I describe a series of experiments that find that human learners flexibly use
a conformity biased learning strategy to learn from multiple demonstrators
depending on demonstrator accuracy, either indicated by environmental cues
or past experience with these demonstrators. The chapter reveals close
quantitative and qualitative matches between participant’s performance and a
Bayesian model of social learning. In both Chapters 2 and 3 I find, consistent
with previous evolutionary findings, that by combining social and asocial
sources of information together individuals are able to learn about the world
vii
effectively. Exploring how animals use social learning experimentally can
be a substantially more difficult task than exploring human social learning.
In Chapter 4, I develop and present a refined version of Network Based
Diffusion analysis to provide a statistical framework for inferring social learning
mechanisms from animal diffusion experiments. In Chapter 5 I move from
examining the effects of social learning at an individual level to examining
their population level outcomes and provide an analysis of how fine-grained
population structure may alter the spread of novel behaviours through a
population. I find that although a learner’s social learning strategy and the
learnability of a novel behaviour strongly impact how likely the behaviour is to
spread through the population, fine grained population structure plays a much
smaller role. In Chapter 6 I summarize the results of this thesis, and provide
suggestions for future work to understand how individuals, humans and other
animals alike, use social information.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The ability to learn from others, social learning, is thought to be one of
the key factors contributing to the development of human culture (Boyd
and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013;
Lewis and Laland, 2012), and thereby enabling humans to adapt and inhabit
almost every known environment on the globe (Boyd and Richerson, 1985;
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Laland et al., 2000; McEvedy et al., 1978;
Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Social learning is not unique to humans, but
is widespread among animals, having been found in a number of species
including birds (Lefebvre, 2000; Benskin et al., 2002; Boogert et al., 2014),
fish (Coolen et al., 2003; Pike and Laland, 2010; Brown and Laland, 2003),
primates (Custance et al., 1999, 2001; Stoinski and Whiten, 2003; Call and
Tomasello, 1995; Whiten, 1998; Whiten et al., 1999), other mammals (Laland
and Plotkin, 1993; Range et al., 2011; Laland and Plotkin, 1992), and even
invertebrates (Grueter and Leadbeater, 2014; Leadbeater and Chittka, 2007).
Although there do exist some instances of cultural1 processes at work in
animals, these processes seem to be qualitatively different both in scope and
evolutionary impact to those operating in humans (Byrne et al., 2004; Whiten,
2000). For example, previous empirical research has found evidence for cultural
1Although there is ample debate on the definition of what culture is (e.g. Hill, 2009; Byrne
et al., 2004), a working definition of culture that suffices in this context is “all group-typical
behavior patterns shared by members of animal communities, that are to some degree reliant
on socially learned and transmitted information” (Laland and Janik, 2006).
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processes at work in both primates and birds, such as the maintenance of
between-group differences in chimpanzees across multiple generations which
(it is argued) is not explainable by environmental factors (Whiten et al.,
1999), or behaviours spreading through social transmission, e.g. sweet potato
washing in macaques (Kawai, 1965) or milk bottle opening in birds (Fisher
and Hinde, 1949). However, in these cases, there exists only limited evidence
for “cumulative culture” (Tennie et al., 2009; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013) –
a phenomenon whereby individuals in a population are able to improve and
refine previously learned behaviours to generate a behaviour not discoverable
by a single individual working alone, which is thought to be a cornerstone of
human culture (Tomasello, 1994, 1999; Dean et al., 2014).
The qualitative difference between cultural phenomena in animals and in
humans suggests that, although humans and different species of animal all use
social information, how that social information is used may differ substantially
enough to alter the cultural processes that emerge from it. One of the primary
features of human social learning, thought to be important for the development
of culture, is the ability for humans to engage in “high-fidelity transmission”
(Lewis and Laland, 2012), highlighted by a number of computational models
(Lewis and Laland, 2012) and experimental studies (Morgan et al., 2015a;
Whalen et al., 2014). Although often not empirically measured, fidelity
of transmission relates to the accuracy by which one animal passes along
information or behaviours to another, and which results in the learner
effectively using that information or learning that behaviour, which may in
turn depend on how individuals use social information (Lewis and Laland,
2
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2012). If fidelity of transmission is high, then individuals are able to effectively
pass information from one learner to the next, or from one generation to the
next. However if the fidelity of transmission is low, individuals may have to
rely primarily on asocial learning to learn about the environment, and may not
be able to maintain, or build upon the information provided by the transmitter
(Galef, 1992; Heyes, 1993; Tomasello, 1999).
Although little empirical work has measured fidelity of transmission
specificity, different ways of using social information (referred to as “processes”
or “mechanisms”) are thought to lead to different levels of fidelity of
transmission (Galef, 1988; Heyes, 1993, 1994; Hoppitt and Laland, 2008, 2013).
For example, the empirical evidence suggests that many animals exhibit only
low-fidelity learning mechanisms such as “local enhancement” or “stimulus
enhancement”, defined as a tendency to preferentially interact with an object
or a location with which other animals are interacting (Thorpe, 1963; Spence,
1937; Heyes, 1994; Galef and Beck, 1985). Local enhancement is thought to be
a low-fidelity method of information transfer because of the potentially high
error rate associated with it, as all local enhancement does is bring the animal
in closer proximity to an object or area of interest, the animal then has to learn
the new behavior on its own (Roper, 1986). There do exist what are thought
to be higher fidelity methods of social transmission than local enhancement,
namely “imitation” (copying the actions of another) or “emulation” (bringing
about the same effect as another’s actions) (Whiten et al., 2009; Tennie et al.,
2009), and evidence for higher fidelity transmission exists in primates, most
notably chimpanzees (Whiten, 1998), gorillas (Stoinski and Whiten, 2003), and
3
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orangutans (Call and Tomasello, 1995; Custance et al., 2001). A full discussion
of the types of social learning observed in animals is outside the scope of this
introduction (for a review see Galef, 1988; Heyes, 1993; Hoppitt and Laland,
2008). However, the fact that different methods of social transmission may
be more or less efficacious at transmitting information may play an important
role in understanding the evolution of social learning, and the development
of human and animal cultures and traditions (Tennie et al., 2009; Laland
and Galef, 2009; Lewis and Laland, 2012; Whiten, 2000), and highlights the
importance of social learning in animals and humans in understanding animal
and human cultures.
In this thesis I examine how social learning might operate in humans and
other animals, and how these processes might lead to the development of stable
traditions. In Chapters 2 and 3, I analyse how individuals might combine
social learning with asocial information to solve novel tasks. In Chapter 4,
I develop and analyse a new statistical technique for inferring the presence
of social transmission in animal behavioural experiments. Finally, Chapter 5
examines how the fine-grained social structure of a population may influence
the spread of novel behaviours across a population. Given that much of this
work is grounded in the understanding of theoretic models of the evolution of
social learning, I review the relevant models in more detail below.
4
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1.1 Understanding culture through population level
models
One of the early questions concerning the evolutionary advantage of social
learning arose from the work of Alan Rogers (1988). Before that point, most
researchers had assumed that social learning was evolutionarily adaptive, both
because it gave animals an opportunity to learn about the environment quickly
and accurately, which did not require potentially costly, or dangerous trial and
error learning, and because of the role that social learning has played in the
development of human culture and the resulting massive population growth.
However Rogers concluded that in the context of a simple mathematical
model, social learning may not always be advantageous, and that it may not
increase the average fitness of individuals in the population. The conflict
between the results of Rogers’ model and researchers’ intuition has led these
results to be known as “Rogers’ Paradox” (Rendell et al., 2010b; Aoki and
Feldman, 2014). Although there now exist a number of solutions to Rogers’
Paradox (discussed in more detail in Section 1.2), understanding the origins
of the paradox provides a stepping stone to understand where, and why social
learning may be adaptive.
To create the paradox, Rogers (1988) presented a simple model of the
evolution of a population of “snerdwumps”, a wholly imaginary species of
animals capable of asocial and social learning. These animals were placed
in an environment that had two environmental states, w1 and w2. Learners
could learn one of two behaviours to exploit the environment, b1, and b2.
Each behaviour provided the learner with a higher fitness in its corresponding
5
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environment (i.e. behaviour b1 provides a higher fitness to the learner in
w1, and a lower fitness in w2 and vice-versa for behaviour b2). To learn a
behaviour, the animals used one of two learning strategies, asocial learning or
social learning. Choice of learning strategy was genetically determined by a
single allele (either asocial learning or social learning) at a haploid locus.
If the animal used asocial learning they learned the adaptive behavior for
the current environment (e.g. b1 in environment w1) and paid a cost, c. If
the animal used social learning they adopted the behaviour of another learner,
randomly selected from the population, and paid a cost s. It was assumed
in the model that s < c, representing the intuition that social learning is less
costly than asocial learning.
Rogers then investigated what would happen over evolutionary time,
allowing individuals to reproduce at a rate proportional to their fitness, so
if a strategy provided a high fitness in one round of the simulation, a higher
proportion of individuals would use that strategy in the next round of the
simulation. He also assumed that the environment changed between w1 and
w2 with some probability u. The fitness of asocial learners in the population
was always a constant – the cost of asocial learning, plus, the benefit of having
the correct behaviour, since the asocial learners always learned the correct
behaviour. The fitness of social learners in the population depended on the
frequency of learners in the population who had the correct behaviour – if
every learner in the population used the correct behaviour, then social learners
would always learn the correct behaviour, however if only half the learners in
the population used the correct behaviour, then there was a 50% chance that
6
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social learners would learn the correct behaviour. This meant that the fitness
of social learners in the population may depend on the relative frequency of
social and asocial learners.
Rogers examined the places where the fitness of social and asocial learners
would be equal, and concluded that in the context of this model:
• Social learning only evolves if social learning costs less than
asocial learning.
If the cost of social learning is higher than the cost of asocial learning,
the fitness of asocial learners (who will always learn the best behaviour)
will always be greater than social learners (who have a chance of learning
the incorrect behaviour).
• If social learning evolves the population will be a mix of social
and asocial learners.
The fitness of social learners depends on the proportion of social learners
in the population. If the rate of environmental change is zero, than a
population of pure social learners might evolve – if all learners always
use the correct behaviour, and social learning is less costly that asocial
learning, social learners will have a higher fitness than asocial learners.
• A population of pure social learners will not evolve in a variable
environment.
Even if the entire population has the currently correct behaviour, after
an environmental change the entire population will have the incorrect
behaviour, and there is no way for the correct behaviour to enter into
a population of pure social learners. This would allow asocial learners
7
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(who always adopt the correct behaviour) to re-invade the population.
• Social learning will never increase the long-term average fitness
of learners in a population
Due to the influence of environmental change, the fitness of social learners
is positively correlated with the proportion of asocial learners. If the
population contains a large number of asocial learners, the number of
individuals in the population who use the correct behaviour is high, and
the fitness of social learners is also high (higher than that of asocial
learners). If the population contains a low number of asocial learners,
then the number of individuals in the population who use the correct
behaviour may be low (particularly after an environmental change),
leaving social learners with lower fitness than asocial learners. This
means that at equilibrium the fitness of social learners will never be
greater than the fitness of asocial learners; if the fitness of social learners
was higher, this would increase the proportion of social learners in the
population, and thereby decrease the fitness of social learners in the
population.
The last finding, that social learning may not increase the evolutionary
fitness of learners in the population, is Rogers’ Paradox. Intuitively the
advantage of low cost learning that social learning gives should increase a
learner’s evolutionary fitness. The fact that social learning does not provide
a fitness advantage in this simple model runs counter to intuitions and marks
the finding as a paradoxical.
Because this paradox only arises in the simple model that Rogers’ provides,
8
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and not in reality – social learning is thought to provide an adaptive advantage
to many species (Galef, 1988), and is a key component of human culture which
has allowed for a massive increase in population size – which suggests that there
is something was lost in the simplicity of Rogers’ model that is important for
social learning. It turns out that not much needs to be added in order for
social learning to provide an evolutionary advantage over asocial learning. A
number of approaches have found that as long as learners strategically utilize
both social and asocial information then Rogers’ paradox can be resolved (e.g.
Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Rendell et al., 2010b; Enquist et al., 2007; Boyd and
Richerson, 1988; Aoki and Nakahashi, 2008; Nakahashi et al., 2012)
1.2 Combining asocial and social information
The primary solution for Rogers’ paradox has been to examine learners who
strategicly use both social and asocial sources of information (Henrich and
Boyd, 1998; Rendell et al., 2010a,b; Enquist et al., 2007). This approach
has good theoretic support given that many experimental findings suggest
that animals do not purely use social learning, but use a mix of social and
asocial sources of information to learn about the environment effectively (Galef,
1992; Galef Jr, 1995; Kendal et al., 2005). In this section I examine two
theoretic strategies for solving Rogers’ paradox by integrating social and
asocial information, either by using a mixed social learning strategy (i.e.
sometimes using social information or sometimes using asocial information
Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Boyd and Richerson,
1988; Wakano and Aoki, 2007), or by integrating social and asocial information
9
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together (Rendell et al., 2010b; Enquist et al., 2007; Perreault et al., 2012).
Learners with a heterogeneous learning strategy
In Rogers’ original model one of the main challenges for social learners
is allowing novel behaviours to spread throughout the population after an
environmental change. In order to receive new adaptive knowledge, the
social learners were required to parasitize asocial learners to adapt to new
environments. However there may be other ways for social learners to gain
new adaptive knowledge – potentially by having learners primarily using social
learning, but occasionally engaging in asocial learning (Boyd and Richerson,
1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998). The model provided by Henrich and Boyd
(1998) provides a good characterization of this strategy, while also introducing
“conformity biased transmission”, a feature of social learning that may also
become beneficial to learners (discussed in more depth in Chapters 3 and 5),
and spatial variation.
The model of Henrich and Boyd (1998) extends the model of Rogers
(1988) with the following changes: Asocial learning was allowed to have error,
there was a ρ of learning the incorrect behaviour. The cost of social and
asocial learning were assumed to be the same, and so the only difference in
fitness between learners of different genotypes was the likelihood of adopting
the correct behavior. Multiple sites were established that were allowed to
have different environments, and different proportions of genotypes. A small
migration term was included to allow individuals to move between sites.
The most important change was that “mixed” learning strategies were
allowed. Rather than imposing on individuals pure strategies of complete
10
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social or asocial learning, individuals have a chance, L, to use either social or
asocial information to learn a new behaviour. A learner with an L of 0, always
used asocial information (asocial learners in Rogers, 1988) and a learner with
an L of 1 always used social information (social learners in Rogers, 1988) .
An additional parameter ∆ was included that altered the degree of
conformity biased transmission individuals used, a measure of the tendency
to adopt the behaviour of a majority more often than by random copying. A
∆ of 0 was random copying, and at a ∆ of 1 individuals overwhelmingly chose
the majority behaviour.
The second primary difference is that the technique used to analyse the
evolutionary fixed point was via simulations and not an analytic analysis of
the model. To make this task amenable to simulation, Henrich and Boyd
(1998) discretized both the social learning and conformity bias parameter into
20 units, and examined competition between the resulting 400 genotypes. In
each simulation the population was initialized to mostly, 80%, asocial learners
(L = 0 and ∆ = 0), and 20% social learners whose genotypes were evenly
distributed across the mix of remaining genotypes. The population was then
allowed to reproduce, learn, migrate and be acted upon by selection. Each
simulation was run for 30,000 generations, assessed by pilot simulations to be
sufficient for the distribution of genotypes in the population to become fixed
(although this may not have been enough in all conditions, see Wakano and
Aoki, 2007).
The results of these simulations revealed that as long as the rates of
environmental change and migration were low, individuals would evolve a
11
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tendency to use social information (L >> 0 at fixation). The amount of social
information used increased for higher values of environmental stability, and
lower migration rates. Henrich and Boyd (1998) also found that in many cases
individuals would also evolve to have a degree of conformity bias. Although
they suggest that the degree of conformity bias should be positively correlated
with social learning, additional analysis by Wakano and Aoki (2007) over a
broader parameter range suggest the reverse; that propensity to socially learn
and degree of conformity bias should be negatively correlated.
Although not directly analysed, we can infer from the simulations of
Henrich and Boyd (1998) that the fitness of these learners outperformed the
fitness of the pure asocial learners. Pure asocial learners have a fixed absolute
fitness, based on the likelihood for learning the correct behaviour and the
benefit for doing so. If the population evolves (without drift) to completely
exclude asocial learners, then the absolute fitness of learners in that population
must be higher than that of asocial learners, otherwise the asocial learners
could re-invade, resulting in a heterogeneous mix of asocial and mixed social
learners (as seen in Roger’s (1988) original model). In the case of Henrich and
Boyd (1998) the entire population (up to simulation error) consisted of learners
using a mixed strategy, implying that the fitness of these learners is higher than
that of the fitness of pure asocial learners. As confirmation, although the mean
fitness was not reported in Henrich and Boyd (1998), Wakano and Aoki (2007)
analysed a similar model and found that at equilibrium the evolutionarily
stable mixed social learning strategy would have higher fitness than a pure
asocial learning strategy. Thus learners using a mixed strategy of social
12
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learning (with a conformity bias) and asocial learning provide one solution
to Roger’s original paradox.
Similar results have also been found in a number of other models using a
variety of different approaches (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1988; Wakano and
Aoki, 2007; Nakahashi et al., 2012; Kandler and Laland, 2013).
Conditional learning strategies
Although the model of Henrich and Boyd (1998) and others highlight the
importance of a dual strategy of combining social and asocial learning, the way
in which they assume learners use social and asocial information is relatively
crude. In their model they assume that for a given learning task individuals
will use either social or asocial information to solve a particular problem.
Although this can represent an individual using a single strategy over the
course of their lifetime, an individual swapping strategies for different tasks
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1988; Galef, 1996), or a copy when uncertain
strategy2, in no case are individuals able to evaluate the behaviours learned
from social and asocial learning, or integrate both social and asocial sources
of information together. At best in the “copy-when-uncertain” scenario of
Boyd and Richerson (1988), individuals use an asocial cue to determine
whether to use social information, but once the individual decides to use
social information, the asocial cue is ignored. Animals on the other hand
likely do integrate social and asocial learning together, for example by using
2Boyd and Richerson (1988) argue that the model they used (which is similar to Henrich
and Boyd, 1998) can also be seen as equivalent to receiving a signal from the environment,
and choosing to use social information if the signal is unclear, and using asocial information
otherwise. However such an interpretation may not be applicable to the specific model of
Henrich and Boyd (1998), see Wakano and Aoki (2007) for a discussion.
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social information to learn where to forage, but using asocial information to
learn how to forage in that particular spot (e.g. Roper, 1986).
There exist a number of recent models that do address how social and
asocial sources of information might be used together to learn from the
environment (Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2010b; Perreault et al., 2012).
These models also provide a solution to Rogers’ Paradox, and may give insights
into how exactly we might expect humans and other animals to integrate social
and asocial information together. In this section I focus on the conditional and
critical social learners of Enquist et al. (2007), and the Bayesian social learners
of Perreault et al. (2012). I discuss the results of Rendell et al. (2010b) which
used a similar model to Enquist et al. (2007) in more depth in Section 1.3.
Enquist et al. (2007) examined an extension of Rogers’ (1988) original
model to understand the influence that a conditional strategy could have on the
adaptive advantage of social learning. In this context, a conditional strategy
is one where learners used one form of learning (e.g. social learning) and
if they were dissatisfied with the outcome they switched to another form of
learning (e.g. asocial learning). The primary difference between their model
and that of Rogers (1988), was the addition of a “critical social learner” who
first used social information to learn a behaviour, and if they learned the
incorrect behaviour, used asocial information to learn the correct behaviour3.
Like Rogers’ (1988) original model, in the model of Enquist et al. (2007)
learners had to pay a cost for both social and asocial learning. If a critical
social learner chose to learn using both social and asocial information, the
3A “conditional social learner” who first used asocial information before using social
information, was also examined. The results were similar to the “critical social learner”.
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learner had to pay the cost for both social and asocial learning. There was
no cost associated with assessing the quality of the behaviour learned from
social learning. However unlike the Rogers’ (1988) model, asocial learning was
not always perfect, and individuals had a small chance of making an error in
learning the correct behaviour when using asocial learning, and an error in
copying when using social learning.
Enquist et al. (2007) provided an analysis of their model use analytic
techniques. They found that as long as asocial learning was beneficial (the
cost of asocial learning was lower than the expected additional payoff off
received for using social learning) a critical social learner outperformed a pure
social learner. This result stems from the fact that if a pure social learner
would adopt the correct behaviour through social learning, a critical social
learner would as well, and pay the same cost for doing so. However if the
pure social learner adopted the incorrect behaviour through social learning, a
corresponding critical social learner would have the opportunity to use asocial
learning to learn the correct behaviour and thus reap higher rewards. Thus in
the context of Enquist et al. (2007) we should not expect pure social learning
to be as an evolutionarily adaptive strategy.
The question then is in what conditions should we expect critical social
learning to out-compete asocial learning, and are there any cases where a
population of mixed learners is a stable fixed point of equilibrium? Enquist
et al. (2007) found that as long as the environment did not change rapidly
critical social learners would out compete pure asocial learners. Similar results
were found for conditional social learners, although critical social learners
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out-competed conditional social learners in increasingly stable environments.
The results of Enquist et al. (2007) provide an additional solution to Roger’s
paradox by allowing social learners to evaluate the behaviours they receive and
if they are unsatisfied with those behaviours use asocial learning to adopt a
potentially better behaviour. Critical social learners provide an example of a
learning strategy where both asocial and social information can be used, and
where the integration of these two sources of information leads to a higher
adaptive advantage for learners. The strategy used in the context of “critical
social learners” deviate from either the model of Henrich and Boyd (1998), or
that of Boyd and Richerson (1988). In the model of Henrich and Boyd (1998)
a learner with a mixed learning strategy will either use social information or
asocial information to solve a particular task, although they may mix using
social and asocial learning to solve different tasks over the course of their
lifetime. In contrast in the model of Enquist et al. (2007) individuals have
the opportunity to both use social information and asocial information to
solve the same task. Another interpretation of the mixed learning strategy of
Henrich and Boyd (1998), is that individuals actually receive an asocial cue
and use that cue to evaluate whether to use social or asocial information –
using social information if they are unsure about the environment, and asocial
information if the cue presents clear evidence to their particular environmental
state (analyzed in more detail in Boyd and Richerson, 1988). Although asocial
information is used to determine whether to perform asocial learning, or social
learning, each learner in Henrich and Boyd (1998) or Boyd and Richerson
(1988) learns at most a single behaviour in a single learning task, where in
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Enquist et al. (2007) learners may actually learn multiple behaviours, one
from asocial learning and one from social learning.
However in some ways, the critical and conditional social learners of Enquist
et al. (2007) are lacking in that they do not use both social and asocial sources
of information together, but use them one after each other. Perreault et al.
(2012) provides a model where individuals always use both social and asocial
information to solve a task and integrate the two sources of information using
a pseudo-Bayesian learning rule. These “Bayesian social learners” provide
an opportunity to examine if a combined learning strategy also provides a
solution to Rogers’ paradox. In Perreault et al.’s (2012) model, they extend
the framework used by Boyd and Richerson (1988), and examine a learner who
inhabits one of two environmental states, and can adopt one of two behaviour.
To make a decision, the learner receives (i) a signal from the environment,
generated from a normal distribution with mean µ if the environment is in
state 1 or −µ if the environment is in state 2, and (ii) the behavioural decisions
of n other learners in the population. The learners then integrate the social
and asocial sources of information, and adopt behaviour 1 if
y − 1
2
n > −gx (1.1)
where y is the number of social learners who use behavior 1, x is the value of
the environmental cue, n is the total number of learners learned from and g is
a genetic determined parameter that guides the relative influence of social and
asocial information. If g is high learners rely primarily on asocial information
(becoming pure asocial learners as g tends towards infinity), and if g is low
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learners rely primarily on social information (becoming pure social learners
as g tends towards 0). The fact that both the social and the asocial cues are
present in Equation 1.1 allows learners to rely more heavily on social or asocial
information if each cue is particularly informative e.g. if the asocial cue is very
large, or if all of the social demonstrators used the same behaviour.
Like Henrich and Boyd (1998), Perreault et al. (2012) used a simulation
based approach to analyse the expected evolutionary value of g and the fitness
of those learners. They found that in all cases examined g was generally low,
suggesting that learners used both social and asocial information. Moreover,
they found that, compared to pure asocial learners, social learners in general
had a higher average fitness, particularly when the rate of environmental
change was low. Bayesian social learners then provide a another solution to
Rogers’ Paradox, and highlight the importance that learners combine social
and asocial information to the adaptive evolutionary advantage of social
learning. The model of Perreault et al. (2012) provides an opportunity to
explore the integration of social and asocial sources of information in more
detail, yet it may not go far enough.
Models of individual decision making
In the model of Perreault et al. (2012), individuals are assumed to only make
a single learning decision over the course of their lives. Although an argument
can be made that this could represent repeated decision making over the course
of the learner’s life (as in Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 1988),
the model does assume that the number of individuals the learner learns from
is fixed, and that they always learn from an environmental cue with the same
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distribution. Both of these assumptions may be challenged when looking
at human or animal learning; learners may have access to a small number
of demonstrators in some cases, and to a large number in others. These
assumptions are likely done for mathematical convenience, but highlight the
limits that a population level study of social learning can have in explaining
individual level use of social information.
Thus what is needed is a better understanding of human and animal
social learning at an individual level, not through population level models
but through individual level learning models and experiment. Given the
importance of the integration of social and asocial sources of information
highlighted by the theoretic models listed above, along with others (e.g.
Kandler and Laland, 2009, 2013; Feldman et al., 1996; Rendell et al., 2010a,
2011), I suggest that understanding the integration of asocial and social
information in humans and animals is a critical area of research.
I begin this analysis in Chapter 2 by examining the net benefits social
information can provide learners who use a reinforcement learning algorithm
to learn about the world (temporal difference learning). I then examine
conformity biased learning in humans in Chapter 3, both in the sense of Henrich
and Boyd (1998), and in the psychological sense of Asch (1951). The goal in
both of these studies is to provide a better theoretic and empirical analysis
of how humans and animals learn from each other in specific situations and
to understand how social learning can be integrated into two already existing
models of asocial learning, temporal difference learning (Sutton and Barto,
1990, 1998) in Chapter 2, and Bayesian learning (Buchsbaum et al., 2011;
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Shafto et al., 2012) in Chapter 3.
1.3 Spatial structure
There does exist another solution to Rogers’ Paradox which arises when there
is spatial heterogeneity between multiple environmental sites. Social structure
has been explored as a secondary factor in some of the studies referenced
in the previous section (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 1985,
1988; Rendell et al., 2010b), and has been found to have a weak effect on
the evolution of social learning. For example, in Henrich and Boyd (1998),
they introduced a multi-island model where individuals inhabited a series of
islands, each with a separate optimal behaviour, and found that the migration
rate acted in a similar manner to an environmental change rate in reducing the
prevalence of social learning when the migration rate was high, and increasing
the prevalence of social learning when the migration rate was low. However
due to the many other deviations of Henrich and Boyd (1998) from Rogers’
(1988) original model, here I focus instead on the model of Aoki and Nakahashi
(2008) which provides a good characterization of the effect of spatial structure
on the evolution of social learning, while deviating less from Rogers (1988).
The model of Aoki and Nakahashi (2008) is a simple extension of
Rogers (1988) original model. In the model, learners inhabited one of n
environmentally heterogeneous sites. At each site wi there was a preferred
behaviour, bi. Learners had a small chance, m, to migrate between sites.
Migration either happened (i) randomly between each site, an island model, (ii)
around neighbouring sites in a circle, a circular-stepping stone model, or (iii)
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between neighbouring sites arranged in a line, a linear stepping-stone model.
Aoki and Nakahashi (2008) modified the rate of migration, and the cost of
social learning to examine whether learners would evolve to use either a pure
asocial learning strategy or a pure social learning strategy. Combined strategies
(as in Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2010b; Perreault et al., 2012; Henrich
and Boyd, 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 1988), were not considered.
Unlike Rogers (1988), Aoki and Nakahashi (2008) did not include
environmental change into their model. Prior work (Boyd and Richerson,
1985, 1988, 1995) had suggested that a high rate of migration between
environmentally heterogeneous sites would be equivalent to a high rate of
environmental change, a finding in part seen in Henrich and Boyd (1998).
Aoki and Nakahashi (2008) found that a homogeneous population of social
learners would evolve if the migration rate was low, or the cost of asocial
learning was high. There was a small parameter range where a heterogeneous
population of social and asocial learners would evolve, and if the migration rate
was high, and the cost of asocial learning was low, a homogeneous population
of asocial learners would evolve. This result then provides a solution to Rogers’
paradox – a population of pure social learners can evolve, and out compete a
population of asocial learners, if learners are subject to only migration between
different populations.
The primary difference then between the models of Aoki and Nakahashi
(2008) and Rogers (1988) is the lack of environmental change in the model of
Aoki and Nakahashi (2008), meaning that learners never need to learn new
behaviours. The one downside of using social information is potentially a high
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rate of learning learning incorrect information about the current environment.
If everyone in the population currently has correct information about the
environment, social learning will be the most effective way to learn about the
environment. Incorrect information only gets added after a migration event,
when migrating individuals might bring a behaviour that is adaptive in one
environment to a new location where it may no longer be adaptive. Thus, in
this context the cost of using social information is that individuals might learn
from migrant individuals and adopt a locally incorrect behaviour. This means
that social learning is adaptive if the migration rate is low, but will be less
effective when the migration rate is high (Boyd and Richerson, 1985).
Aoki and Nakahashi (2008) also examined the influence of population
structure on social learning, using two additional island models. They found
that if the environments were arranged in a circle, this would increase the
range of values for which social learning could be beneficial compared to the
island model. Similar results were found for environments arranged in a line.
The increase in the social learning rate has to do with the spatial structure
decreasing, somewhat, the impact of migration. During a migration event
learners from one environment, environment i, only move to two neighbouring
environments. i + 1 and i− 1, but use behaviour i. After a second migration
event, some of those learners (or social learners who learned from those
learners) will come back to environment i with behaviour i. In the original
island model, the likelihood of this back migration is low (on the order of 1
n2
for
n islands), whereas for the circular stepping stone model the likelihood of back
migration is fixed at 1
4
, the likelihood of migrating to one of two neighbours, and
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then migrating back again. This decreases the negative impact of migration
rates on social learning, thereby enhances the adaptive value of social learning,
and allowing pure social learning to evolve in a wider variety of settings.
The spatial differences seen in Aoki and Nakahashi (2008) suggest that
population structure may play a role in determining the value and adaptive
advantage of social learning. However the island model formulation of
population structure induces a rather coarse-grained understanding of the
influence of population structure, which may only be reasonable when
examining social learning across multiple groups of individuals, but may miss
out on some of the more fine-grained population structure within a group
of individuals. Analysis of the spread of social learning with fine-grained
population structure has been carried out by Rendell et al. (2010b).
The model used in Rendell et al. (2010b) is an extension of Enquist
et al. (2007) discussed in Section 1.2. In the model they analysed the
evolution of pure asocial and social learning along with critical and conditional
social learning. Learners were placed on the nodes of a two dimensional
lattice, and could learn from their eight surrounding neighbours. Each
learner was presented with one of two environments, and had to learn one
of two behaviours. The environmental states of neighbours were either left
uncorrelated, or had a weak or strong correlation with their neighbours.
Otherwise the details of the simulations were similar to Enquist et al. (2007).
In the analysis of pure asocial and social learning strategies in Rendell
et al. (2010b), the authors noted that spatial structure could increase the
proportion of social learners spreading through the population by creating
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“bubbles” of social learners. In each spatially contiguous “bubble”, social
learners performed, on average less well than an asocial learner. However
the bubbles were stable – at the edge of each bubble where social learners
interacted with asocial learners, these social learners performed better than
opposing asocial learners, and asocial learning could not invade the bubble – if
an asocial learner was placed in the middle of a bubble, it would introduce new
information and allow each of its social learning neighbours to out compete it.
The creation of these bubbles had the effect of increasing the number of social
learners in the population compared to a freely mixing population, suggesting
that fine-grained spatial structure may play an important role in increasing
the value of social learning.
For the two mixed strategies, conditional and critical social learning,
Rendell et al. (2010b) found that, similar to Enquist et al. (2007), critical
social learning (learners used social learning and asocial learning second) was
the dominat strategy across a range of parameter values. However unlike
Enquist et al. (2007) who found only a limited range of parameter values where
conditional social learning was favoured, Rendell et al. (2010b) found that
when spatial structure was included, conditional social learning was favoured
over critical social learning for a much broader range of parameter values.
The importance of fine-grained spatial structure found in Rendell et al.
(2010b) extends the results of Enquist et al. (2007) and others that spatial
structure both across populations and within a population may play an
important role for understanding the development of social learning.
However, although Rendell et al. (2010b) has examined fine-grained spatial
24
Chapter 1. Introduction
structure in the context of a two dimensional lattice, a number of recent
studies have found that human (and animal) populations are not organized
as a lattice, but may have additional population structure (Newman and
Park, 2003; Travers and Milgram, 1969; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Zachary,
1977; Newman, 2006; Lusseau et al., 2003). Dynamic process on lattices have
been found to differ from more realistic population structures, such as small
world networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), or scale free networks (Barabasi
and Albert, 1999) in a number of domains, e.g. the evolution of cooperation
(Fu et al., 2008), genetic selection and drift (Lieberman et al., 2005) and the
development of language (Dall’Asta et al., 2006). No such analysis has been
carried out for the influence of complex, realistic population structure on the
dynamics of a population of social learners. I carry out such an analysis in
Chapter 5.
Spatial structure may also play a role in understanding and inferring
whether social learning underlies the spread of behaviours in an animal
population. A recent technique known as “Network Based Diffusion Analysis”
(NBDA; Franz and Nunn, 2009; Hoppitt et al., 2010) uses the social structure
of a population to analyse whether behaviours spread randomly over across a
predefined social network. If behaviours spread according to a social network
it provides strong evidence that the behaviour spread socially. In Chapter
4, I review the literature on inferring the presence of social transmission
from animal behavioural data. I present and evaluate an extended, Bayesian
version of NBDA, and apply it to better understand a behavioural experiment
with budgerigars. The goal of this work is to create a more accurate tool to
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understand when and how animals use social information.
1.4 Summary
In this thesis I present a broad body of work designed to make a contribution
to our understanding of cultural evolution.
In the next two chapters, I analyse how social learning and individual
learning might be integrated together, both in the context of animals and in
humans.
In Chapter 2 I examine the problem of action sequence learning in animals
– a particularly hard set of behaviours to learn given the massive number of
possible action sequences. In that chapter, I examine how social learning
can be included in temporal difference learning to examine how a simple
reinforcement learner could learn to perform an action sequence, modelled
as a Markov decision process.
In Chapter 3 I turn to analyse human learning, particularly human
conformity biased learning. I use a Bayesian learning model to explore how
a rational learner might learn from multiple demonstrators, and find that
a rational learner should be sensitive to the number of demonstrators, the
demonstrator’s past history of accuracy, and the learner’s own accuracy. I then
tested these predictions with a series of six experiments with adult humans.
In Chapter 4 I develop and present a new statistical method (based on
NBDA) for detecting social transmission in animal diffusion experiments, and
apply that method to understanding whether the observed spread of a novel
behavior in a captive budgerigar population was due to social transmission or
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pure asocial learning.
In Chapter 5 I use a simulation study (based on the voter model) to examine
how fine-grained population structure, represented as a social network can
change how novel behaviours spread through populations, to better understand
the role that network structure plays on changing the efficacy and benefit of
social learning.
Finally, in Chapter 6 I discuss my findings in the context of the previous
literature on animal and human social learning and suggest directions for future
work.
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The facilitation of action sequence learning
through social transmission
Abstract
Previous empirical work on animal social learning has found that many species
lack the ability to learn entire action sequences through social information
alone. Conversely, acquiring action sequences through asocial learning can be
difficult due to the large number of potential sequences arising from even a
small number of base actions. In spite of this, several studies report that
some primates use action sequences in the wild. I investigate how social
information can be integrated with asocial learning to facilitate the learning
of action sequences. I formalize this problem by examining how learners
using temporal difference learning, a widely applicable model of reinforcement
learning, can combine social cues with their own experiences to acquire an
action sequence. The learning problem is modelled as a Markov decision
process. The learning of nettle processing by mountain gorillas serves as a focal
example. Through simulations, I find that the social facilitation of component
actions can combine with individual learning to facilitate the acquisition of
action sequences. This analysis illustrates how even simple forms of social
learning generate substantially faster learning of action sequences compared
to asocial processes alone, and that the benefits of social information increase
with the length of the action sequence and the number of base actions.
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2.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, social learning can help facilitate animal and human
learning, saving the learner the time associated with asocial learning, and may
help individuals acquire otherwise difficult to learn behaviours. However, it
is not well understood how social and asocial sources of information can be
combined, a factor of interest in theoretic (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Henrich
and Boyd, 1998; Enquist et al., 2007) and experimental (Galef Jr, 1995; Roper,
1986) explorations of social learning. In this chapter, I examine how individuals
might combine social and asocial sources of information in more detail. I
demonstrate how social learning can be integrated into a reinforcement learning
paradigm, and the types of benefits such integration may provide learners.
To focus this problem, I examine how animals might learn action sequences,
behaviours composed of a sequence of base actions, many or all of which
may be already contained in the learner’s repertoire. Action sequences are
a particularly challenging learning problem for asocial learning since the
number of possible action sequences grows exponentially with the length
of the sequence, so that even for a small repertoire of known base actions
and relatively short sequences, the space of all possible action sequences is
vast. Despite this, many animals in the wild are able to acquire novel action
sequences, which can improve their exploitation of the environment.
Action sequences are commonly found in the resource collection behaviours
of a number of animals. One of the more prominent accounts of learning action
sequences is the nettle preparation technique of mountain gorillas, which allows
these animals to exploit a food with a number of physical and chemical defences
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(Byrne and Byrne, 1993). Being able to process nettles (and other foods)
contributes to enabling these gorillas to thrive in a harsher environment than
their lowland kin while still maintaining a comparatively resource rich diet
(Byrne, 1999). Partly because nearly every gorilla in the study population
uses the same food processing technique, and partly because of the complexity
of the action sequences deployed Byrne and Russon (1998) suggest that this
behaviour is learned socially. Due to the species’ endangered classification it is
hard to test this hypothesis in the wild (although see Reader and Biro, 2010;
Kendal et al., 2010), although some studies have examined the acquisition of
nettle processing in captive gorillas (e.g. Tennie et al., 2008).
Action sequences, particularly involving the use of tools, have been found
in other species more amenable to controlled study. Both chimpanzees (Boesch
and Boesch, 1983) and capuchin monkeys (Ottoni and Izar, 2008) use stone
hammers to crack nuts. Chimpanzees also use stems of grass and vines to fish
for termites (Goodall, 1964), and may modify these stems for more efficient
food gathering (Sanz et al., 2009). Given the difficulty of learning these action
sequences asocially, and inter-group variation of these techniques that is not
readily explained by ecological differences, researchers have posited that these
behaviours are, at least in part, acquired through social transmission (Byrne
and Russon, 1998; Whiten et al., 1999; Byrne, 2003; Biro et al., 2003).
However, a number of experimental studies suggest that the role that social
transmission plays in behaviour acquisition is limited in some of these species
(Hoppitt and Laland, 2013). In particular, while it appears that many primates
are able to acquire individual elements of a sequence through observational
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learning, there is very little evidence that these animals are able to acquire the
entire sequence through observational learning alone. Whiten (1998) found
some evidence that chimpanzees could learn how to open an artificial fruit
using a sequence of actions through observational learning, although even here
it is not clear how much of the sequence was learned through observation.
For other primates the evidence suggests that action sequences are rarely, if
ever, acquired all at once (Hoppitt and Laland, 2013). Nonetheless, elements
of an action sequence (individual actions) have been found to be transmitted
in both captive (Stoinski and Whiten, 2003) and wild (Custance et al., 2001;
Call and Tomasello, 1995) orangutans, and capuchin monkeys (Custance et al.,
1999), suggesting that the learning of action sequences by primates is typically
achieved piecemeal over a period of time, through a combination of social and
individual information. This begs the question: “How does limited social
learning, coupled with individual learning, enable the transmission of action
sequences?”
To address this I extend a well-established machine learning and
decision-making framework, temporal difference learning in Markov decision
processes, to analyse how learners might tackle the problem of learning
sequences of actions.
2.2 Markov decision processes
For many action sequences the order in which the actions are performed is
important; often early actions in a sequence change the environment so that
previously ineffective actions become effective. Understanding how individuals
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learn action sequences then requires a model of the environment that changes
with a learner’s actions. A Markov decision process (MDP) is a mathematical
formalism used to represent how individuals interact with the world. In an
MDP, learners navigate a series of states, representing possible configurations
of the world. The learner then moves between states by performing actions.
These actions change the state of the world, and can reward the learner with
a payoff. This is a general setting that can capture a wide range of decision
problems, including the learning of action sequences.
To give a concrete example of an MDP, consider the problem of picking an
apple from a tree. In the initial state of the problem, the learner is at the base
of the tree with the apple out of reach above her. The learner considers three
actions: climb the tree, pull the branch down, and try to grab the apple. The
first two actions change the learner’s state: climbing up the tree changes the
learner’s location, and pulling the branch down changes the apple’s location.
In the absence of the first two, the third action, trying to grab the apple,
does not change the learner’s state, but rather returns her to the initial state,
having now wasted some time and energy trying to grab an out of reach apple.
However after climbing the tree or pulling the branch down, the third action,
grabbing the apple, now results in a reward, the apple.
The MDP framework makes explicit the nature of the problem that the
learner faces, the possible steps the learner can go through to achieve (or fail
to achieve) a goal, and the primary reinforcement or reward that a learner
receives at each step of the process. Formally, a given MDP is defined by a set
of states, S. For each state, s ∈ S, a learner has a set of possible actions, As.
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For each action, a ∈ As, a transition function Ta specifies (probabilistically)
which state the learner will find herself in next. Similarly a reward function, R,
specifies the reward (positive or negative) the learner receives for each action.
Agents in an MDP perform sequences of actions to try and maximize their
rewards. The traditional problem is to compute the optimal decision rule for
an agent, given complete knowledge of the structure and rewards of the MDP.
This problem becomes far more complicated, and applicable to learned
behaviours, when learners are initially ignorant of the structure of the MDP.
Learners are then tasked with an exploration-exploitation trade off; the more
time a learner invests in discovering the structure of an MDP, the less time she
will have to exploit that MDP for reward. Conversely, if a learner prematurely
begins to focus on exploitation of her environment without first exploring it,
she runs the risk of not discovering the most efficient means of exploitation, and
losing out on substantial reward. A number of multipurpose algorithms have
been developed for asocial learning in MDPs (see Sutton and Barto, 1998).
While many of these algorithms might require complex cognitive machinery,
Temporal Difference learning has emerged as a simple yet powerful model of
reinforcement learning that provides an effective means to explore and exploit
MDPs.
2.3 Temporal difference learning
Temporal difference (TD) learning provides a model of how animals build up
associations between actions and rewards. This problem becomes difficult
when actions and subsequent rewards are separated in time and space,
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and when the relationship between reward and action is contingent upon
intermediate actions. This frequently occurs when an action provides no
immediate reward, but serves only to create opportunities to engage in other
actions.
In the case of the apple tree example presented above, the difficulty in
learning stems from the fact that pulling the branch down is not immediately
rewarding, but changes the world so that reaching for the apple is now
rewarding. In order to learn this sequence learners must be able to create
an association between pulling the branch down and the future reward this
enables. In a TD learning framework, learners do this by creating an
intermediate association between the state with the branch pulled down and
a reward, allowing this state to act as a secondary reinforcer.
TD learning has received broad empirical support both at a behavioural
level and at a neurological level (Seymour et al., 2004; Sutton and Barto,
1990; Glimcher, 2011; Dayan and Niv, 2008). Additionally, despite being more
than twenty years old, TD learning is still an integral part of state of the
art artificial intelligence research (Mnih et al., 2015). TD learning builds
on associative learning models like Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla et al., 1972)
and Bush-Mosteller (Bush and Mosteller, 1951) learning, by considering a
much finer temporal resolution; unlike previous models, TD learning considers
behaviours on an action by action level, instead of a trial level. This allows
TD learning to model the acquisition of secondary reinforcer explicitly, which
is critical for understanding how learners acquire a sequence of actions.
TD learning provides a theoretical grounding for the experimental
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observation that arbitrary actions sequences are typically only acquired by
animals with the use of a training technique known as chaining, where
sequences are built up action by action using either starting with the
final component action and working backwards (backward chaining), or
starting with the initial action and working forwards (forward chaining).
Associative chaining was observed as early as Thorndike’s 1898 PhD thesis
(Thorndike, 1898), and has been most recently investigated within the
experimental paradigms of “simultaneous chains” and “concurrent chains”.
The “simultaneous chains” paradigm was developed to investigate the
formation of action sequences when only previous actions, and their resulting
transformations of the learner’s perspective, provided cues for subsequent
actions. Although this paradigm was developed to test the limits of associative
chaining theory (see Terrace, 2005), the results of these experiments are
consistent with TD learning. The “concurrent chains” paradigm was developed
to investigate the relative strength of secondary reinforcers, often taking into
account their temporal context (e.g. Berg and Grace, 2006). This paradigm
has been used to test the predictions of delay reduction theory (Fantino et al.,
1993) and other theories that, like TD learning, seek to model the effect of
temporal structure on instrumental learning (Grace, 1994). However, delay
reduction theory and related theories are trial level models of learning, and
unlike TD learning, do not make within trial, action level, predictions of
sequence acquisition.
Like Rescorla-Wagner learning, TD learning interprets association
strengths as predictions of future reward. Associations change on the basis of
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the mismatch between the predicted future reward and the rewards received.
In the context of Markov decision processes, learners are faced with a series of
states, s, and actions, a, within those states. In TD learning, learners predict
the expected value of actions, W (a), and the expected values of states, V (s).
To capture the effect of secondary reinforcers, TD learning treats the expected
value of an action, W (a), as the sum of the immediate reward produced by
the action, r, and the expected value of the state the action brings the learner
to V (s). Moreover, the learner is able to refine these value predictions based
on the difference between prior expectations and actual experience.
Specifically, if a learner was in state si, took action ai, transitioned to state
si+1 and received a reward r = R(ai, si, si+1) I assume that learners update
their state prediction, V (si) and their action prediction W (ai) according to
the following rule,
Vnew(si) = Vold(si) + α(r + γV (si+1)− Vold(si)) (2.1)
Wnew(ai) = Wold(ai) + β(r + γV (si+1)−Wold(ai)). (2.2)
The change in predicted values are based the difference between the old
predicted value and the new estimated of value based on recent experience.
This new estimate of value has two components, r which is the immediate
reward, i.e. the primary reinforcement, and γV (si+1) which is the predicted
future reward of being in state si+1, i.e. the learned secondary reinforcement.
The parameter γ determines how important the immediacy of reward is to
the learner. If γ is close to zero, future rewards are relatively unimportant
compared to immediate rewards, whereas if γ is close to one, future rewards
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are almost as important as immediate rewards. α and β summarize how much
the learner changes her predictions on the basis new experiences. If α and β
are close to zero then the learner only slightly changes her predictions, whereas
if α and β are close to one, the learner completely changes her predictions to
match recent experiences.
Despite its apparent simplicity this update rule allows chains of associations
to be built up over repeated trials. These associations are formed by using the
value of states as secondary reinforcers, allowing actions that do not provide
an immediate reward to become associated with reward.
We can see this process at work in our apple example. One solution is to
pull the branch down and then reach for the apple. If the learner is initially
ignorant of the value of each state, being in a state with the branch pulled down
is not associated with reward. This means that the first time the learner pulls
the branch down, this action will not be associated with reward. After the
learner grabs the apple, both the value of that action and the value of having
the branch pulled down are updated and become associated with reward.
This means that the next time the learner pulls the branch down, they
are placed in a state which they now know to be rewarding, and so only then
associate pulling the branch down with reward.
As can be seen from this example, value associations can only propagate
back through a sequence of actions one step at time. This means that at
minimum, the number of successful trials needed to propagate the value of
ultimate rewards of a sequence to initial choices is equal to the length of that
sequence. This is a consequence of only updating value predictions about the
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immediately preceding action and state after experiencing a reward and state
transition. However, it is also possible to update the value of an additional
preceding state and action. This is captured in TD learning by updating not
only the estimated values of si and ai, as in Equations 3 and 4, but also the
estimated values of si−1, and ai−1:
Vnew(si−1) = Vold(si−1) + αγ(Vnew(si)− Vold(si)) (2.3)
Wnew(si−1) = Wold(si−1) + βγ(Vnew(si−1)− Vold(si−1)). (2.4)
It is straightforward to update value estimates for an arbitrary number of
previous states and actions in this manner. The number of preceding states and
actions updated determines how fast new experiences influence far preceding
actions. Those states and actions which are eligible for updating based on the
rewards at a given time and in a given state are referred to as the “Eligibility
Trace” within TD learning, and is interpreted as a short term memory of what
the learner has done. These eligibility traces have received neurological and
behavioural support in operant learning contexts (Pan et al., 2005).
TD learning produces predictions of the value of states and actions based
on experiences, but does not prescribe which actions a learner should perform.
A simple method to select an action, known as a greedy rule, is to choose
the action with the highest predicted value. However, if learners implement
a greedy rule they may not explore the MDP sufficiently, and may miss a
high-payoff solution. Thus a good decision rule needs to incorporate some
degree of exploration, balanced against the risk of wasting time searching for
a better solutions, when a good solution has already been found. A softmax
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decision rule can be used to balance exploration and exploitation. This rule
has proven effective in engineering contexts (Sutton and Barto, 1998) and
in predicting the choices of humans and animals (Racey et al., 2011). In a
softmax decision rule the probability of choosing an action, a, is proportional
to exp(W (a)/τ), where τ parametrizes how exploratory the learner is. The
softmax decision rule becomes the greedy rule as τ goes to 0, and becomes
random action selection as τ goes to positive infinity. To enhance early
exploration, when a learner has never performed an action before, for the
purposes of choosing an action, the learner uses the mean estimated value of
performed actions as a proxy for the value of the unperformed action (Sutton
and Barto, 1998).
TD learning, paired with a softmax decision rule fully specifies how a
learner navigates and MDP. These rules depend upon four parameters, α,
β, γ, and τ . The ideal parametrization for a learner, depends on the specific
MDP the learner faces.
2.4 Social information in temporal difference learning
Previous work on MDPs has focused on asocial learning, with the exception of
multi-agent engineering contexts where agents share information in biologically
unfeasable ways (e.g. Tan, 1993). However, many animals are known to also
use some form of social information to make decisions (Laland and Galef,
2009; Zentall and Galef Jr, 1988; Heyes and Galef Jr, 1996; Hoppitt and
Laland, 2013). There are many ways of incorporating social information into
a reinforcement learning paradigm (see for example Heyes, 1994). One of the
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basic findings of social learning research, is that seeing an action demonstrated
will make it more likely for an animal to perform that action. Fierce debate
has been waged about the underlying mechanism responsible for this empirical
observation (Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013). To model such learning,
however, we can ignore this debate, and simply posit that learners are more
likely to perform demonstrated actions. Specifically, social information is
integrated into TD learning, by assuming that when a learner would assign
equal probability to engaging in the actions available in a given state, (e.g.
when a learner arrives at a state for the first time), instead of choosing between
the actions randomly, they instead choose an action proportional to the number
of demonstrators who they have seen perform that action in that state.
This is a simplified implementation of social information use, but it provides
a reasonable starting point for incorporating the behavioural level effects
of social information into TD learning. This use of social information is
consistent with a broad variety of social learning mechanisms, ranging from
local enhancement to motor imitation. In practice, our model of social
information use likely underestimates the impact of social learning (animals,
unlike these learners, use social information even when knowledgeable about
the environment), but it nonetheless suffices to illustrate the value of social
information when learning action sequences.
In this model of learning and social information use I assume that learners
already know how to perform all of the component actions, and that they
are able to discriminate between all states and all actions. I also assume
that learners treat all actions independently, precluding generalization between
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similar actions in different states. As presented in this model, the associations
developed for one action have no impact on the associations developed for
any other action. This assumption is likely unrealistic, but is sufficient to
investigate the impact of social information on sequence learning. How learners
parse their environment and their actions into functional units is itself an
area of intense study, known as the ‘parsing problem’ (Byrne, 2003; Heyes,
2009; Brass and Heyes, 2005). The experimental work of Reid et al. (2001)
demonstrated how the presence of a non-instrumental cue in the environment
can shape the functional units of behaviour, with profound consequences on
the effects of reinforcement. Thus, more realistic models of animal learning
will need to combine the problem of learning to perceive the environment
with learning which actions to choose. Indeed, a current frontier in artificial
intelligence research concerns extending the TD learning paradigm to rich,
high dimensional perceptual spaces (e.g. Mnih et al., 2015).
To demonstrate the applicability of this modelling framework to learning
problems that animals might face, despite the above limitations, I next turn
to the specific problem of nettle processing in gorillas and construct an MDP
to represent it.
2.5 Nettle processing
Byrne and Russon (1998) provide an account of how gorillas process nettles
to make them more palatable to eat and digest. Nettles are covered in a
layer of small spines, which make nettles painful to eat especially when these
spines brush against the gorilla’s sensitive lips. In order to eat nettles with
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Figure 2.1: A graphical representation of gorilla nettle preparation. Arrows between nodes
represent possible actions and the transitions between states. Dotted lines represent eating
actions.
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a minimum of suffering, the gorillas employ a sequence of actions that allow
them to avoid the majority of the spines, and encase the rest of the spines in
relatively spine-free leaves.
Much of the interest in gorilla nettle processing is due to the hierarchical
nature of the action sequence. It is possible to model hierarchical process
as an MDPs, but these models are substantially more complicated than
non hierarchical processes. To understand how social information can be
used to aid in the acquisition of action sequences, I consider a simplified,
non-hierarchical model of nettle processing.
I simplify this process into a series of four procedural steps, in which
the gorilla: (1) gathers leaves from a plant and removes the petioles; (2)
removes debris from the bundle of leaves; (3) uses a handful of leaves to wrap
the rest of the bundle in; (4) eats the bundle of leaves, leaving their hands
free to collect a new bundle of leaves. This setup assumes that each of the
actions (1-4) are already contained in the learner’s repertoire, and does not
model how the actions in each step are initially learned. Learning (1) may be
particularly challenging, as this action is composed of two lower-level actions,
stripping leaves from the stem, and tearing off the petioles of the stripped
leaves. Additionally both lower-level actions may need to be repeated before
the gorilla has enough partially prepared leaves in her hand.
The sequential dependencies of the actions in this sequence motivates our
choice to use it as a focal example. Once the gorilla has wrapped the leaves
into a bundle, she cannot remove debris. Likewise, once the gorilla has eaten
the bundle no further modification to the leaves can be made.
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The resulting states, and the actions linking the states together, are given
in Figure 2.1. I include in this diagram an ‘alternative action’ which represents
the option of non-nettle foraging. This problem has three potential “branches”
of actions. First the gorilla could eat the bundle of leaves raw. Second, the
gorilla could fold the leaves over, and then eat them. Or third, the gorilla could
pick out debris from the leaves and either then eat them, or fold the leaves
over, and then eat them. After each eating action, the gorilla enters into the
same state (shown in grey), where she is then able to gather and process more
leaves. However, once the leaves are folded, I assume that the gorillas do
not unfold them and then remove debris, which consequently means that the
order in which these action happens influences the types of reinforcement the
individuals receive.
I assume that the state where the leaves are folded and the debris have
been removed is experienced as distinct from the state where the leaves are
folded and the debris have not been removed. The discriminability of these
states can arise either from actual immediate perceptual differences, or from
the short term memory of the gorilla. To aid understanding of why gorillas
might process nettles I include the option of abstaining from processing nettles
and foraging elsewhere.
Learning to process nettles, like other food processing behaviours, is
difficult because feedback is only provided at the final step when the gorilla
actually eats the bundle of leaves. The gorilla must choose which actions
to perform based solely on past knowledge of the outcomes of these actions.
Moreover performing some actions may preclude the gorilla from performing
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others. This means that short action sequences, like failing to remove the
debris or fold the leaves may be easier to learn, but less rewarding. I use a
series of simulations to explore how social and asocial learners might solve this
problem.
2.5.1 Simulations on the nettle task
I examined how each learner explored and exploited the nettle MDP over a
series of 50 trials. Each trial was a sequence of actions that returned the learner
to the initial state shown in grey in Figure 2.1. I examined the payoff of each
learner, and the number of times each learner performed the canonical action
sequence, i.e. steps 1-4 above. Because the actions each learner performs are
stochastic, I measure these values for 100,000 learners.
In the case of social learners, the performance of each learner depends
on from whom they learn. To create a pool of experienced demonstrators, I
artificially constructed a population of 50 learners who explored the MDP
simultaneously. At each time step a single learner was selected from the
population at random and performed an action. When a learner completed 50
trials they were removed from the population and were replaced by a novice
learner. The goal was not to model a realistic demographic process, but to
provide an environment with experienced social learners. The performance of
each social learner increased in the first few generations of learners before
stabilizing at an equilibrium value. Pilot simulations showed that after a
turnover of 5,000 learners performance was no longer increasing. Because of
this, the simulations were run for an initial 10,000 learners before measuring
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average payoff and canonical sequences performed.
The performance of learners in an MDP depends crucially on the structure
and rewards of the MDP and the parameters of the learning algorithm.
Learners explored the MDP characterization of the nettle task given in
Figure 2.1. Any path that does not involve eating had a payoff of 0, the
canonical action sequence had a payoff of 10, and the remaining two eating
actions had a payoff of 1. The value of the alternative action was varied from
2 to 10. The results are similar to those presented here for a broad number of
payoff values.
For simplicity, I assume that learners have no knowledge of the task and
so set V and W to 0, and because the MDP is deterministic, I set β = 1. The
learner’s eligibility trace was truncated to n = 2, although this parameter is
later varied. To provide a fair comparison between the performance of social
and asocial learners, I use the values of α, γ, and τ that maximize an asocial
learner’s average payoff on a given MDP. Because the value of the alternative
action changes the optimal learning parameters, the learning parameters were
optimized separately for each set of payoffs in the nettle processing task.
Using the optimal values allows us to examine the benefit that social
information provides. If I find that social learners perform better than asocial
learners who are not optimized to a task, it cannot be determined if this
difference is due to the presence of social information, or to a paramaterization
that favours social learning. By focusing on the case where asocial learners are
optimal, I are able to examine whether social learners can perform better than
the best, and hence any asocial learner, regardless of the paramaterization.
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Other learning parameters will optimize the performance of social learners.
However to provide a clear comparison, in our simulations, social learners use
the same learning parameters as asocial learners.
Asocial learners performance was optimized using a radial basis function
learning algorithm (Buhmann, 2000). This algorithm samples a large number
of values of α, γ, and τ and estimates the performance of asocial learners who
use these sampled learning parameters. These sampled values are then used
to interpolate the performance of learners for unsampled parameter values.
The interpolation was done by averaging the value of nearby sampled points
weighted by the inverse of their cubed euclidean distance. This interpolation
provides an efficient way to approximate the topography of the learner’s
payoffs as a function of α, γ, and τ , even when a learner’s performance is
highly stochastic. This process was then repeated, with new samples being
drawn from ever smaller radii around the current estimated optima, until the
optimal value converged. Convergence was assessed by examining whether
the difference between the largest estimated payoff and the median estimated
payoff was < 0.01 for the 5,000 learners in the current radius.
I also ran a second set of simulations to examine how the performance
of social and asocial learners depended on the parameters chosen. Given the
large number of parameters, evaluating all possible permutations of parameter
values would lead to a combinatorial explosion. Because of this, I focused
on a single MDP, and examined how the performance of learners changed,
varying one parameter at a time. The baseline MDP was a version of the
nettle task when the alternative payoff had reward 4, and learners used the
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Figure 2.2: Learners’ performance on the nettle MDP. Black lines represent asocial
learners, grey lines represent social learners. All measurements are averaged over 100,000
learners. (a) learners’ average per-trial payoff, (b) the frequency at which learners performed
the canonical sequence averaged over all trials, and (c) the frequency at which learners
performed the canonical sequence on each of their 50 trials, on the nettle MDP with
alternative action payoff of 4.
optimal learning parameters, α = 0.18, γ = 0.99, and τ = 0.47.
I explored the following ranges of paramater values. The eligibility trace
of each learner was varied from 1 to 5, the number of trials that each learner
explored varied from between 10, and 100 in increments of 10, and the size of
the population of social learners varied from between 10 to 100 in increments
of 10. I examined 20 values of α evenly distributed between 0.1 and 0.9, 20
values of γ between .01 and .99, and 20 values of τ between .1 and 2.
All simulations were hand coded and run in Python, python.org.
2.5.2 Results
Overall I found that the use of social information increased learners’ average
payoff and led to a faster acquisition of the canonical action sequence compared
to the optimal asocial learner.
I examined the average payoffs of the asocial and social learners and the
frequency with which they performed the canonical action sequence (Figure
2.2). I found that when the alternative actions provided a low reward social
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Figure 2.3: Learners’ average performance on the nettle MDP with an alternative action
payoff of 4, when varying (a) number of trials, (b) population size, (c) the eligibility trace,
(d) γ, (e) τ , and (f) α. Black lines represent asocial learners, grey lines represent social
learners.
learners on average received a higher payoff than asocial learners (Figure
2.2(a)). This difference is a result of the social learners exploiting the
canonical action sequence more frequently than asocial learners (Figure 2.2(b)).
However, when the alternative action provides a sufficiently high reward, the
exploration effort required to learn the canonical sequences outweighs the
benefit of discovering it. In this case I find that both the social and asocial
learners do not exploit the canonical actions sequence, but instead learn to use
the alternative action.
I also find that the difference in performance between social and asocial
learners is primarily driven by the early acquisition of the canonical action
sequence by social learners. As an illustration of this I chart in Figure 2.2(c)
the probability that a social or an asocial learner will perform the canonical
action sequence over the course of their life, on the MDP with a alternative
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reward of 4. I find that at all times social learners are more likely to perform
the canonical actions sequence than asocial learners. On a social learners
first trial, they have a roughly 60% chance of performing the canonical action
sequence. This chance then drops for subsequent trials as the learner explores
other options, before rising again as the social learners learn to exclusively
exploit the canonical action sequence.
I examined a range of parameter values and found that social learners
consistently outperformed asocial learners. Results of this parameter
exploration are shown in Figure 2.3. When I varied the number of trials
a learner performed, I found that decreasing the number of trials decreased
performance of both asocial and social learners, but that social learners
continued to outperform asocial learners (Figure 2.3(a)). As the number of
learning trials increased the difference between asocial and social learners first
increased and then reduced, but even with 100 learning trial there is still a
strong difference between social and asocial learners (Figure 2.3(a)). When I
varied the number individuals in a population, I found that the performance
of social learners was less in small population, but that their performance
quickly plateaued for medium sized populations (greater than 20 learners),
and the performance of social learners always remained above that of asocial
learners (Figure 2.3(b)).
When I varied the length of the learners eligibility trace I found that asocial
learners performance decreased, but even for a short eligibility trace (length 1)
the performance of social learners was left largely unchanged (Figure 2.3(c)).
With longer eligibility traces asocial performance improved, but remained
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below the performance of social learners. This is likely driven by executing
low reward action sequences during initial exploration.
I also systematically varied α, γ, and τ . The results are given in Figure
2.3(d-f). I found that as learning parameters deviate from the optimum the
performance of asocial learners decreased. However for all parameter values
social learners performed better than or as well as asocial learners. Social and
asocial learners tended to perform similarly, and poorly, when the learning
parameters were ill-suited to the MDP. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, the
optimal values of τ and α for social learners differ from those of asocial learners.
2.6 Broad and deep tasks
The findings on the nettle task suggest that incorporating social information
into a general purpose asocial learning algorithm can substantially improve
learning outcomes. This is particularly the case when the alternative action
provides a lower payoff. However, when the alternative action provides a
high payoff, both social and asocial learners perform that alternative action,
and their difference in performance shrinks. This suggest that when the task
learners face is relatively simple social information provides little benefit. In
order to investigate when social information provides a benefit to learners in
a more general setting I move away from our cartoon of the nettle stripping
problem to investigate two sets of simple stylized MDPs, broad tasks and deep
tasks.
The difficulty of learning an action sequence depends primarily on two
things, the length of the sequence and the number of base actions available to
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the learner. I examine how each of these factors might impact the benefit of
social information by first considering a set of MDPs where learners are faced
with an increasing number of possible actions, and then by examining a set of
MDPs where learners are faced with increasingly long sequences of actions.
2.6.1 Simulations on broad and deep tasks
Both the breadth and depth tasks are built up from a basic binary decision
task. In the binary decision task learners are placed at a central node and face
two options. Each option leads to a different state, from which the only action
available returns them to the home state. The initial transition to each state
has a payoff of 0. The transition back to the home state from one of the states
has a payoff of 1, the other has a payoff of 2. This creates a simple learning
problem for asocial learners. To solve this problem learners simply need to
explore both branches and associate one branch with the higher reward.
In the case of deep tasks I increase the number of actions it takes for the
learner to receive a reward and return to the home state. I vary the number
of intermediate actions between 1 and 9. The difficulty in this problem is not
exploration of the task, there are only two choices, but creating a chains of
associations between the final reward and the initial choice.
In the case of broad tasks I increase the number of available actions the
learner has in the home state, but keep the number of actions in each sequence
the same. I set the reward of one of the possible choices to 2 and all other
choices to 1. This creates a challenging task as there are many options to be
explored. I vary the number choices available between 1 and 9.
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In all other respects the details of these simulations are identical to those
conducted on the nettle processing task. Here, I examine the average lifetime
payoff of each learner, which also provides the frequency with which the learner
performs the canonical action sequence; a learner obtains a payoff of 2 when
performing the canonical action sequence, and a payoff of 1 in all other cases.
All measures were averaged over 100,000 learners.
2.6.2 Results
Once again I found that social information consistently provided a benefit
relative to asocial learners. The results of these simulations are given in
Figure 2.4. Social information provided a greater benefit on deep tasks where
the length of the actions sequence was long as compared to short. Social
information also provided a greater benefit on broad tasks with a large number
of options as compared to few. I find that the performance of social learners
does not substantially change with the difficulty of the task, in most task social
learners perform at ceiling. In contrast the performance of asocial learners
decreases as the difficulty of the learning problem increases. This drives the
difference in performance between social and asocial learners.
2.7 Discussion
In this chapter I used Markov decision processes to model the learning of
action sequences. I presented a simple and empirically supported model for
individual learning, temporal difference learning, and demonstrate the benefit
that social information can provide within this individual learning framework.
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Figure 2.4: Learners’ performance on the (a) breadth and (b) depth MDPs. Black lines
represent asocial learners, grey lines represent social learners. All measurements are averaged
over 100,000 learners.
I find that the addition of social information allows learners to find and exploit
high-payoffs behaviours more effectively than through asocial learning alone.
Further analyses suggest that social information is particularly helpful both
when learners are presented with a choice of many possible actions, or when
learning a long sequence of actions to receive a reward: two cases that are
challenging for asocial learners.
These results highlight how social information can be integrated into
an effective asocial learning algorithm to provide a benefit. In this study
I modelled social learning as copying the action of a randomly selected
demonstrator when the learner is unsure of which action to choose. It
will be apparent that there are many ways of incorporating social learning
into TD learning (see below for a more thorough discussion), and that this
particular implementation provides an empirically supported yet minimal way
of modelling how social information can influence a learners behaviours. This
use of social information likely underestimates the impact social information
on a actual learning processes. Nonetheless I observe a consistent advantage
to the use of social information.
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Early theoretical work on social learning focused on a dichotomy between
costly individual learning and cheap social learning (Boyd and Richerson, 1985;
Rogers, 1988; Enquist et al., 2007, e.g.). One of the longstanding messages of
these evolutionary models of social learning, is that in order for social learning
to be beneficial, learners must be selective in whom they copy (Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Laland, 2004; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Enquist et al., 2007) In
this framework I show how a learner can simultaneously use social information
and individual learning to solve a complex problem. Even though I assume
that learners do not preferentially select their demonstrator, social information
still provides a benefit to these learners. These results agree with previous work
on social learning (Enquist et al., 2007; Rendell et al., 2010b), by suggesting
that even copying a with a random choice of demonstrator can be effective
when it is incorporated with asocial learning.
In this analysis I have used a simple model of social learning: individuals
defer to social information when unsure what to do, restricting their copying
to individuals in the same state. In reality many animals can also exploit
information provided by other animals occupying different states, through
various forms of observational learning (Hoppitt and Laland, 2013), which
would further enhance the utility of social learning. Nonetheless, this minimal
use of social information is consistent with a number of different mechanisms
of social information transfer, such as local and stimulus enhancement and
emulation (Zentall and Galef Jr, 1988; Heyes, 1994; Hoppitt and Laland, 2008).
For instance, Hoppitt et al. (2007) found evidence of a response facilitation
effect on the rate at which domestic fowl initiated bouts of preening. The rate
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at which chickens initiated bouts of preening was more strongly related to the
number of birds already preening in the same aviary than it was to the number
of birds preening in an adjacent, visually obscured aviary. This rules out the
possibility that any plausible external cues could be wholly responsible for the
behavioural synchrony. For social animals, in particular, it is highly plausible
that the facilitatory effects of other animal’s actions will frequently suffice to
push them to taking the same options, when in the same state. This model
shows how response facilitation not only generates behavioural homogeneity
across individuals, but also may accelerates sequence learning.
Although I implement social learning as a form of copying, there are other
potential social influences on learning. One notable example is the case of
Israeli rats learning to strip pinecones. Terkel (1996) found that juvenile
rats learn to strip pinecones in an efficient, spiral manner if presented with
pinecones that had been partially processed in this way. However juveniles
who received unprocessed pinecones did not learn to use the spiral method to
strip pinecones. The social influence on learning in this case is not a direct
form of copying, but is instead mediated by interactions with the partially
processed products of an experienced learner. These same processes may be
at work in other animals as well. While I do not explicitly model this form
of social influence, this process can be readily understood within a temporal
difference learning framework. One of the difficulties in learning, highlighted
in the deep task, was forming associations between early actions and later
rewards. The same difficulty is present here; the effort required to remove the
first segments of a pinecone outweigh the nutritional reward, however this is
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not the case for later segments provided the spiral method is used. Partially
processed pinecones then provide the learner with an opportunity to learn
and build associations in later stages. These associations can then serve as
secondary reinforcers when learning on un-processed pinecones.
This chapter offers insights into how social information contributes to
learning action sequences, and suggests that social information may be
beneficial even when learners are only able to copy single component actions
of a longer sequence. Seen another way, in the context of learning action
sequences, social information only needs to point the learner in the right
direction; individual learning can handle the rest.
This result suggests that in order to understand human and animal social
learning, it is not enough to examine how individuals learn from social
information alone, we must also understand how individuals integrate social
and asocial sources of information. I examine this question in more detail with
human learners in Chapter 3, with an experimental examination of conformity
biased learning.
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Experimental studies of social learning
Abstract
In many cases when animals lack accurate information concerning how to
solve a task, they may resort to following the majority opinion. This tendency
is often called ‘conformity bias’ or ‘conformist transmission’. I develop a
simple Bayesian model of learning and use it to predict when individuals
might use conformist transmission based on their asocial information and
information about their demonstrators’ reliability. The model suggests that
conformist transmission is favoured when the accuracy of demonstrators is
high relative to a learner’s own asocial information. I conduct a series of
experiments and find a good qualitative match between the predictions of the
model and the behaviours of individuals. I then replicate these findings using
a different task, and at the same time examine from how many demonstrators
a learner will choose to learn. I find that individuals will choose to learn
from more demonstrators if their own accuracy is low, and if each individual
demonstrator’s accuracy is low. Set against the backdrop of previous studies,
I am able to replicate many traditional findings of conformity biases, and
find that they arise naturally from a Bayesian learning rule depending on the
situation. The results of these experiments suggest the learning strategies that
individuals deploy are flexible enough to track differences in the environment,
and may be quickly tuned to the task at hand.
58
Chapter 3. Experimental studies of social learning
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, I analysed how individual learners might combine social and
asocial sources of information to learn how to perform an action sequence. In
the simulation study, I assumed an artificial model of learning, based on a
“copy when uncertain” learning strategy (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Hoppitt
and Laland, 2013), which although sufficient to demonstrate the benefits of
social learning in learning action sequences is likely not a representation of
how individuals use social information.
In this chapter, I aim to better understand how humans integrate social
and asocial sources of information, particularly in the context of learning
from multiple demonstrators. Past research has found that in many cases
learning from multiple demonstrators can provide an effective way to learn from
others (Henrich and Boyd, 1998); barring other information, and assuming
demonstrator individuals are more often right than wrong, the majority will
be correct more often than the minority (Morgan et al., 2011). Moreover, the
likelihood that the majority is correct increases quickly with the demonstrators’
accuracy (see Equation 1). In other words, a strong conformity bias makes
sense in cases where demonstrators are likely to be right.
Past work has shown that even young children change how they copy others
based on the perceived qualities of demonstrators. For example children are
sensitive to relevant traits like a demonstrator’s level of competence, reliability
and expertise (Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig and Harris, 2005; Shafto et al.,
2012), but also surface qualities like native language (Kinzler et al., 2011),
familiarity (Corriveau and Harris, 2009) or ‘niceness’ (Landrum et al., 2013).
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However up until this point little work has examined whether the likelihood
that an adult will go with the majority changes with the perceived accuracy of
each demonstrator. If adults are sensitive to the reliability of demonstrators,
then they may use that knowledge to determine how they evaluate a majority’s
stance. This is particularly important given past results from social psychology
and studies on cultural transmission that suggest how and when an individual
follows a majority might have profound effects on how novel behaviours spread
through populations and how beneficial social learning is (briefly discussed in
Chapter 1, also see Hoppitt and Laland, 2013; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).
In this chapter, I first review past work examining conformity and
conformity biased transmission. I then use a simple mathematical model
to explore how a rational learner might learn from demonstrators of varying
reliability, and experimentally test how adults evaluate evidence presented
by a majority of demonstrators based on the perceived reliability of each
demonstrator.
Past research into conformity biased transmission has been particularly
influenced by two fields: on the one hand many social psychologists have
examined when individuals might disregard their own personal judgements
to follow a majority, on the other researchers interested in evolution of culture
have examined conformity bias in terms of how likely an individual is to
follow a majority when lacking any personal information. I briefly review
both literatures below.
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3.2 Conformity biases in social psychology
Early research into conformity was carried out by social psychologists.
Pioneering work by Sherif (1935) and Asch (1951) found that when individuals
are presented with social information, they will sometimes disregard their own
private information and follow the majority belief. Sherif found that in an
ambiguous distance estimation task, individuals would change their answers
and give estimates closer to those of their peers. Asch found that about 30% of
the time individuals would even completely disregard their own observations
on a line-length perceptual task and follow a (seemingly obviously incorrect)
majority. Such behaviours were categorized of as being ‘irrational’.
Why would an animal disregard their own observation and follow incorrect
social advice? Formal theory suggests that in many cases following social
advice is the rational thing to do (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Boyd and
Richerson, 1985). Provided that each animal that provides information is
generating that knowledge based on their own private experience, then their
information gives insights into the current state of the world. For example, in
Sherif’s task, each person is estimating the distance a projected dot moves,
with some perceptual error. The confederates’ judgements provide noisy
estimates of the distance. Were the confederates’ estimates genuine then
the true distance would likely lie within the range of the confederates’ and
participant’s estimates. Thus the best guess for the participant is an answer
between their initial judgement, those given by the confederates, reflecting the
truth of the saying that ‘many pairs of eyes are better than one’. Naturally,
when individuals are being deliberately misinformed in an experimental
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setting, such logic breaks down, and using social advice renders individual’s
judgements inaccurate. However, in more naturalistic circumstances, social
information will typically increase accuracy in decision making.
One of the key assumptions of this line of reasoning is that demonstrators
provide useful information. How useful that information is will determine
how many demonstrators are required for an individual to disregard their
own private information (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Although past work
has analysed the presence of this type of conformity bias in information
cascades (Anderson and Holt, 1997), it has not examined how it changes based
on demonstrator accuracy. Given the key role that demonstrator accuracy
plays in the theory behind rationally following a majority, understanding how
individuals in practice use that information is particularly important.
3.3 Conformity biased transmission
When learning from multiple demonstrators, without any personal
information, disproportionately copying the majority opinion may often be
beneficial. Boyd and Richerson (Boyd and Richerson, 1985) call such copying
conformity biased transmission (‘conformist transmission’). Conformist
transmission is one of a wide range of frequency dependent transmission
rules where the probability that a learner adopts a new behaviour depends
on the number of individuals that demonstrate that behaviour. Random
copying is another frequency dependent learning rule, where learners adopt
a behaviour in proportion to the number of demonstrators demonstrating that
behaviour. Conformist transmission is distinguished from random copying
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by being a disproportionate chance of copying the majority behaviour; the
majority behaviour will be copied more often than if learners used random
copying.
Boyd and Richerson argue that conformity biased transmission will be
beneficial because it allows individuals to acquire adaptive knowledge quickly.
Particularly in spatially variable environments, adopting the local majority
behaviour is an effective route to accurate decision making (Boyd and
Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998). The use of conformist transmission
may also lead to population-level consequences, including stabilizing dominant
behavioural patterns, reducing within group behavioural variation, and
preserving between group differences. A finding born out by theoretic analyses
by Henrich and Boyd (1998), discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 (also see
Kandler and Laland, 2013; Wakano and Aoki, 2007).
While social psychology experiments such as Sherif’s and Asch’s generate
findings that are broadly consistent with these evolutionary models, they
do not compute whether the level of copying exceeds the frequency of
the demonstrated behaviour. Accordingly, the experimental evidence for
conformist transmission, as defined by Boyd and Richerson (1985), has
been slow to materialize, although some recent studies provide evidence
for conformist transmission. For instance, Morgan et al. (Morgan et al.,
2011) presented human adults with four perceptual tasks. Participants
were shown two ambiguous stimuli, along with the predictions of multiple
confederates, and asked to make a judgement about them. In the study,
participants systematically preferred the majority’s answer in a pattern
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indicating conformist transmission.
Evidence for this type of conformist transmission has also been found
in laboratory microsociety experiments, where groups of participants
simultaneously play a game with each other. McElreath et al. (2005) found
that individuals would change their options to be closer to the majority’s
opinion. Efferson et al. Efferson et al. (2008) found that not all individuals
copied, but those that did copied within a manner consistent with conformist
transmission. Efferson et al. also found that those individuals who copied
consistent with conformist transmission received a higher payoff in the game,
suggesting that in some cases individuals will follow the majority and be
rewarded for it.
These studies on conformity biased transmission suggest that individuals
in some cases use social information in a manner consistent with conformity
biased transmission, not all individuals will always do so. One aspect of the
task used in Efferson et al. was that individuals had access to their own
personal information to solve the task. The access to personal information
may change how learners chose to use social information, and may be key for
understanding how and why individuals use social information. In light of this
it seems necessary to develop and test a model that allows for the inclusion
of (a) only social information and (b) both social and asocial information
to explore empirically how individuals respond to different types of social
and asocial information. Below, I first build such a model to integrate
different types of information and use it to generate predictions for a series
of experimental tasks.
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Figure 3.1: Model predictions for learning a behaviour from either three or ten
demonstrators based on the proportion of demonstrators that use that behaviour, and the
accuracy of each demonstrator. Accuracy varied between .6 to .9 in increments of .1.
3.4 A rational basis for conforming to the majority
When trying to solve every day problems, learners may be required to integrate
their own asocial information with multiple sources of social information to find
a solution. In the absence of their own asocial information, the option that
is most likely to be correct is that exhibited by the majority. This is easy to
demonstrate formally.
Suppose that the likelihood that each demonstrator is correct is p, and
that there are n demonstrators, k of whom support one idea, the other n− k
support another. The probability that the majority is correct, pm, is given by,
pm =
pk(1− p)n−k
pk(1− p)n−k + pn−k(1− p)k , (3.1)
which is always greater than p if p > .5. This result is known as Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem (Condorcet, 1785), and is often used to provide a rational basis
for majority biased copying (Morgan et al., 2011; Nakahashi et al., 2012;
Efferson et al., 2008). For illustration, graphs of Equation 3.1 are given in
Figure 3.1, for n = 3 and n = 10.
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Note, the reliability of the majority behaviour depends crucially on the
value of p and the number of demonstrators n. If the likelihood that a
demonstrator is correct, p, or the number of demonstrators, n, is low then
pm is generally not much more than p. But if each demonstrator is very likely
to be correct, or there are a large number of demonstrators, then pm tends to
be close to 1, indicating that the majority is almost always correct. Under the
latter circumstance, conformity is rational.
To examine how asocial information might sway an individual’s decision
in the presence of multiple demonstrators, I can use Bayes’ rule to combine
multiple sources of knowledge. If the learner receives testimony t, and asocial
data d, then the probability of a given hypothesis, h, is
p(h|d, t) = p(d, t|h)p(h)∑
p(d, t|h)p(h) . (3.2)
In many cases the testimony and the data the learner receives are generated
independently, something that often happens if the data the learner receives
is unknown to the informant, and is assumed to happen in the experiments
below. If that is the case then p(d, t|h) = p(d|h)p(t|h). If the informant’s
testimony depends on the data the learner receives, p(t|h) can be replaced by
p(t|h, d). Bayes’ rules is a probabilistic mechanism for evaluating hypotheses
based on multiple sources of information, which combines them based on their
relative support for each hypotheses. It has been successfully used to explain
human social learning in previous experimental (e.g. Shafto et al. (2012); Hu
et al. (2013); Buchsbaum et al. (2012)) and modelling studies (Perreault et al.,
2012). In this setting, I consider the case where there are two hypothesis, (i)
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the option (behaviour or belief) of the majority is correct, or (ii) the option of
the minority is correct.
The likelihood that each demonstrator performs the correct option, p,
changes how informative that demonstrator’s social information is. The
relative weight that each demonstrator provides for their option is p
1−p . This
quantity grows large as p approaches 1, indicating strong support for that
behaviour. When p is close to .5, p
1−p is close to 1, indicating that each
demonstrator provides only minimal information about which option is correct.
Under the assumption that each demonstrator provides social information
independently from all of the other demonstrators, the total weight for the
option of the majority over the option of the minority is the product of
the relative weights provided by each demonstrator. Although I consider a
binary decision task here, generalizing this model to deciding between many
hypothesizes is also possible (Whalen et al., 2014). Similar calculations can be
made for the influence of a learner’s social information.
If individuals use Bayes’ rule and do not receive asocial information, then
we can remove the p(d|h) term from Equation 3.2. Since the likelihood that
each individual supports the correct hypothesis is p, I find that the likelihood
of observing the group’s testimony given that h is the true hypothesis, is
p(t|h) = pk(1− p)n−k if k out of n individuals support the hypothesis, h. This
means that if all hypotheses are equally likely (i.e. p(h) is the same for all
hypotheses), Equation 3.2 reduces to Equation 3.1.
Equation 3.2 becomes more complicated when individuals also receive
asocial information. If an individual receives asocial information which has
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accuracy q, there is the possibility that the asocial information may conflict
with the social information. Where this occurs the model predicts that
individuals will follow their asocial information if q > pm, and perhaps more
interestingly, that individuals will disregard their own personal information
and go with the majority if q < pm. Once again, we can see that conformity is
rational when each informant is highly accurate, or if there are a large number
of demonstrators in the majority.
The model potentially allows predictions to be made specifying the amount
of weight that individuals will place on demonstrators’ decisions. Of course,
the model is reliant on the assumptions that the learner knows p and q exactly,
that they use Bayes’ rule to make decisions, and that they always select the
maximally likely hypothesis - assumptions that may be violated in practice.
However I expect that animals (including humans) will follow the qualitative
predictions of the model, namely that they (i) will place more weight on a
majority made up of accurate demonstrators than on a majority made up of
less accurate demonstrators, (ii) will place more weight on a majority made
up of a large number of demonstrators than on a majority made up by few
demonstrators, (iii) will place more weight on a large than a small majority, and
(iv) that even when receiving conflicting asocial information, will still conform
to a majority where the accuracy, consistency, and number of demonstrators
is high. Here I focus on predictions (i), (iii), and (iv), as prediction (ii) is
already well supported by Morgan et al. (Morgan et al., 2011), where learners
were found to adopt a majority beliefs more when presented with a large
number of demonstrators, and less when presented only with a few number of
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demonstrators.
3.5 Learning from multiple informants
To explore these predictions I use a ball and jar experimental design following
Anderson and Holt’s (1997) study on information cascades, which is presented
to adult human subjects. At the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter
presents a participant with two jars of blue and red balls. In one of the jars,
the red jar, there are a proportion p red balls, and a proportion 1−p blue balls.
In the blue jar, the proportions are reversed. The experimenter then takes the
jars behind a screen and pours one of the jars into a bag. Participants receive
information about the balls in the bag, from three confederates, each of whom
independently receive a ball from the bag. In some cases, the participants also
receive a ball from the bag. The participant must guess which jar was used to
fill the bag.
This experimental design closely matches the setting of the model, above.
At best, each informant will be accurate p of the time, by guessing that the
bag is filled with mostly balls of their own colour. The asocial data in this case
also has p accuracy.
The question is, how much weight will individuals place on the majority
testimony based on the proportion of balls in each jar, the number of
demonstrators in the majority, and whether or not individuals receive their
own ball. I explore this question experimentally below.
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3.5.1 Experiments 1 - 4: Learning from variably
correct informants.
Experiments 1 and 2 followed the ball and jar design, where individuals
only received social information, the two experiments differing solely in the
number of balls in the jars. In Experiments 3 and 4, individuals received
both social and asocial information, again with differing numbers of balls. In
each experiment, participants were allocated to four conditions, based on the
number of demonstrators in the majority, and the proportion of balls in each
jar. In Experiment 1 and 3, each jar was filled with twenty balls, and the
proportion of balls in each jar was either 60% or 90%. In Experiment 2 and 4,
each jar was filled with 100 balls, and the proportion of balls in each jar was
either 51% or 60%.
In Experiment 3 I also varied whether the participant saw their asocial
information before hearing the confederate’s judgements or after. I found no
effect of the order of presentations, and so in Experiment 4 asocial information
was always shown last.
3.5.2 Participants
Participants took part in a very short experiment, typically lasting
just 5 minutes. They were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
http://www.mturk.com, and were compensated $0.50 for their time.
Each participants was randomly assigned to an experimental condition,
that varied the proportion of balls in each jar and the number of demonstrators
in the majority. The number of participants in each condition is given in Table
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Condition Two of Three Demonstrators All Three Demonstrators
N Mean 95% CI N Mean 95% CI
Experiment 1 90% 66 8.00 (7.50, 8.50) 55 8.85 (8.40, 9.30)
60% 52 7.42 (6.98, 7.86) 63 7.79 (7.36, 8.22)
Experiment 2 60% 69 7.00 (6.59, 7.40) 59 7.32 (6.73, 7.90)
51% 56 6.23 (5.68, 6.78) 56 6.62 (6.09, 7.16)
Experiment 3 90% 65 4.68 (4.04, 5.31) 62 7.42 (6.59, 8.25)
Asocial Data First 60% 61 5.31 (4.82, 5.80) 63 7.19 (6.56, 7.81)
Experiment 3 90% 63 5.06 (4.41, 5.71) 57 7.54 (6.73, 8.35)
Social Data First 60% 60 4.93 (4.43, 5.44) 62 6.71 (6.07, 7.35)
Experiment 4 60% 58 4.61 (4.10, 5.10) 63 7.31 (6.76, 7.86)
51% 56 4.67 (4.22, 5.11) 64 5.43 (4.94, 5.92)
Table 3.1: Number of participants in each condition, and the average rating of the
majority’s position in Experiments 1 - 2. Participants were split up into four conditions
in each experiment, varying the proportion of balls in each urn, 51%, 60%, 90%, and the
number of demonstrators in the majority was either two out of three, or all three.
3.1.
3.5.3 Methods
This was a web-administered experiment using text and pictures. At the
beginning of the study a cartoon experimenter introduced the participant to
two clear jars of balls filled with red and blue balls. The experiment told the
participant that, depending on condition, 51%, 60% or 90% of the balls were
red in one jar, and blue in the other jar. In Experiment 1 each jar contained 20
balls. In Experiment 2, each jar contained 100 balls. The proportion of balls
visible in each jar accurately reflected this number and these proportions.
The virtual experimenter then introduced her three virtual friends, named
Sue, Mary, and Ann. She explained that she was going to pour one of the
jars into a bag and give a ball from the bag to each of her three friends.1 The
friends would then tell the participant which jar they think the bag was filled
from.
1It was left ambiguous whether the balls were drawn with, or without replacement.
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Figure 3.2: Combined experimental data from Experiment 1 and 2 and Experiments 3 and
4 along with model predictions. The results and model predictions differ in scale; the model
produces probability judgements between 0 and 1, whereas in the experiment individuals
gave ratings between 0 and 10. This means that a .5 on the model scale corresponds with
a 5 on the experimental results.
The participant was then shown into three separate virtual rooms which
contained one of the friends sitting behind a desk. Each friend told the
participant if they thought the bag was filled with mostly red, or mostly blue
balls, and said that they only looked at their ball, did not see anyone else’s
ball, and did not hear the advice of the other confederates. It is implied that
the advice of the friend accurately reflects the ball received.
The colour of balls was randomized. If there was a dissenter (i.e. if one of
the three friends disagreed with the other two), the order in which the dissenter
was presented and spoke was also randomized.
During Experiments 3 and 4, participants also received their own ball drawn
from the jar. The colour of the ball always conflicted with the colour supported
by the majority. In Experiment 3, the presentation of the ball was randomized;
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participant either saw the ball before receiving testimony, or saw it after seeing
the testimony. In Experiment 4, all participants saw the ball after receiving
testimony.
Finally, the virtual experimenter asked participants to rate how likely it was
that the bag was filled from the red jar or the blue jar. Participants responded
to the survey on an 11-point scale, with 0 corresponding to ‘definitely the blue
jar’, 10 to ‘definitely the red jar’, and 5 to ‘equally likely the blue jar or red
jar’.
3.5.4 Results
I found, in line with the model’s predictions, that individuals in this experiment
were sensitive to the number of demonstrators in the majority, and the
likelihood that each demonstrator was correct. Average participant ratings
for each condition are found in Table 1. A summary across Experiments 1 and
2 along with model predictions is found in Figure 3.2(a, b), and Experiments
3 and 4, in Figure 3.2(c,d).
In Experiment 1, the mean rating was significantly higher (i.e. more
consistent with the majority) when all three demonstrators gave consistent
advice, compared to the circumstance where there was a majority of two
(2-factor ANOVA F (1, 233) = 5.45, p < .05), and increased with the
percentage of balls in the jar that were the dominant colour (i.e. 60% < 90%)
(2-factor ANOVA F (1, 233) = 12.56, p < .01).
In Experiment 2, the mean rating was not significantly higher when all
three demonstrators gave consistent advice, compared to the circumstance
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when there was a majority of two (2-factor ANOVA F (1, 237) = 1.60, p = .21),
but increases in the predicted direction, and it did increase with the percentage
of balls in the jar that were the dominant colour (i.e. 51% < 60%), (2-factor
ANOVA F (1, 237) = 8.061, p < .01).
The 60% condition was tested in both Experiments 1 and 2, but I found
no significant differences between the two experiments in both the two-person
majority, (two-tailed t-test t(113.75) = 1.4, p = .16), or three person majority
conditions (two-tailed t-test t(107.84) = 1.30, p = .20). Combining the data
from the two experiments, I find a significant effect of both number of dissenters
and percentage of balls, (2-factor ANOVA F (1, 472) = 7.00, p < .01, and
F (1, 472) = 32.08, p < .01 respectively).
I find a similar pattern of results in Experiments 3 and 4. In Experiment
3, I found no difference between presenting the asocial information first, or the
social information first (3-factor ANOVA F (1, 489) = 0.14, p = .71). I also find
that the mean rating was significantly higher when all three demonstrators gave
consistent advice, compared to the circumstance where there was a majority of
two (3-factor ANOVA F (1, 489) = 90.938, p < .01), but that the mean rating
was not significantly influenced by the proportion of balls in each jar (3-factor
ANOVA F (1, 489) = .318, p = .57).
In Experiment 4, the mean rating was significantly higher when all three
demonstrators gave consistent advice, compared to the circumstance where
there was a majority of two, (F (1, 238) = 45.62, p < .01), and increased
with the percentage of balls in the jar that were the dominant colour (i.e.
60% < 90%) (F (1, 238) = 14.02, p < .01).
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A likely difficulty in interpreting the results of Experiment 3 and 4 is that
when individuals see a majority of two out of three demonstrators, and see
their own, conflicting piece of evidence, they have nearly equal evidence for
and against the majority’s response. To account for this, I also analysed
just the case where all three demonstrators were in the majority. I found,
like Experiments 1 and 2, that the mean rating in the 60% conditions in
Experiments 3 and 4 were not significantly different from each other (two-tailed
t-test t(143.94) = 1.02, p = .31). I combined the responses from the 60%
condition in both Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 for further analysis finding
that the mean rating of the majority in the 51% condition was significantly less
than in the 60% condition (two-tailed t-test t(130.07) = 5.47, p < .01), and
in the 90% condition (two-tailed t-test t(175.72) = 5.42, p < .01), but that
the mean rating of the majority in the 60% condition was not significantly
less than in the 90% condition (two-tailed t-test t(203.20) = 1.20, p = .23),
although it trended in the predicted direction.
The results of these experiments are in-line with the model’s predictions:
individuals are sensitive to both the number of demonstrators in the majority,
and the proportion of balls in each jar (which corresponds to sensitivity to
demonstrator accuracy). Our model provides good qualitative fit to the data
in both Experiments 1 and 2 and in Experiments 3 and 4 (Figure 3.2).
However there is one quantitative trend not predicted by the model.
Our model expects that in Experiment 3 and 4, when individuals see three
demonstrators in the majority, but receive conflicting testimony, they will be
more confident that the majority is correct than in Experiments 1 and 2 when
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individuals see two out of three demonstrators in the majority. I find that
this ordering is actually the reverse of expected; individuals give lower mean
ratings when seeing their own asocial information in Experiments 3 and 4, than
either condition of Experiment 1 and 2, significantly so in the 51% condition
(t(113.35) = 2.14, p < .05), and trended in the right direction in both the 60%,
(t(306.00) = .47, p = 0.64) and 90% (t(178.70) = 1.37, p = 0.17) conditions.
This suggests that individuals may have a small bias towards preferring their
own asocial information.
3.5.5 Discussion
The results of Experiment 1-4 suggest that individuals differentially follow a
majority based on the quality of social information. In Experiments 1 and 2,
I found that individuals would prefer a group of demonstrators depending
on each demonstrator’s accuracy. In Experiments 3 and 4, I found that
individuals would sometimes go with the majority, when receiving conflicting
asocial information, but might weigh their own information more than social
information. In both sets of experiments, these results mirror a simple model
of Bayesian learning.
The results of these experiments shed some light on the historical notions
of ‘conformity’ and ‘conformist transmission’. Relating to “conformity”, I
find that in Experiments 3 and 4, individuals will disregard their own asocial
information and go with the majority when the amount of information that
the informants provide outweighs their own information. These results are
consistent with theoretical findings on Information Cascades that suggest
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there may be times when even rational agents should follow a majority
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992), and may provide a partial explanation for the
social influence seen in Asch and Sherrif’s experiments.
Relating to “conformist transmission”, in Experiment 1 and 2 I test
how individuals respond to social information in the absence of their own
asocial information. I find that the amount of trust individuals place on the
majority depends on the majority’s accuracy, and even when the majority
completely agrees, individuals do not always assume they are correct. This
finding diverges from the assumption of “conformity biased transmission”
which suggests that individuals will preferentially choose to copy a majority
more than expected by randomly copying a demonstrator. Although I find
evidence for “conformity biased transmission” when demonstrators are highly
accurate, when demonstrators are inaccurate, I find instead the people place
nearly equal weight on the majority or minority. And, interestingly, to the
extent that individuals use a ‘conformity biased transmission’ strategy, the
degree of conformity bias appears to depends on demonstrator accuracy.
There was overall good correspondence between the Bayesian model and
human subjects’ behaviour. Although this suggests that individuals are
behaving in a manner consistent with Bayesian learning, there are a wide
number of alternative learning strategies that would likely have qualitatively
similar results. However the results of these experiments suggest that
when making decisions individuals integrate the quality of demonstrator’s
knowledge, social information, and their own asocial information to make
decisions.
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Although informative, this experiment does not examine a situation where
the accuracy of an individual’s information differed from the accuracy of the
social information, one of the key areas where the Bayesian model is useful
to make predictions. Because of this, the results seen in this experiment may
simply be a product of individuals understanding how balls can be sampled
out of a jar, and not a deeper understanding of weighing different types of
information. Experiment 5 explores this issue by presenting individuals with a
substantially different task to understand how individuals may learn to weigh
sources of information with different accuracies.
3.5.6 Experiment 5
In Experiment 5, I examine the case where subjects learn about their own and
demonstrator accuracy, and where these differ. The goal of this experiment
is to replicate the primary result of Experiments 1-4 that individuals change
how they use a majority bias based on the quality of their own information
and demonstrator’s information.
In this experiment participants are presented with repeated trials of an
ambiguous perception task, choosing whether there were more blue circles or
red circles out of a field of 33 coloured circles displayed for 500ms. To help
them make this decision they were shown the responses of 5 demonstrators,
each of who were accurate 75% of the time. I varied the quality of their asocial
information to either be high-quality (20 circles of one colour, 13 of the other),
or low-quality (17 circles of one colour, 16 of the other). The number of circles
participants saw was constant over the course of the task.
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Based on the results of the model I predict that individuals will place
more weight on their personal information than the social information when
their personal information is high-quality (20 red circles), rather than when
it was low-quality (17 red circles), and that the amount of trust they
place in informants will change based on the number of informants in the
majority. Model predictions are given in Figure 3.3(b), to generate these
model predictions I assumed that individuals knew that informants were
75% accurate, and that their personal accuracy was 60% in the low-quality
asocial information condition and 90% in the high-quality asocial information
condition. However the model results are qualitatively similar for a broad
range of parameter values.
3.5.7 Participants
Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
http://www.mturk.com, and were compensated $1.00 for their time.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two experimental
conditions, low-quality asocial information (n=19) or high-quality asocial
information (n = 21)
3.5.8 Methods
This was a web-administered experiment using text and pictures. At the
beginning of the experiment study participants were told that “In this
experiment you will be shown a group of circles. You will have to decide
whether there are more blue circles or red circles,” that each group of circle
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will be shown for a short amount of time, and that they would be able to see
the judgements of up to five other individuals. Participants were then told
that:
“In order to finish this [task] you will need to get a score of 20
on this task. Getting an answer correct increases your score by 1,
while getting an answer wrong decreases your score by 1.”
On the experiment page, the participant was presented with a large black
circle, and five female demonstrators. There were three buttons on the page, a
‘Start’ button at the bottom, and a ‘Red’ and ‘Blue’ button on the right and
left hand sides of the screen. The ‘Red’ and ‘Blue’ buttons were coloured red
and blue. At the beginning of the experiment the ‘Start’ button was enabled,
and the ‘Red’ and ‘Blue’ buttons were disabled.
To remind participants, the instructions were repeated at the of the page:
“Press the ‘Start’ button to see the next group of circles. Click the
‘red’ or ‘blue’ button corresponding to the majority of circles. After
a few seconds, you will be able to see the advice of five other people.
You have gotten a score of 0 out of a total score of 20 required to
finish this survey. Getting an answer correct increases your score
by 1. Getting an answer wrong decreases your score by 1.”
Once the participant pressed the ‘Start’ button, the numbers ‘3’, ‘2’, and
‘1’ were flashed on the black circle, for 1000ms each, the stimulus was then
presented for 500ms, after which it was occluded by a large black circle. The
stimulus consisted of 33 blue and red circles. The proportion of circles was
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determined by condition, either 20 of one colour, and 13 of the other colour,
or 17 of one colour and 16 of the other. The location of each circle was fixed,
although the colours of individual circles changed. After the stimulus was
presented, the five confederates gave their social advice in the form of ‘red’
or ‘blue’. Each demonstrator independently gave the correct answer 75% of
the time. After the demonstrators gave advice, the ‘red’ and ‘blue’ buttons
were enabled. Pressing the ‘Red’ or ‘Blue’ button ended the trial, showed the
participant the answer (e.g. “The correct answer was BLUE”), disabled the
‘Red’, ‘Blue’ buttons and started the next trial.
If the participant got the answer correct their score increased by one, if they
got the answer wrong, their score decreased by one (minimum of zero). Once
the participants reached a score of 20 they were shown debriefing information
and given a ‘secret code’ which was used to receive payment from Mechanical
Turk. The setup of this experiment makes each decision individuals make
incentivized. Although the participants are paid the same over the course of
the task, the speed at which they finish the task depends on their accuracy.
Because many users take repeated Mechanical Turk hits, finishing a HIT faster
allows them to take other HITs, making it financially beneficial to be accurate
on this task.
The experiment was coded in Javascript and shown on the participant’s
own browser.
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Figure 3.3: Experimental data and model predictions for Experiment 5, showing the
accuracy of participants based on the number (out of 5) correct demonstrators observed.
Participants always received asocial information consistent with the correct response. If
participants followed the majority they would have a 0% accuracy when the number of
correct demonstrators is less than 3 (i.e. the majority is not correct), and 100% accuracy
when the number of correct demonstrators is greater than or equal to three. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals calculated using the Pearson-Klopper method.
3.5.9 Results
I found that accuracy increased significantly with the number of correct
demonstrators (2-factor ANOVA, F(1,1064) = 125.96, p< .01), as well as
the quality of an individual’s asocial information (2-factor ANOVA, F(1,1064)
) = 67.56, p< .01). There was a significant interaction between these two
factors (2-factor ANOVA, F(1,1064) = 30.51, p< .01), suggesting that accuracy
increased more if asocial information was low-quality, and less when it was
high-quality. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 3.3(b).
Interestingly, as illustrated by Figure 3.3(a), I find that when their asocial
information is low-quality, participants follow the majority opinion in many
cases – when the number of correct demonstrators is less than 3 (i.e. the
majority is incorrect) participants also generally are incorrect. However, when
the quality of their asocial information is high, on average participants follow
their own personal information instead and leading them to select the correct
answer even when the majority is wrong. I also find that the size of the
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majority matters. When participants receive either high or low quality asocial
information increasing the number of correct demonstrators also raise the
participants’ accuracy. This result suggest that participants do not either
use social information (i.e. follow the majority) alone, or asocial information,
but instead combine the two sources of information together to make decisions.
To control for participant experience with this task I also analysed an
ANOVA where trial number was added as a predictor, but found that the trial
number was not a significant factor (3-factor ANOVA F(1, 1064) = 1.46, p =
.22).
3.5.10 Discussion
The results of Experiment 5 are qualitatively similar to the results of
Experiments 1-4, confirming the experimental findings with a different task.
In all the experiments individuals appear to be able to take into account
differences between their own accuracy, and demonstrator accuracy when
learning from others. I find good evidence that individuals do not simply
blindly trust the majority, but will strategically trust the majority when
it is supported by most members of the group, or when their own asocial
information is ambiguous. This finding is further supported by the fact that
the size of the majority has an impact on whether or not the participant will
follow it. I find that there is a substantial difference between following the
majority when four out of five demonstrators agree, compared with following
the majority when only three out of five demonstrators agree.
I also find qualitative similarities between the results of this experiment
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and model predictions, although the model predicts that individuals who see
4 out of 5 demonstrators agree, but who disagree with high accuracy social
information, will go with the majority, and not with their asocial information,
as the experimental data suggests. One caveat is that the model predictions
use perfect knowledge of demonstrator accuracy and an artificial proxy for
individual accuracy. This proxy may under or overestimate individuals’
performances on either version of the task.
The results of this experiment suggest that individuals are able to learn
from multiple demonstrators based on demonstrator accuracy. However a
key factor in this analysis is how many demonstrators individuals choose to
learn from. In Experiments 1-5 the number of demonstrators that individuals
learned from was fixed. To analyse this question further in a final experiment,
I allowed individuals to choose how many demonstrators they learn from.
3.6 Choosing the number of demonstrators to learn
from
The predictions of the Bayesian model depend on four factors, the accuracy
of demonstrators, the accuracy of personal information, the number of
demonstrators in a group, and the size of the majority. In Experiments
1-5, I find good evidence that individuals are sensitive to the accuracy
of demonstrators, and the size of the majority, however I do not test for
differences based on group size. This decision is partly based on the fact
that previous results (Morgan et al., 2011) have already examined how the
number of demonstrators learned from impacts individual’s decisions, and
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found, consistent with the model predictions, that individuals are more willing
to trust larger groups than smaller groups.
However a key issue, not addressed previously, is how an individual
might go about choosing the number of demonstrators from whom to learn.
This is a particularly important question as the number of demonstrators
can substantially change the usefulness of social information, and in many
naturalistic tasks individuals are not provided with a fixed number of
demonstrators but seek out demonstrators from whom to learn.
Our model predicts that learning from more demonstrators is better than
learning from fewer demonstrators, so an individual facing a decision should
acquire information from as many sources as possible. However thus far the
model does not consider the cost of gathering social information; acquiring
information can be costly, not just financially but also in terms of the time and
energy that it takes gather more demonstrations. To explore how individuals
might choose a number of demonstrators from whom to learn, taking account
the costs of gathering further information, I extend the model.
3.6.1 Bayesian model for choosing the number of
demonstrators
Here I examine how many demonstrators an individual might seek to learn
from based on demonstrator accuracy, the learners’ own accuracy, and the
cost of learning from each demonstrator.
To understand why learners would not just ask all available demonstrators,
I assume that learning from a demonstrator requires the learner to pay a small
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cost c to learn from each demonstrator, and for getting the answer correct,
receive a reward rcorrect. The goal for the learner is then to maximize their
expected reward
rtotal = rcorrectaccuracy(d, t1, ..., tn)− cn (3.3)
if they receive private data d and testimony ti. In the set-up of Experiment 5,
the learner’s accuracy is the same as the posterior probability of the hypothesis
they support, p(h|d, t1, ..., tn). If the learner receives each piece of social
information sequentially, and has the option to use that social information
to decide whether or not to ask for more social information, the decision they
are required to make is whether to use the current information to make a
decision or ask for more information, or if
rtotal(d, t1, ..., tk) >
∑
tk+1
p(tk+1|d, t1, ..., tk)rexpected(d, t1, ..., tk, tk+1) (3.4)
where p(tk+1|d, t1, ..., tk) can be found using the expansion
p(tk+1|(d, t1, ..., tk)) =
∑
h p(tk+1|h)p(h|d, t1, ..., tk). The learner has the
option of receiving a further piece of testimony, leading to rexpected to either
be rtotal as in Equation 3.3, or as in Equation 3.4 the expected future reward
marginalized over potential future testimony. The value for rexpected can
simply be calculated recursively if, as in Experiment 6, the maximum number
of pieces of testimony the learner can receive is finite.
I tested the predictions of the model in four conditions, where individuals
had either a 60% or 90% accuracy, and demonstrators had either a 75% or
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90% accuracy. I set the reward of the task to 40, and the cost to 1, although
the results of the model are similar for a broad range of values. These values
were chosen to be broadly consistent with the cost of social information in
Experiment 6. Model predictions are given in Figure 3.4(b).
I find that if the learner is highly accurate the model predicts that they
will choose to learn from a small number of demonstrators. Conversely,
if the learner is inaccurate the model predicts that they will learn from
more demonstrators, and even more demonstrators when the demonstrators
themselves are inaccurate.
These results make sense from the perspective of the learner. If individuals
already have high accuracy, paying a cost to increase their accuracy slightly
does not yield a large amount of reward. On the other hand, if they have low
accuracy, learning from demonstrators allows them to greatly improve their
accuracy, and yield a higher reward.
3.6.2 Experiment 6
In Experiment 6 I extend the framework of Experiment 5 to analyse how many
demonstrators a learner will choose to learn from explicitly. The primary
difference between this experiment and Experiment 5 is that here participants
must press a button to receive demonstrator opinions. I also varied the quality
of the social information to be either 75% accurate or 90% accurate.
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3.6.3 Participants
Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
http://www.mturk.com, and were compensated $1.50 for their time.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four experimental
conditions, high accuracy social (90% accuracy) information, and high-quality
asocial (20 red circles) information (n=21), high accuracy social information,
and low-quality asocial (17 red circles) information (n = 20), low accuracy (75%
accuracy) social information, and high-quality asocial information (n=20), low
accuracy social information, and low-quality asocial information (n = 17).
3.6.4 Methods
This experiment was the same as Experiment 5 with the following exception.
A ‘Get Advice’ button was added to the experiment, and was disabled at
the beginning of each trial. The ‘Red’, ‘Blue’ and ‘Get Advice’ buttons were
enabled immediately after the stimulus presentation, instead of waiting until
all social information was given. Pressing the ‘Get Advice’ button immediately
showed the advice of one demonstrator (either “red” or “blue”), and disabled
the ‘Get Advice’ button for 500ms. A maximum of five demonstrators could
be asked for advice, at which point pressing the button did nothing.
In addition, 500ms after the stimuli was presented the text ‘Press “Get
Advice” for more information.’ was placed on central black circle.
Demonstrators were either accurate 75% of the time or 90% of the time,
and the proportion of circles was either 20 of one colour and 13 of another, or
17 of one colour and 16 of another.
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Figure 3.4: Experimental data and model predictions for Experiment 6, giving the number
of demonstrators (out of 5) participants asked to see depending on the condition they were
in and the participants’ current score. Score (between 0 and 20) is used as a proxy for
trial number since it is naturally bounded, whereas the number of trails each participant
performed varied between participants based on their accuracy. Since the number of
demonstrators participant’s chose to learn from changed over time, the comparison between
the experimental results and the model predictions (which assumed perfect knowledge of
reliability and accuracy), should be done only after learning occurred and the number of
demonstrators each participant learned from stabilized (e.g. score > 15, shown by the
dashed line).
3.6.5 Results
The results of this experiment are given in Figure 3.4(a). I found that
the number of demonstrators participants chose to learn from depended on
both the quality of their asocial information and the accuracy of their social
information. I found that participants who had access to low-quality asocial
information asked to see the responses of more demonstrators, compared
to those with access to high-quality asocial information (3-factor ANOVA
F(1, 2522) = 406.394, p < .01). I also found a small, but significant
interaction between the accuracy of the social information, and the quality
of the asocial information (3-factor ANOVA F(1, 2522) = 40.489, p < .01).
When participants had access to low-quality asocial information they chose to
learn from more demonstrators if the demonstrators were inaccurate, compared
to accurate. However when the participants had access to high-quality
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asocial information, participants tended to learn from none or just one
demonstrator. They also tended to learn from slightly more demonstrators
if the demonstrators were accurate, compared to inaccurate (3-factor ANOVA
F(1, 2522) = 11.562, p < .01).
I also find evidence for a learning effect whereby participants with
low-quality asocial information tended to learn from an increasingly large
number of demonstrators over time (3-factor ANOVA F(1, 2522) = 149.178,
p < .01), or as their score increased (3-factor ANOVA F(1, 2522) = 15.45, p <
.01).
3.6.6 Discussion
I find that participants choose the number of demonstrators they learn from
based on the accuracy of their own information and demonstrator accuracy, in
a manner broadly consistent with the model predictions.
Participants chose the greatest number of demonstrators to learn from when
demonstrators were inaccurate, and when their own personal information was
poor. When demonstrators are more accurate, individuals choose to learn
from fewer demonstrators. This effect is reversed when individuals receive
high quality asocial information, where having accurate demonstrators slightly
increases the average number of demonstrators from whom participants chose
to learn.
Interestingly, the behavioural data from this experiment suggests that the
appropriate number of demonstrators chosen can be learned over time (Figure
3.4(a)). Initially, participants do not ask many demonstrators for advice. The
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number of demonstrators that participants ask does not substantially change
in either of the high-quality asocial information conditions, but increases in
the low-quality asocial information condition. The speed of change is greater
when demonstrators are inaccurate, compared to accurate.
The results of this experiment are broadly consistent with the Bayesian
model, which predicts that individuals will choose more demonstrators to learn
from where asocial information is poor. The model also captures the effect
that if asocial information is good, and demonstrators are highly accurate,
then individuals will seek more social information to ’double check’ their
information compared to where demonstrators are of low accuracy. Given these
qualitative parallels, the fact that the quantitative predictions of the model and
the experiment are different is not surprising – in the model I made a number
of assumptions of how participants judged the reliability of their own evidence,
of social evidence and the cost of asking for social information. Overall
individuals were more conservative then the model predicts and asked to see
more demonstrators. It is likely that by changing some of these parameters a
better quantitative fit to the empirical data could be obtained.
3.7 General discussion
I have examined how individuals learn from multiple demonstrators depending
on the accuracy of their own information and the accuracy of each
demonstrator. In Experiments 1 and 2, I found that individuals would prefer
demonstrators depending on the demonstrator’s accuracy. In Experiments
3 and 4, I found that individuals would strategically go with the majority,
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when receiving conflicting asocial information, but might weigh their own
information more than social information. Experiment 5 confirmed the results
of Experiments 3 and 4 using a different task, whilst Experiment 6 investigated
how individuals choose how many demonstrators they learn from. In all
experiments, individuals’ responses mirrored a simple model of Bayesian
learning.
In Experiments 3-5 I was able to replicate the “conformity bias” results
of Asch and Sherif that suggest that individuals may in some cases follow the
majority even if it disagrees with their own personal information. However in
these experiments I find that to the extent that individuals have a “conformity
bias” it is rational to do so. Individuals, by and large, follow a Bayesian
model and do not mindlessly choose to go with the majority, but instead do
so strategically, relying on personal information if it is more reliable than the
information provided by the majority. However where their information is
unreliable (as in Experiment 5), or the majority provides a greater source of
information (as in Experiments 3 and 4), individuals will follow the majority.
I also find support for the form of “conformist transmission” predicted
by many formal models. Conformist transmission analyses how individuals
learn from multiple demonstrators when not provided any asocial information.
This occurred in Experiments 1 and 2, when individuals received only social
information. In these experiments I find that when demonstrator accuracy
is high, individuals will disproportionately copy the majority, as conformity
bias transmission predicts, but when accuracy is low the copy demonstrator
behaviours randomly. This suggest that the level of conformity biased
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transmission that individuals deploy likely depends on the context in which
they find themselves.
A key finding of Experiment 6 was that individuals not only choose a
number of demonstrators to learn from based on their own accuracy and the
accuracy of others, but learn to do so over the course of multiple trials. This
implies that human social learning is deployed flexibly and in line with the
results of Experiments 1-4, that it responds to the context in which learners
find themselves. These results stand in contrast to the assumption of many
evolutionary models of social learning and conformity bias transmission that
ostensibly assume that the degree of reliance on social learning is genetically
specified and fixed over the course of a learner’s life time. (It is important to
recognize this assumption is often made for mathematical convenience rather
than commitment to a particular mechanism, and much theory in this domain
implicitly or explicitly adopts a ‘phenotypic gambit’ approach). Nonetheless, I
find that in humans the manner in which social information is used can change
depending on explicit information about the environment (Experiments 1-4),
or prior experience with a task (Experiments 5 and 6).
I have used a series of Bayesian models to investigate how individuals might
learn to process social information, finding a good qualitative fit between the
model predictions and individual’s behaviours in each experiment. This work
stands in line with similar work that has analysed human social learning in the
context of Bayesian learning (Shafto et al., 2012; Hu et al., 2013; Buchsbaum
et al., 2012). However the results of these studies do not necessarily imply
learners are Bayesian – other models of cognition may give similar results –
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instead the models simply provide a guideline for understanding how a rational
learner might act in a wide variety of situations. The fact that I find that
humans perform qualitatively similarly to a rational learner in these situations,
suggests that the mechanism that they use to process social information are
able to accurately change in the light of differences of the reliability of asocial
information and social information.
In sum, this analysis sheds new light on how humans’ use of conformist
transmission may change depending on local factors like demonstrator accuracy
and number of demonstrators. These experiments reveal that by varying
demonstrator accuracy I can recreate a conformity bias both in the traditional
sense of Sherif and Asch’s work in social psychology, but also in the sense of
Boyd and Richerson’s ‘conformist transmission’. I also find that individuals
are able to use information about demonstrator accuracy to choose the number
of demonstrators from whom they learn. This work also suggests a possible
reason for previous evidence for conformity biased transmission; if individuals
do not have access to the exact level of accuracy of received social information,
they may overestimate how accurate it is, and thereby put more faith in the
majority’s response. In cases when demonstrator’s past accuracy has been
verified, such a response may in fact be rational.
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Statistical analysis of social learning in avian
diffusion experiments
Abstract
A number of recent studies have used Network Based Diffusion Analysis
(NBDA) to detect the role of social transmission in the spread of a novel
behaviour through a population. In this chapter I present a unified framework
for performing NBDA in a Bayesian setting and demonstrate how the
Watanabe Akaike Information Criteria (WAIC) can be used for effective
model selection. I present a specific example of applying this method to
performing Time to Acquisition Diffusion Analysis (TADA), a commonly used
implementation of NBDA. To examine the robustness of this technique, I
performed a large scale simulation study and found that NBDA using WAIC
could recover the correct model of social transmission under a wide range
of cases, including under the presence of random effects, individual-level
variables, and alternative models of social transmission. I also apply this
method to an experimental study on the diffusion of foraging information in
budgerigars and find that although several novel behaviours diffused through
the populations, only in some cases was the diffusion due to social transmission.
This work suggests that NBDA is an effective tool for uncovering whether
social transmission underpins the spread of a novel behaviour, and may provide
accurate results even when key model assumptions are relaxed.
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4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I examined how adult humans learned from
multiple independent demonstrators. The study demonstrated the complex
social learning mechanisms that underlie human social learning. However
understanding social learning in animals is not as easy a task – in many cases
it can be hard to determine when and how animals use social information by
observational or even experimental studies alone (Allen et al., 2013; Reader,
2004; Atton et al., 2012).
An early approach in distinguishing social transmission and asocial learning
was to analyse the shape of the “diffusion curve”, the number of animals in the
population who had performed the novel behaviour over time (Lefebvre, 2000).
The theory was that if the diffusion followed an accelerating pattern, or an
“s-shaped curve”, this was likely a product of social learning (Reader, 2004).
However “s-shaped curves’ can also be produced by other mechanisms, like
individual differences in the rates of learning, which has lead to the technique to
be considered unreliable (Franz and Nunn, 2009; Hoppitt et al., 2010; Reader,
2004).
Later research has responded to concerns over the validity of diffusion curve
analysis to develop novel statistical tools to analyse the rates of diffusion of
novel behaviours. Network Based Diffusion Analysis (NBDA), is one such
approach that infers social transmission if the spread of the novel behaviour
follows a social network (Franz and Nunn, 2009; Hoppitt et al., 2010). In most
cases the social network is a pre-established association network (e.g. Aplin
et al., 2012; Allen et al., 2013) that is assumed to reflect opportunities for
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learning between each pair of individuals (Hoppitt et al., 2010). However the
networks used can instead directly reflect the pattern of recorded (probable)
observations among individuals if such information is available (Hobaiter et al.,
2014), or different networks can be used to represent different hypotheses about
the pathways of transmission (e.g. Farine et al., 2015)
Although initially a frequentest method, NBDA has been recast into a
Bayesian framework to allow better specification of different models of social
learning, and the inclusion of random effects (e.g. Boogert et al., 2014;
Nightingale et al., 2015). Although the move to a Bayesian model of NBDA
has advantages, one of the disadvantages has been the ability for researchers
unfamiliar with the method to use it, a problem exacerbated by the existence
of a number of alternatives for model selection, several of which have been
used in the context of NBDA.
In this chapter, I address these issues by presenting and evaluating
a framework for performing NBDA where model selection is done using
the Watanabe Akaike Information Criteria (WAIC; Watanabe, 2013). Use
of WAIC has the advantage that it is computationally relatively more
straightforward to implement than alternatives like reversible jump Markov
chain Monte Carlo (RJMCMC). One of the goals of this chapter is to evaluate
the performance of WAIC in performing model selection in the context of
NBDA, and to examine how the performance changes if key model assumptions
are not met. Here I provide a computational framework for performing model
selection with WAIC, and evaluate the method’s performance using a large
simulation study. I then use this new procedure to analyse the results of a set
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of diffusion experiments carried out on with captive budgerigars.
4.2 Network based diffusion analysis
Network based Diffusion Analysis is a general framework for evaluating
different hypotheses for the spread of a novel behaviour. At its core, NBDA
relies on a two-step process to evaluate, and select a most likely model that
describes observed data. First, we construct a likelihood function to represent
the likelihood that each model generated the observed data. Many of these
likelihood functions require the values for large number of parameters to
be estimated. To estimate these parameters, Bayes’ rule is used to fit the
parameters to the data. The resulting model and parameters are then assessed
using WAIC, which evaluates the predictive fit of each model. In the simplest
case the model with the best (lowest) WAIC is chosen as our model.
NBDA falls under a wide class of hierarchical Bayesian models (Gelman
et al., 2014), and many of the steps below are applicable to a broad range of
settings. NBDA is distinguished from other hierarchical models by explicitly
modelling social influences on learning. There are two notable variants of
NBDA. Time of Acquisition Diffusion Analysis (TADA) analyses the time at
which an animal first performs a novel behaviour, and can be analysed in
continuous (Hoppitt et al., 2010) or discrete (Franz and Nunn, 2009) time.
In contrast, Order of Acquisition Diffusion Analysis (OADA) analyses only
the order in which animals first perform the behaviour. Here I focus on
continuous TADA and evaluate the effectiveness of NBDA with WAIC in this
context, although the same approach is applicable to other variants of NBDA
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like OADA.
4.3 Time of acquisition diffusion analysis
Time of Acquisition Diffusion Analysis is a modelling technique which
evaluates whether the rate at which an individual first perform a novel
behaviour is dependent on the behaviours of other individuals in that
population. Because the method focuses primarily on acquisition, it typically
only analyses the initial performance of a novel behaviour and ignores
subsequent performance.
As an example, imagine a population of birds learning to flip open the lid
of containers to receive a food reward (e.g. see Figure 4.9). When the task is
initially presented, none of the birds are able to solve it. Over a long period of
time, all or most of the birds are eventually able to solve the task and receive
the food reward. The question I wish to ask is, was the spread of the novel
behaviour (flipping the lid) acquired through asocial learning alone, or asocial
learning aided by social transmission. If learning was done through pure asocial
learning (including the effects of individual-level covariates), then the rate at
which each bird solves the task should be constant, and independent of other
birds having solved the task. If the learning was aided by social transmission,
that rate of solving should increase as more other birds solve the task.
We can formalize this logic using an instantaneous rate model. This model
assumes that at each instant, a given bird has a some chance of learning the
novel behaviour. In the case of asocial learning, this rate does not depend on
the number of other birds that had previously solved the task. In the case of
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social transmission, this rate will be sensitive to other birds solving the task.
To generate a likelihood function, I assume that at each instant the rate
that bird i, solves the task (i.e. acquires the novel behaviour) is λi(t), where
λi(t) = ai(t) + si(t), (4.1)
the sum of an asocial learning rate a and social learning rate s. These rates
are allowed to change over time, allowing the model to capture changes in the
birds’ environment, and the birds’ social environment.
There may be individual-level differences in the rate at which the birds learn
novel behaviours, to capture these differences I parametrize asocial learning as
ai(t) = exp(λ0 + Ai + φi), (4.2)
where λ0 stands for a base rate of learning, modified by some set of
individual-level covariates, Ai and individual-level random effects φi.
To incorporate social information we must be explicit on how an
individual’s learning rate is influenced by other animal’s actions. In TADA
I assume that animals are only influenced by the number of other individuals
who have solved the task. I assume that the social learning rate is
si(t) = σiSi(t), (4.3)
where σi is an individual-level rate which determines the influence of social
information and Si captures how much social information is in the environment.
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Like asocial learning, we allow for individual-level differences in social learning
ability,
σi(t) = exp(s0 +Bi + ψi), (4.4)
where s0 is a base rate of social learning, Bi the influence of individual-level
covariates on social learning, and ψi the influence of individual-level random
effects on social learning. Si is given by
Si(t) =
∑
aijIj(t), (4.5)
where aij(t) is the amount of influence individual i has on individual j, and
Ij(t) is an indicator variable that is 1 if animal j has solved the task prior
to time t, and 0 otherwise. The amount of influence each individual exerts
on each other can be captured by a social network which can be empirically
estimated (Boogert et al., 2008). If there are no network differences, then
Si(t) =
∑
Ij(t) or the number of animals who have solved the task at each
point in time. This model of assumes that the rate of learning due to social
transmission depends linearly on the number of other animals who have solved
the task. Other learning rules are possible, and I discuss some of these below
in Section 4.5.
In TADA, the rates of solving are estimates from the observed data using
a hazard model, where if an individual has not solved the task at time t0 then
the likelihood that they solve the task at t1 is,
p(si = t) = λi(t1)
∫ t1
t0
exp(λi(t))dt, (4.6)
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and the likelihood that they fail to solve the task by time t1 is
p(si > t1) =
∫ t1
t0
exp(λi(t))dt. (4.7)
Note that the parametrization of the model presented here differs from the
original presentation of the continuous TADA (Hoppitt et al., 2010), although
it follows that used for previous versions of Bayesian NBDA (Nightingale
et al., 2015). The parametrization presented is better suited for Monte Carlo
sampling (Nightingale et al., 2015) but estimates for the parameter for the
original specification can still be obtained from the posterior distribution.
Using the hazard model and our parametrization of the learning rate,
we can estimate the rates of different model parameters based on a given
data set by using Bayes’ rule. Bayesian inference can be accomplished by
a mutli-functional statistical software packages like JAGS or Stan. In this
study, I use a hand-coded Monte Carlo sampler implemented in R (R Core
Team, 2013). Once posterior distributions are obtained, we can then use a
model selection technique to compare between different models of learning. I
outline one model selection approach below.
4.4 Model selection using WAIC
The goal of model selection is to compare multiple competing models, given a
data set, and determine a single, or set of likely candidate model(s) that are
thought to be ‘best’. In the context of NBDA, a primary goal of the model
selection is often to tell if a social model describes the data better than a purely
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asocial model. Although there are many ways of defining a best model, in this
context, I evaluate models based on their predictive validity. Other approaches
are discussed in the discussion.
Predictive validity is an assessment of the ability of each model to predict
the results of future experiments, or unanalysed tasks. However true measures
of predictive validity can be hard to obtain since it is often not feasible, or
expensive to collect further data. A traditional alternative is to examine the
performance of the model in relation to predicting already obtained data. In
the best case, ’leave one out’ cross validation trains the model on all but one
piece of data, and then examines how well the model predicts the left out
piece of data. This process is repeated for every data point. This technique
is computationally expensive with a large number of data points, and may be
inappropriate with few data points, since a single data point may be a large
fraction of the total data.
There exist alternatives to leave one out cross validation like information
criteria, a set of techniques (including WAIC) for balancing goodness of fit
to collected data, against the number of parameters in the model. In some
cases these techniques are asymptotically equivalent to leave one out cross
validation as the number of data points grows large, while being much more
computationally tractable to compute.
Here, I use the Watanabe Akaike Information Criteria (WAIC) to score each
model. WAIC is a new alternative to older information criteria like Akaike’s
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) or Deviance Information Criterion
(DIC; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). It has a number of advantages over AIC
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and DIC. Unlike AIC or DIC, which assess a model’s fit based on a single
point estimate, WAIC uses the entire Bayesian posterior distribution, making
it more accurate when the posterior distribution is not normally distributed.
The results of WAIC also asymptotically approach Bayesian cross validation
in the large sample limit (Watanabe, 2013).
WAIC assesses model fit by computing the ability of each model to predict
the entire data set that it is fit on, penalizing models that have an un-even fit
across individual pieces of data. WAIC can be calculated by (Gelman et al.,
2014):
WAIC = −2(lppd− pWAIC), (4.8)
where lppd is the logpoint-wise predictive density, and pWAIC is a term
that penalizes models with large numbers of paramaters. The factor of -2
brings WAIC to be on the same scale as other information criteria. lppd is
approximated using the posterior output of an MCMC chain by:
lppd =
∑
log(Epostp(yi|θ)), (4.9)
where the outer sum is over individual data points, and the inner term is the
expectation of the likelihood over the entire posterior sample. This value is
then corrected for the estimated number of parameters of the model by
pWAIC =
∑
varpostlog(p(yi|θ). (4.10)
This remaining term penalizes models that have uneven (i.e. high variance)
fit across different data points, which may be an indication of over fitting.
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To perform model selection, we can fit multiple potential models to the
data and use WAIC to evaluate their predictive value, selecting the model
with the smallest WAIC value as our chosen model.
For example, if the question of interest is whether or not animals use social
transmission to acquire behaviours, I could fit two models, one where animals
are assumed to use social information, and a second where they are assumed
to only use asocial information. After fitting both models and calculating the
WAIC for them we can assess which model has a better fit, and whether the
animals are more likely to have used social information, or to have relied only
on asocial learning.
One open question is how big does the WAIC difference between models
need to be, in order to be considered indicative of a true preference for one
model. There is no hard and fast rule, although the difference should be greater
than the variation due to Monte-Carlo sampling often greater than 1, or in the
case study presented below, greater than 5.
4.5 Simulated performance of NBDA
To evaluate the expected reliability of NBDA, I performed a large-scale
simulation study to understand under what conditions NBDA will accurately
determine whether social or asocial information was being used to solve the
task. In this study, I used a single model to generate the results of (generally)
1000 diffusion experiments, and used NBDA to infer the model used to generate
each simulation. The accuracy of NBDA is then the likelihood that the model
inferred by NBDA was the model used to generate the data.
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Table 4.1: Model parameters and the rate equation for each model used in the simulation
study.
Model Name Parameters Rate Equation
Asocial λ0 λ = exp(λ0)
Social λ0, s0 λ = exp(λ0) + exp(s0)S
Asocial with Random Effects λ0, φ λ = exp(λ0 + φi) + exp(s0)S
Social with Random Effects λ0, s0, ψ λ = exp(λ0) + exp(s0 + ψi)S
Asocial with individual-level effects λ,A λ = exp(λ0 +Ai)
Social with individual-level effects λ0, s0, B λ = exp(λ0) + exp(s0 +Bi)S
Linear Social Model λ0, s0, φ, ψ λ = exp(λ0 + φi) + exp(s0 + ψi)S
Diminishing Returns Social Model λ0, s0, φ, ψ λ = exp(λ0 + φi) + exp(s0 + ψi)
√
S
Threshold Social Model λ0, s0, φ, ψ λ = exp(λ0 + φi) + exp(s0 + ψi)sign(S)
Unless otherwise noted, each simulation followed the same design. I
considered a population of ten animals who were given a novel foraging task
(similar to Boogert et al., 2008, 2014). Each experiment was run until each
animal in the group had “solved” the novel task. This process was repeated
ten times with the same group of animals.
The data for each experiment were generated by turning the hazard model
above, into a generative model. For each simulation a model of learning was
chosen (e.g. asocial learning without random effects, social learning with
random effects), and parameter values for the model were drawn from our
prior distribution (see Table 4.2). The models, including parameters and
the distributions for each parameter are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The
distributions give in Table 4.2 were also used as the prior distribution for
performing Bayesian inference (see below). individual-level effects were treated
as a product of an underlying measurable property, η, and a rate term a or b.
I assumed that η was normally distributed with mean 0.
I allowed individuals to use the social information provided on either a
homogeneous network, or on a lesioned network. In the lesioned network, half
of the network connections between individuals were removed. Because there
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Table 4.2: Model Parameter Distributions.
Paramater Distribution
λ0 Uniform(-7, -5)
s0 Uniform(-7, -5)
φi Normal(0, 1)
ψi Normal(0, 1)
a Uniform(-1, 1)
b Uniform(-1, 1)
may be cases where researchers are not able to measure the network accurately,
I examined three alternative social networks, which had errors in either 25%,
50% or 75% of the network connections – removing a connection if one existed,
or adding a connection if there was none.
I considered three models of social learning. In all cases, I assumed that the
social information was transmitted on a homogeneous network. In the Linear
model, social information term was set to s = ck, where k is the number of
animals who have already solved the task (c is a constant). In the Diminishing
Returns model, social information was set to s = c
√
k, to model the fact
that subsequent solvers may have a diminishing influence. The choice of the
square-root function to model this process was arbitrary; other functions give
similar results. In the Threshold model, social information was set to s = cI
where I is 1 if at least one other individual has solved the task, and 0 otherwise.
After each simulated experiment, NBDA was performed using TADA. I
used WAIC to evaluate a number of alternative models and select the best
model. Unless otherwise stated, I ran 1,000 simulated experiments for each set
of models, with different parameter values for each experiment.
In the first set of simulations I look at recovering the correct underlying
model and parameter values for when learners use only asocial learning (with
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random effects), or asocial learning and social transmission (with random
effects). In the next set of simulations I examined whether we could correctly
infer the influence of individual-level variables on learning. In the last set of
simulations, I also examined whether we could correctly infer the underlying
model of social learning for each experiment.
4.5.1 Model and parameter recovery
To estimate our ability to recover the correct underlying model used to
generate the data set, I simulated diffusion based on four models: the asocial,
social, asocial with random effects, and social with random effects models.
The performance of model recovery is given in Figure 4.1. Overall the
statistical technique was able to determine whether or not a model uses asocial
information or social information, but there was a high false positive rate for
detecting the presence of random effects, shown by the large number of asocial
models without random effects being inferred to be asocial models with random
effects (Figure 4.1(a)), with the same holding true for social models (Figure
4.1(b)). However even though this method occasionally infers the presence of
random effects it is still able to distinguish between social and asocial models,
e.g. data generated from a social model may be inferred to have been generated
from a social model with random effects, but is unlikely to be inferred to have
been generated from either an asocial model, or an asocial model with random
effects. This suggest that it may appear that there is underlying variation in
social and asocial learning ability, where no such variation exists.
We are also interested in whether or not we can correctly infer the
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Figure 4.1: Model performance for inferring the asocial, social, asocial with random effects
and social learning with random effects models.
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Figure 4.2: Inferred model parameters for the asocial and social models.
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underlying learning rates. I assess this question by looking at the social
learning model without random effects. The inferred (median) asocial learning
and social transmission rates compared to the true rates are given in Figure
4.2.
The performance of inferring the correct value of the random effects was
substantially lower, although in most cases this method correctly inferred the
relative ordering of the random effect values (i.e. which bird learned faster) but
misestimated the absolute value of the random effect values. The technique’s
ability to recover the ordering (expressed by the within-experiment correlation
between the inferred values and the true values) is fairly good, with over 85%
of the time the Spearman correlation coefficient is higher than .9.
These findings suggest that researchers are safe in using NBDA to infer
population average rates of asocial learning, and social transmission, and thus
draw conclusions about the overall importance of each (the primary goal of
NBDA), if the model is correctly specified (see below). However, I suggest
that researchers should not take estimates of individual variability in asocial
learning and social transmission too seriously, but are safe to use the technique
to obtain rankings of individual abilities in these domains.
4.5.2 Individual-level effects
There has been recent interest in understanding which other traits that an
individual possesses might correlate with asocial or social learning abilities
(e.g. Boogert et al., 2006, 2008). Individual-level effects allow us to include the
influence of these covariates in our model. I found that NBDA could correctly
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Figure 4.3: Model Performance for the individual-level effects models.
interpret the presence of correlates for social, or asocial information some of
the time, but the false negative rate was high (see Figure 4.3; although it was
able to distinguish between models that included social learning and those that
did not). I also found that the technique could mostly infer the true value of
the covariate; and find that for the individual-level asocial effects 94.7% of the
time the true value is within our 95% likely interval, and for the social effects
95.3% of the time the true value is within our 95% likely interval.
These results may in part be due to the presence of covariates that have only
a weak impact on learning. In the simulations the influence of the covariates
varied between -1 and 1, meaning that some of the time, they could have a
very small influence on social learning ability i.e. the parameter can be close
to 0. I explored how the impact size of the covariate determined the likelihood
of determining the correct model. I found that if the parameter had a large
impact, most of the time the technique could recover its presence. However
if the parameter had a small impact, the technique had a high false negative
rate.
Therefore I advise that instead of attempting to infer whether an
111
Chapter 4. Detecting social learning in diffusion experiments
individual-level effect is present or absent, researchers use the posterior
distribution for a parameter to give credible intervals for how big or small the
effect might be. Where these intervals are sufficiently small, conclusions can
be drawn about the importance or lack of importance of that effect (Nakagawa
and Cuthill, 2007).
4.5.3 Errors in assessment of social networks
I examined how NBDA would perform when diffusions followed a social
network, and when researchers had incorrect knowledge of the social network.
In these simulations, individuals had a baseline asocial and social learning
rates, and their learning followed a lesioned social network.
I found that even when social learning followed an association network,
the technique was able to determine the influence of social learning (Figure
4.4(b, c)). The ability to distinguish between social and asocial learning was
not substantially reduced when no knowledge of the network was known and
it was assumed that transmission followed a homogeneous network.
To examine how performance may change as a function of network errors,
I considered three alternative social networks, which had errors in either 25,
50, or 75% of the network connections. In all of these cases, even though the
actual social network was not known, the technique was overwhelmingly able
to interpret correctly that social transmission was at work (see Figure 4.5).
When the network was accurate, or had 25% errors, the technique generally
inferred that the social transmission followed the measured network. However,
when the network was inaccurate (50% or 75% errors), the technique inferred
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Figure 4.4: Model Performance for the social network models.
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Figure 4.5: Model performance depending on network error.
that social transmission followed a homogeneous network.
These results suggest that in many cases, analysis of a homogeneous
network is warranted, but that if a homogeneous network is preferred over
a non-homogeneous network it does not imply that social transmission was
equal, but may simply imply that the measured non-homogeneous network
was substantially different from the true network of associations.
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Figure 4.6: Model performance for the four social learning models.
4.5.4 Distinguishing alternative models of social
learning
The last thing I tested was whether or not we could distinguish between
alternative models of social learning. In these simulations, individuals had
both individual and social-level random effects and social information was
transmitted across a homogeneous network. I found that in general the
technique could correctly recover the true underlying model at above-chance
levels (except in the case of the Diminishing Returns model, Figure 4.6(c)),
and had very good performance in determining whether or not a model was
asocial, or social (Figure 4.6).
The above findings make it clear that when the true social transmission
model is included in model selection, NBDA is successful in ruling out a model
of purely asocial learning. However, it is more realistic that the model of social
transmission will be mis-specified in some way, i.e. at best our model with be
a good approximation of the social transmission process. In most cases the
linear model is assumed.
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These results show that even if the underlying model was not linear, the
technique could still detect the influence of social information, at least some of
the time. The success rate was much higher when the true model was closer to
linear, than when it was not. Furthermore in such cases, the estimated learning
parameter was generally lower than the true value of the parameter. These
results suggest that if we suspect a linear model to be a poor approximation,
then we should still trust the inference that social transmission is occurring.
However we should take estimates of the strength of social transmission to
be conservative and understand that a negative result for social transmission
may indicate that our social transmission model does not approximate the
underlying process very well.
To estimate whether considering a linear model alone is sufficient for
inferring the presence or absence of social information, I re-analyzed these
simulations considering only the Asocial and Linear social learning models.
Even if the underlying model was not linear, the technique could still detect
the influence of social information, however the social learning parameter was
generally lower than the true value of the parameter. Figure 4.6 gives the
results when all four models are considered. In contrast, Figure 4.7 gives the
results when our choice of models were restricted to an asocial and a linear
social model.
Performance was worse when the influence of social information was
smallest; particularly in the case of the threshold model, which will be
behaviourally similar to the asocial learning model. In contrast, performance
was best in the linear social learning model, where the vast majority of the
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Figure 4.7: Model performance for the four social learning models, when only the asocial
and linear social models are considered.
time, I was able to correctly infer the correct underlying model.
Finally, to understand how NBDA works in an actual experimental context,
I applied this technique to a diffusion experiment with budgerigars, below.
4.6 Social transmission in budgerigars
In this study, I examine the results of 25 diffusion experiments where eight
groups of birds were presented with one of four novel tasks without a seeded
demonstrator. The goal of this analysis was to (i) estimate the magnitude
of asocial learning and social transmission in the diffusions, (ii) examine
whether social transmission followed the social network, (iii) explore whether
two individual-level variables (competitive rank and a measure of neophobia)
predicted the innovator and the subsequent pathway of diffusion, and (iv)
investigate whether the effects of innovation differ from those of later asocial
learning
Below, I present a brief overview of the experimental methods. More
details including information about this study, including ethical information
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and the housing of the birds, can be found in Appendix 1. This experiment
was conducted by Elodie Alapetite, Alice Cowie, Tess Hanrahan, Joel Higgin,
Jennifer Falconer, Kevin Laland, and William Hoppitt. The data from this
experiment was used with their permission.
4.6.1 Methods
In this experiment eight groups of budgerigars were presented with four novel
tasks, termed the Lids, Flip, Stick and Door tasks (described below; see
Figures 4.8-4.11). The birds were allowed to interact with the task, and
the novel behaviours required to obtain food from each task was allowed to
diffuse through the population. All diffusions were “unseeded”, i.e. without a
demonstrator trained to solve the task, so we could investigate the variables
influencing the probability an individual would be the innovator. The diffusion
experiments were run in a series of sessions, with five sessions per week, and
varying numbers of sessions across tasks (see Table 4.3). Each diffusion was
preceded by a period of pre-training to ensure that birds were motivated to
solve the task. This involved feeding from a reduced version of the task that
did not require solving. Pre-training was run until all birds in the group were
observed feeding from the reduced task, and for a minimum of seven sessions.
Pilot studies with the Lids task suggested pretraining was necessary, otherwise
no birds were likely to solve the task in a feasible time frame. Furthermore,
the pre-training phase meant that in all cases budgerigars likely knew that
food was present in the tasks, regardless of whether the task was clear (Door
and Flip) or opaque (Lids and Stick).
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The lids task (Figure 4.8) consisted of a small plastic brown plant pot of
base diameter 3.5cm cut down to a height of 3.5cm, and attached to wide
square cardboard base (side = 10cm) to ensure that it could not be knocked
over. Task solution required a bird to remove a white circular lid to gain
access to a valued food reward inside the pot (half a piece of sweetcorn). The
lid consisted of two pieces of white cardboard (diameter = 6cm) sandwiching
a 2 pence coin, which added weight, stuck together with tape. 8 copies of
the task were presented in each session to ensure that a single bird could not
monopolise the task, and each task apparatus (like the stick task, below) could
only be solved once without the disturbance of removal and replenishing.
The flip task (Figure 4.9) consisted of a rectangular clear glass bowl ( 9L x
7W x 4H cm) to which we attached a cardboard lid, hinged across the centre of
the bowl, which could be pushed downwards on either side of the hinge to gain
access to the food reward. Half of the lid was coloured red, and the other half
blue, such that a bird had two identifiable options to solve the task. Elastic
bands were used to tension the lid so it returned to the closed position after
each solve. 4 copies of the task were presented each session, with the positions
of the red/blue sides balanced across session. Since the task reset itself between
solves, we put 20 halved pieces of sweetcorn in each side to ensure the food
reward did not run out.
The stick task (Figure 4.10) was designed such that it could be solved in
two different ways. A piece of sweetcorn was skewered on a cocktail stick,
which protruded outside the task structure: the birds could solve the task by
pulling the stick out, or by lifting a hinged cardboard lid to access the food
118
Chapter 4. Detecting social learning in diffusion experiments
underneath. In practise, all solvers used the “stick” option. Four identical
copies of the task were presented. As with the Lids task, if all tasks had been
solved after 20 minutes, the tasks were reset so they could be solved again.
The door task (Figure 4.11) consisted of a transparent plastic box (13Lx
9.5Wx 7.5Hcm), containing a piece of millet spray. The birds had to open a
hinged cardboard door (5.5 x 4cm) to gain access to the millet spray. The door
would swing back into a closed position after solving. The task was designed
such that birds could potentially open the door by pushing or pulling on it. In
practise all solvers used either the “push” option, or learned to feed from the
millet spray through the small gap under the door, which we included as a task
solution. The millet spray was attached to the inside of the box to prevent
birds from removing it from the box. Two copies of the task were presented.
Prior to the task, the researchers removed the group’s ad libitum food
60 minutes later the diffusion session was run for 40 minutes. Screens were
placed between the subject group and adjacent group(s) to ensure that the
task solutions could not be socially transmitted between groups. Although
the screens did not prevent acoustic communication, it was judged unlikely
that the solution of the tasks could be transmitted acoustically. With the
exception of the Door task, the researchers then guided the budgerigars into
one half of their enclosure, and inserted an opaque divider, allowing us to set
up the task in the other half of the enclosure without being observed by the
birds.
In total 25 diffusions were run: 6 Lids tasks; 6 Flip tasks; 8 Stick tasks and 5
Door tasks (see Table 4.3). As the diffusions were conducted over a substantial
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Figure 4.8: A schematic of the lid task. Figure reproduced with permission from Whalen
et al. under review.
Figure 4.9: A schematic of the flip task. Figure reproduced with permission from Whalen
et al. under review.
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Figure 4.10: A schematic of the stick task. Note that in practice, birds only used the first
method to solve the task. Figure reproduced with permission from Whalen et al. under
review.
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Figure 4.11: A schematic of the door task. Figure reproduced with permission from
Whalen et al. under review.
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period of time (17 months), throughout the course of the experiment some
budgerigars died, and where convenient these were replaced with new birds.
In addition, some birds had to be temporarily isolated from their group due to
illness or injury. This means that the group size varied, and that some birds
were present in some diffusions but not others. However, this is taken into
account in the analysis. Such groups were allowed at least 2 weeks to settle
before any data was collected, which was judged to be sufficient to allow the
social structure to stabilise.
Social network data
In this experiment, I examined a nearest neighbour network where each
connection from A to B is an estimate of the probability that, at any given
time, A will be the closest individual to B. This was chosen as a plausible
measure of how likely B is to learn from A, each time A solves a task. Social
network data was collected in the 2-3 weeks preceding each diffusion, to allow
for the fact that the social network might change over time.
For each session of data collection an experimenter collected data on all the
birds in a single room (2 or 3 groups), obtaining 5 observations on each bird.
This was done by cycling through all the birds in the room and, at 30s intervals,
recording which bird was closest to the focal bird for that observation. This
meant that observations on each bird, as a focal bird, were further apart in
time and have lower autocorrelation, than observing a continuous sequence on
each bird. Nonetheless, we allowed for autocorrelations when estimating the
social network and its precision. On occasion, it was not possible to distinguish
which bird was closest to the focal bird, so two or three nearest neighbours
123
Chapter 4. Detecting social learning in diffusion experiments
Task 
 
G
roup 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Lids 
N
um
ber solved task 
 
6 
 
7 
4 
5 
3 
5 
N
um
ber contacted task  
 
6 
 
7 
5 
8 
4 
7 
N
um
ber of birds in group 
 
8 
 
8 
7 
8 
8 
8 
D
ate started 
N
ot run 
19/05/08 
N
ot run 
19/05/08 
19/05/08 
16/05/08 
16/05/08 
16/05/08 
N
um
ber of sessions 
 
24 
 
21 
19 
21 
21 
24 
Total diffusion tim
e (hours) 
 
10.9 
 
8.5 
8.8 
10.4 
9.7 
11.1 
Experim
enters 
 
EA
 W
H
 
 
EA
 W
H
 
EA
 W
H
 
EA
 W
H
 
EA
 W
H
 
EA
 W
H
 
Flip 
N
um
ber solved task 
 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
 
5 
N
um
ber contacted task  
 
3 
2 
5 
8 
3 
 
8 
N
um
ber of birds in group 
 
5 
6 
8 
8 
8 
 
8 
D
ate started 
N
ot run 
21/09/09 
21/01/09 
09/09/08 
09/09/08 
21/01/09 
N
ot run 
04/09/08 
N
um
ber of sessions 
 
20 
9 
11 
15 
9 
 
11 
Total diffusion tim
e (h) 
 
14.4 
5.2 
7.4 
7.3 
6.2 
 
6.4 
Experim
enters 
 
A
C
 
W
H
 
W
H
 
W
H
 
W
H
 
 
W
H
 
Stick 
N
um
ber solved task 
1 
0 
2 
0 
3 
3 
0 
4 
N
um
ber contacted task  
3 
2 
7 
5 
5 
7 
4 
8 
N
um
ber of birds in group 
5 
5 
7 
8 
6 
8 
7 
8 
D
ate started 
07/04/09 
02/11/09 
31/03/09 
16/06/09 
21/09/09 
18/03/09 
16/06/09 
16/07/09 
N
um
ber of sessions 
11 
20 
25 
30 
25 
30 
30 
31 
Total diffusion tim
e (h) 
7.3 
16.7 
10.6 
20.0 
19.8 
9.7 
20.0 
20.7 
Experim
enters 
JH
 
A
C
 
JH
 
TH
 
A
C
 
JH
 
TH
 
TH
 A
C
 
D
oor 
N
um
ber solved task 
 
8 
 
6 
0 
0 
2 
 
N
um
ber contacted task  
 
8 
 
6 
2 
3 
6 
 
N
um
ber of birds in group 
 
8 
 
6 
6 
7 
6 
 
D
ate started 
N
ot run 
02/04/09 
N
ot run 
22/04/09 
20/07/09 
11/08/09 
15/04/09 
N
ot run 
N
um
ber of sessions 
 
19 
 
6 
8 
22 
9 
 
Total diffusion tim
e (h) 
 
12.7 
 
4.0 
5.3 
14.7 
6.0 
 
Experim
enters 
 
TH
 
 
TH
 
TH
 
TH
 
TH
 
 
 
T
a
b
le
4
.3
:
S
u
m
m
a
ry
of
d
iff
u
sio
n
ex
p
erim
en
ts.
D
iff
u
sio
n
s
a
re
sh
a
d
ed
d
a
rk
g
rey
if
a
t
lea
st
o
n
e
b
ird
solved
th
e
task
,
ligh
t
grey
if
n
o
b
ird
s
solved
th
e
task
,
an
d
w
h
ite
if
th
e
ta
sk
w
a
s
n
o
t
ru
n
fo
r
th
at
g
ro
u
p
.
124
Chapter 4. Detecting social learning in diffusion experiments
could be recorded. On other occasions, the focal bird was far from the rest of
the group such that recording the nearest neighbour seemed misleading. To
allow for this, no nearest neighbour was recorded if the closest bird was judged
to be > 30cm away. Consequently the network connection from A to B is
really an estimate of the probability that, at any given time, A is both closest
to B and within 30cm. For the initial diffusions 20 sessions in every room (100
observations per bird) were conducted but for later diffusions 10 sessions (50
observations per bird) in each room were conducted as this was judged this to
be sufficient from the first set of association data.
To take into account alternative social networks how behaviours might
diffuse over a homogeneous network was also analysed, a proxy for alternative
unknown networks.
Competitive ranks
The competitive rank (CR) of a bird was calculated using a similar method to
Boogert et al. (2008), by ranking individuals on their access to a highly valued
resource (millet spray). After a one-hour period of food deprivation, the millet
spray was placed through the mesh of the enclosure, next to a perch where only
1-2 individuals could access it at a time, setting up a video camera to record
access to the millet spray. The total time each individual spent feeding during
the following 10 mins was recorded. This occurred ten times for each group
over a period of 2-3 weeks prior to the initial diffusion experiments. This was
repeated for any group that acquired additional members, in order to update
competitive ranks. Competitive rank was the rank of each bird in the total
time spent feeding over the ten sessions. This was then transformed to allow
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for different group sizes, by calculating CR=(Rank-1)/(N-1)-0.5, where N is
the number in the group. This leads to an index that varies from -0.5 (highest
ranking) to 0.5 (lowest ranking).
Latency to feed in a novel environment
The second dependent measure, latency to feed in a novel environment
(LTFNE), was measured by placing four birds from the same group in separate
visually isolated cages in a testing room that contained no other birds and was
unfamiliar to the subjects. The birds were food deprived for 1 hour to try to
ensure that they were all motivated to feed at the start of the trial. At the
beginning of each trial, a single food bowl was placed in each bird’s cage and
set a video camera to record all birds’ behaviour. The trial lasted 4 hours,
after which the birds were replaced in their groups 30 mins before sunset to
ensure they had time to feed in familiar conditions. LTFNE was the time each
bird first fed from the bowl. Birds that did not feed were given a ceiling value
of 14,400s.
Analysis
I analysed these data using an adapted version of NBDA in order to investigate
the questions above. I used the following rate equations to model the diffusion
process:
aijk(t) = exp(λ0 + AijIijk(t) +Bij(1− Iijk(t)) + ωk), (4.11)
where aijk(t) stands for the rate of solving due to asocial learning of individual
i in group j during task k, where λ0 is, as before, a base rate of learning,
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modified by an individual-level effect A, or B, and a term to account for task
differences, ωk. Ijk is an indicator variable giving whether or not a bird has
solved the task before in group j on task k at time t. If no bird has solved
the task than individuals use A as their rate parameter, and use B otherwise.
This separation of asocial rate parameters allows for the testing of whether the
first solve (an innovation) happens at a different rate from subsequent solves.
In this model,
Aij = α1V1,ij + α2V2,ij + φj + γij, (4.12)
and
Bij = β1, ijV1,ij + β2, ijV2,ij + φj + γij, (4.13)
where V1 is the bird’s latency to feed in a novel environment, and V2 is the
bird’s competitive rank. Both values were standardized by subtracting the
mean value across all individuals and groups. α and β determine the influence
of these individual-level covariates either before the first solve or for subsequent
solves. φi and γij are group, and individual-level random effects.
The social information term is:
σi(t) = exp(s0 + κ1, ijV1,ij + κ2, ijV2,ij + ψij + ηk), (4.14)
where κ determines the influence of the individual-level covariates, ψ accounts
for individual-level differences in social information use, and ηk accounts for
task level differences in social information use. Otherwise the details of the
model are the same as presented before.
To generate posterior samples for each parameter in the models, I used
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Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) using custom code written in R (R Core
Team 2014).Each MCMC chain was run for 500,000 samples. The first 10%
of these samples were discarded as part of the burn-in period. I thinned the
remaining samples aggressively to reduce autocorrelation, keeping only 2% of
the remaining samples. For estimates of parameters I provide the median
of the posterior distribution, which minimizes the expected absolute error of
the estimate (Jaynes, 2003). I also provide 95% credible intervals in squared
parentheses, which give the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the posterior sample
as a credible range for a parameter or contrast. Pilot simulations on the
innovation + transmission model (defined below), suggested WAIC values may
fluctuate +/- 2 between repeated simulated MCMC chains. Because of this,
I only take differences of WAIC greater than 5 to be informative differences,
and report WAIC values rounded to the nearest integer. All other values are
given to 2 significant figures.
4.6.2 Results
Innovation and asocial learning
To establish a baseline model fit, I first examined a null (constant rate) model
with only a single asocial learning parameter, where each bird solves the task
at the same constant rate (WAIC = 1,631). Compared to the constant rate
model, I found that a baseline asocial model, which included differences in
task difficulty, group-level random effects and individual-level random effects
provided a substantially better fitting model (WAIC = 1,567). Inclusion of
an effect of LTFNE (WAIC = 1,580) or CR (WAIC = 1,572) on rate of
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asocial learning to the baseline asocial model did not lead to a better model
fit when added individually, or together (WAIC = 1,566). However, when
allowing for differences in the effect of CR and LTFNE between innovators
and non-innovators in an innovation model, I found a substantially better fit
(WAIC = 1,541) than the baseline asocial model.
Social transmission
We found that an innovation + transmission model, which allowed for social
transmission based on a homogenous network, led to a better fit (WAIC =
1,512) than the innovation model. However, a worse fit was found than the
innovation model when including social transmission based on an association
network (WAIC = 1,542). In both models, I allowed for the rate of social
learning to differ between tasks. We found that including individual random
effects in social transmission (WAIC = 1,511), or allowing social transmission
to depend on LTFNE and CR (WAIC = 1,517), did not increase model fit.
To assess whether social information was used on all of the tasks, I tested
four models that only allowed social transmission to work on the task in
question, and compared WAIC to that for the innovation model (WAIC =
1,541). We found evidence for social transmission in both the Door task
(WAIC = 1,423) and the Stick task (WAIC 1,534) but not in either the Flip
task (WAIC = 1,552) or Lid Task (WAIC = 1,553).
To assess the influence of individual-level effects on innovation, in the
innovation +transmission model, I found that for innovators the effect
of LTFNE was .27 [-1.60, 1.94], and the effect of CR was -8.5 [-9.90,
-5.9] indicating that high-ranked individuals solved the task faster through
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innovation than lower-ranked individuals: with the highest-ranked innovator
(CR = -0.5) being exp(-0.5 x -8.5)/exp(0.1 x -8.5) = exp(5.1) = 164 [34, 379]
more likely to solve the task than the lowest-ranked innovator (CR = 0.1).
A similar relationship did not hold for solves that were not innovations: the
effect on CR was .34 [-1.06, 1.36].
To gauge the magnitude of the social learning effect, I found that in the
innovation +transmission model the social learning rate was -10.54 [-11.24,
-9.98] for the door task, -12.89[-14.17, -12.02] for the stick task, -12.72 [-16.66,
-11.80] for the flip task, and -13.16 [-16.92, -11.39] for the lid task. These rates
represent the sum s0 + ηk in the innovation + transmission model, and are
presented on a log scale. The social learning rate represents the increase in
solving due to social transmission. To give a sense of what the magnitude of
this rate is compared to the asocial learning rate, after a single bird solved the
task, the proportion of an average bird’s social learning rate that was due to
social effects for the Door task was .92 [.65, .99], for the Stick task was .81 [.32,
.98], for the Flip task was.40 [.01, .94], and for the Lid task was.18 [.002, .76].
The magnitude of the potential range of the estimated social learning effect
in the Lid task and the Flip Task, suggests that the model cannot distinguish
asocial learning from social learning in these two tasks, providing little evidence
that social learning was actually used to solve this task.
4.6.3 Discussion
In this analysis of novel foraging tasks, I find that in spite of the fact that
the solution to all four tasks appears to spread through multiple ‘populations’,
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there is only compelling evidence for social transmission in the door and stick
tasks, and at best a weak increase at the rate at which individuals solved
the task due to social transmission in the Lids and Flip tasks. It would have
been difficult through casual observation alone to distinguish the true cases of
social transmission from those more likely to be reliant on repeated bouts of
asocial learning. This suggests that in the future, researchers need to clearly
identify which diffusions are the product of social learning and those that are
the product of repeated asocial learning. This technique provides one method
to do that.
The lack of evidence for social transmission in the lid and flip tasks
over a homogeneous network, does not preclude the possibility that social
transmission occurred via a separate, unmeasured network. However given
the homogenous network provides a case where birds learn from each equally,
and in this case birds had the opportunity to observe every conspecific at
any point in time, I believe that it is more likely that no social transmission
occurred in the lid and flip tasks, than that it occurred but simply followed a
highly restricted network (i.e. that individual birds would only learn from a
small number of conspecifics).
4.7 General discussion
In this chapter I have built on a growing literature using NBDA to infer under
what conditions social information underlies the spread of novel behaviours. I
present a unified framework for NBDA in the context of Time to Acquisition
Diffusion Analysis. I analysed the performance of NBDA in this context on a
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series of simulated experiments and found that NBDA was robust to inferring
the presence of social information in most contexts, could infer the influence
of random effects, and in at least some cases, can distinguish between different
patterns of social learning. Finally, I applied these results to a diffusion
experiment with budgerigars and found the surprising result that in only two
out of the four tasks the diffusion was driven by social, as opposed to asocial
information.
These findings offer new insights into our ability to infer when social
transmission, as opposed to asocial learning, can account for the spread of
a novel behaviour. However, these findings are not without their own caveats.
As part of our simulation study, I found that although I could recover the
correct parameter values for population-wide effects, I often underestimated
the influence of random effects. Our performance in determining the presence
of external correlates for learning was better, but only when the influence
of these correlates was strong. I also found that I had a high error rate in
determining which model of social learning was used to generate the data.
Our overall accuracy of determining if social learning was used was high, but
our accuracy in estimating how it was used was much lower.
These findings lead me to suggest three new recommendations for the use
of NBDA. (1) When fitting models to data where multiple diffusions are run
on the same individuals, researchers should fit models with random effects to
account for repeated observations on individuals, but expect the estimated
magnitudes of the random effects to differ from the true underlying values.
(2) Individual-level effects on learning are able to be inferred, but researchers
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should rely on credible intervals as providing the plausible magnitude of the
effect, rather than using model selection to infer its presence/absence. (3)
Researchers should focus on a single, likely model of social learning to detect
the presence of social information. My results suggest the standard NBDA
model used thus far is robust to fairly major departures from the assumptions
of linearity, so I suggest this is used in the absence of any reason to prefer a
different model. If the use of social information is well established for the task,
more detailed models of learning can be used, although a large amount of data
may be required to determine the underlying shape of the model.
Unlike early versions of NBDA (Franz and Nunn, 2009; Hoppitt et al.,
2010), in this chapter I present NBDA in the context of a Bayesian
methodology, which allows us easily to include the influence of random
effects. However, while most previous studies using Bayesian NBDA have
used Reversible Jump Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to perform model
selection (Boogert et al., 2014; Nightingale et al., 2015), I suggest using
an information criteria approach. While RJMCMC, and other methods of
approximating a posterior over models are an alternative way of performing
model selection, these methods are computationally difficult to perform
especially when models have a large number of parameters, as occurs when
including individual-level random effects. The influence of random effects
is a driving factor for the development and use of a Bayesian version of
NBDA, since including random effects allows us to model cases where the same
individuals take part in multiple diffusion, and reduces the impact of random
effects (particularly in asocial learning) as a confound in inferring the presence
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of social information. Consequently, I believe that using a WAIC-based
approach provides an ideal tradeoff between tractability in performing the
analysis, and the advantages conferred by inclusion of random effects. I
recommend using Bayesian NBDA with WAIC use for examining future
diffusion experiments, and believe it can give us insights into how other animals
learn, and how that might influence the development of animal and human
culture.
Appendix
Ethical statement
The research followed the ASAB/ABS Guidelines for the Use of Animals in
Research (2006) and was approved by the University of St Andrews Animal
Welfare Committee. Food deprivation procedures were judged to be very mild
by the Named Veterinary Surgeon, and a UK Home Office license was not
required. Following the completion of the study, the budgerigars remained
in the bird housing facility for further social learning experiments until July
2012, when they were taken to a budgerigar enthusiast to be housed for the
remainder of their lives.
Birds and housing
Budgerigars were purchased from local breeders and housed indoors in a
custom bird-housing facility. There were 8 groups of 8 birds, with 3 groups
in 2 rooms and 2 groups in another room. All birds used were adult males
of age 1-5 years. Groups were composed such that individuals could be
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distinguished by their plumage and birds were fitted with Budgerigar Society
rings. Each group was housed in a mini-aviary of size 70cm x 140cm x 120cm
H, constructed of a wooden frame, painted with white Ecos Organic Paints
(www.ecospaints.com) and a wire mesh of size 1cm x 2.5cm. The floor was
covered in wood chip pellets, and perches were provided. Full time technical
staff provided husbandry and the St Andrews University vet monitored the
birds on a monthly basis. Water, food (Bucktons 50-50 finest canary and
white millet), cuttlebone, and grit were freely available. Additional foods were
also provided, including Eucalyptus, millet spray, sweetcorn, carrot, apple and
spinach. Rooms were air conditioned at a temperature of 20-21◦C with light
cycle of 12/12H, with natural daylight bulbs. “Sunset” time was staggered
between the three rooms (1550H/ 1640H/ 1730H). Budgerigars are flock-living,
group-foraging, nomadic birds of Australia, whose movements are determined
by the availability of food and water. Foraging in the presence of conspecifics
may provide individual budgerigars with the opportunity to learn socially
about the location and quality of food patches, and potentially about specific
foraging techniques.
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The spread of behaviours on graphs
Abstract
In this chapter I explore how the structure of a population can differentially
influence the spread of novel behaviours, depending on the learning strategy
of each individual. I use a series of simulations to analyse how frequency
dependent learning rules might affect how easily novel behaviours can spread
through a population on four artificial social networks, and three real
social networks. I measured the likelihood that a novel behaviour could
spread through the population, and the likelihood that there were multiple
behavioural variants in the population, a measure of cultural diversity.
Surprisingly, I find few differences between networks on either measure.
However, I do find that where a behaviour originated on a network can have
a substantial impact on the likelihood that it spreads, and that this location
effect depends on the learning strategy of an individual. These results suggest
that for first-order analysis of how behaviours spread through a population,
social network structure can be ignored, but that the social network structure
may be useful for more fine-tuned analyses and predictions.
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5.1 Introduction
In Chapters 2-4, I explored how individuals might learn from the world around
them from a variety of social, and asocial sources of information. In this
chapter, I focus on how the ways that individuals learn, and particularly whom
they learn from, could influence how behaviours spread through a population of
individuals. Previous work on social learning has tended to examine who and
how individuals learn from each other independently (see Rendell et al., 2010a;
Hoppitt and Laland, 2013). In this chapter, I look at these issues together by
examining how an individual’s use of a conformity biased learning strategy
(a “how” question), might interact with their location on a social network (a
“who” question).
To provide a background on evolutionary models of social learning, I briefly
review past work done on conformity biased transmission on social networks,
before turning to examine work on how network structure may impact dynamic
processes.
5.2 The evolution of conformity biased transmission
One of the primary focuses on evolutionary work on social learning has been
a better understanding of the role that conformity biases, or conformity
biased transmission plays in making social learning evolutionarily beneficial.
In early work on conformity biased transition, Boyd and Richerson (1985)
explored the evolutionary outcomes of a conformity biased transmission
strategy in a spatially variable environment, and concluded that human social
learning should commonly evolve to exhibit a conformity bias. Subsequently,
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Henrich and Boyd (1998) found that in a spatially and temporally changing
environment, conformist transmission would evolve whenever social learning
would evolve. Wakano and Aoki (2007) extended and upheld these results,
but concluded that a very strong conformity bias might not be adaptive,
because it may prevent novel beneficial behaviours from spreading through the
population, thus limiting the advantage of social learning. Both Nakahashi
et al. (2012) and Kandler and Laland (2013) reached similar conclusions;
the first using an island model, where individuals were spread on a series
of environmentally varying islands, and the second using reaction-diffusion
models. These results suggest that conformity biased transmission is likely to
be adaptive under a wide variety of situations.
While the above studies do explore both who individuals learn from (e.g.
learning from island neighbours) and how they do (applying a conformist
transmission rule), their representation of social structure is at best, relatively
crude. Many of these models examine social structures at a comparatively large
scale that driven by differences in the underlying environmental structure. In
reality social structure will arise at several different scales, including within
demes. Directed social learning may arise through more fine-grained spatial
structure, where individuals disproportionately learn from others that are
physically proximate, or more salient in some other respect, compared to
individuals within the same deme but more distant in space, or less attractive
as models. Social structure may play an important role in the value of social
learning since the value of social information depends not only on how you use
it, but also from whom it came. If the structure of the population inhibits the
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spread of novel behaviours, it may decrease the usefulness of social learning.
Conversely, if the structure allows only beneficial behaviours to spread, it may
increase the usefulness of social learning. Thus, it is likely that the usefulness
of a given learning strategy, like conformity biased copying, may depend on
the relationships of who learns from whom. This set of relationships is called
the social network of the population.
I set out to explore how the structure of the social network will influence
the spread of behaviours through a population, and how this will be affected
by the learning strategies deployed.
5.3 Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations
How the network structure of a population influences the spread of traits
through a population is not a problem unique to social learning; a similar
question arises with respect to the spread of novel alleles through structured
populations. Evolutionary theorists have addressed this issue by examining
how the social network of a population (often described as a ”graph”) can
mediate the interplay between selection and drift. Lieberman et al. (2005)
used a simple evolutionary model, the Moran model, to examine the selective
properties of certain graphs. In the Moran model, individuals are placed
at the nodes of a graph, and reproduce with probability proportional to
their fitness. Their child replaces the individual at a neighbouring node, to
which they are connected on the social network. Lieberman et al. found
that under this process, the structure of many “normal” graphs did not
influence selection. The normality condition required is that the graph has
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to be isothermal : each node is equally likely to replace a neighbour as it
is to be replaced by a neighbour. Isothermal graphs include degree-regular
graphs, a type of graph where every node has the same number of neighbours.
Recent work has extended this result to large random graphs as well, whose
dynamics asymptotically approach those of freely mixing populations (Adlam
and Nowak, 2014).
However on smaller non-isothermal graphs, Lieberman et al. found that
selection was enhanced on variants of a “star” graph, a type of network that
has many weakly connected components connected through a small handful
of nodes. Selection was reduced, and drift enhanced on some directed graphs,
particularly those that had an asymmetric relationship between two subsets
of nodes (where one subset could replace the other, but not in turn be
replaced). Although the graphs considered may not represent real populations,
these findings nevertheless suggest that the structure of a population may
influence the selection on genetic traits. However, these conclusions will not
necessarily map onto cultural processes, because of differences between genetic
and cultural dynamics.
In cultural processes the pathways of information transmission may be
different from those of biological systems. In biological systems information
is typically transmitted vertically from parent to child, although lateral gene
transfer is increasingly recognized as important, particularly in prokaryotes
(Koonin et al., 2001). Also, and again with some exceptions, in eukaryote
evolution offspring rarely have more than two genetic parents. In contrast,
a social learner may learn from multiple individuals – not just parents but
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teachers, elders, siblings, friends, and peers and may seek out suitable cultural
parents from whom to learn.
Hence cultural information passes not just vertically, but also horizontally
and obliquely, frequently with multiple tutors involved (Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman, 1981). The Moran model captures the biological intuition in how it
defines sexual reproduction. At each reproductive event a parent is selected
and chosen to reproduce, with the offspring replacing a neighbour. For a
cultural process, the reverse might be more natural; an ‘offspring’ is selected
to learn, and then learns from one (or many) of their neighbours. This
‘reproductive’ model is known as the voter model (Castellano, 2012), and has
been explored in the context of opinion dynamics.
The voter model, like the Moran model, is based on a birth-death process
on a graph. At each update, a new learner is selected from the population at
random. That learner selects a teacher to learn from and adopts the behaviour
(or belief) of their teacher. Given their similarities, it is unsurprising that
the dynamics of the voter model are similar to those of the Moran model.
Antal et al. (2006) explored both models and found that, just as in the
Moran model, with the voter model the likelihood that a novel behaviour
becomes fixed in a population is the same for all degree-regular graphs (graphs
where all individuals have the same number of neighbours). However for
degree heterogeneous graphs they found that the probability of fixation was
proportional to the degree of the initial (mutant) node in the voter model, and
inversely proportional to the degree of the initial node for the Moran model.
Much of the past work on the voter model has assumed that learners use
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random copying to adopt a novel behaviour. However extensive theoretic work
suggests that human adults and children, and other animals strategically copy
other individuals. What is required is a detailed analysis of how strategic
copying influences information spread through social networks.
One learning strategy of particular significance is conformity biased
learning, which has strong theoretical and empirical support in humans
(Morgan et al., 2011; McElreath et al., 2005; Efferson et al., 2008; Morgan
et al., 2011), children (e.g. Harris and Corriveau, 2011; Fusaro and Harris, 2008;
Corriveau et al., 2009) and animals (Pike and Laland, 2010). Conformity bias
is a non-random and non-linear learning rule, where the probability of adopting
a behaviour depends non-linearly on the frequency of that behaviour in the
population (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). The dynamics of the voter model
when individuals deploy a non-linear learning rule are not well understood,
since the population-level dynamics become analytically intractable in nearly
all situations.
Some progress on this issue has been made through the use of
approximations. Castellano et al. (2009) examined a nonlinear q-voter model
where individuals sample q of their neighbours. If all of their neighbours
agree, the learner adopts their neighbours’ belief, otherwise the learner
switches state with probability . Quantities of interest were found using a
mean-field approximation, a type of approximation that ignores the underlying
network structure. For other learning rules, Sood et al. (2008) presented
a pair-approximation technique that can be used to estimate the behaviour
of other non-linear learning rules on general graphs. However the pair
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approximation is limited to understanding the dynamics of random graphs,
and may perform poorly on predicting the diffusion of behaviours on networks
with additional structure.
Here, I use agent-based simulations on a modified voter model to explore
how diverse network structures can interact with conformity biases to influence
how information spreads through the population.
5.4 A model of conformity biased transmission in
structured populations
This model is designed to investigate the dynamics of a novel idea or
behavioural trait spreading through a population of social learners structured
in a social network. I assume that this diffusion occurs within a single
generation, such that biological birth-death processes need not be considered.
I extend the traditional voter model in two ways. First, I assume that
individuals learn from multiple teachers, deploying a non-linear learning rule
to make decisions. Second, I assume that individuals do not always adopt the
novel behaviour, instead they only switch to the novel behaviour with some
probability.
To model the invasion of a new learned trait into a population, I consider
a population of n individuals placed on an undirected graph. I assume that
at the point of invasion, all individuals in the population initially possess the
same belief/behaviour (henceforth I use the term ‘behaviour’ generally to also
cover transmitted beliefs). A single learner is chosen at random and is given
a “mutated” novel behaviour. The population then goes through the cultural
143
Chapter 5. The spread of behaviours on graphs
equivalent of a birth-death cycle, where at each time step (i) a learner is
randomly chosen from the population, (ii) the learner samples the belief of m
of their neighbours, and (iii) adopts a new behaviour based on a combination
of the neighbour’s behaviour, and the intrinsic likelihood of adopting that new
behaviour (e.g. its salience or attractiveness). These steps are repeated until
either the novel behaviour no longer exists in the population, or the population
consists entirely of learners using the novel behaviour.
Consistent with previous literature on conformity biased transmission, I
assume that individuals use a frequency dependent learning rule to make
decisions. In this rule, the likelihood that an individual selects a behaviour
should depend on the number of demonstrators currently expressing that
behaviour. A general form for such a rule is
p(b : p) = cb
pa
pa + (1− p)a , (5.1)
which stands for the likelihood that individuals adopt a behaviour b, if a
proportion p of their demonstrators are observed using b. This rule is the
similar to the learning rule used in Nakahashi et al. (2012), and is variant of
the Luce choice axiom, a probabilistic model that captures human decision
making on some tasks (Luce, 1977). The parameter a determines the shape
of the learning rule. At ln(a) = 0 this rule is equivalent to random copying,
higher values of ln(a) > 0 lead to a conformity biased copying, and lower
values of ln(a) < 0 lead to an anti-conformity biased copy, where individuals
adopt the minority behaviour disproportionately often, but still adopting the
majority behaviour more often than not. For illustration, I depict the values
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Figure 5.1: (a) Graphical visualization of conformity biased transmission for five values of
a. (b) A cartoon depiction of example artificial networks. The complete graph represents a
freely mixing population. On the lattice nodes are arranged in a 5 by 6 grid and connected
to their four nearest neighbours, wrapping around the grid, if necessary. Small world graphs
contain nodes initially arranged in a ring, and have include a small number of “shortcuts”.
Scale free graphs tend to have nodes with varying degrees.
of the function for a = {1/3, 1/2, 1, 2, 3} in Figure 5.1(a).
Over-and-above this frequency dependent effect, individuals adopt the new
behaviour, b, with fixed probability cb. This captures the fact that some
behaviours may be adopted more frequently than others, reflecting differences
in learnability, salience, reinforcement, or prior preferences. Relative
differences in c allow us to capture different preferences for one behaviour
over another.
The network structure is incorporated into the decision-making by
restricting the choice of teachers solely to the neighbours of each individual on
the social network, represented by a undirected graph. To analyse how different
structures may influence the spread of behaviours, I consider how behaviours
diffuse over four artificial graphs, complete graphs, lattices, small world graphs
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Table 5.1: Network Proprieties for the four artificial networks and each real social network.
Network Type n Average Path Clustering Average Network
Length Coeficient Degree Diameter
Complete Graph 30 1 1 4 1
Lattice 30 2.87 0.5 4 5
Small World 30 2.94 0.38 4.1 5.865
Scale Free Graph 30 1.92 0.35 6.38 3.12
Karate 34 2.4 0.588 2.294 5
Dolphins 62 3.357 0.303 5.129 8
Network Science 389 6.042 0.798 4.823 17
and scale free graphs along with three real social networks. I provide simple
illustrations of each network in Figure 5.1(b). These graphs differ in their
average path lengths, clustering coefficients, and degree distribution. As a
reference, Table 1 charts the average parameter values for the four types
of artificial graphs considered, and the three real network structures that I
examine.
The clustering coefficient is a measure of how likely it is that an individual’s
neighbours are themselves neighbours to each other. In many human
populations the clustering coefficient is thought to be high, on the order of
tens of percent (Newman and Park, 2003). Lattices are a type of graph which
tend to have a high clustering coefficient.
The average path length represents the topological distance between two
individuals; i.e. what is the minimum number of jumps needed to get from
one individual to another individual. In human populations the average path
length is thought to be low, leading to the concept of “six degrees of separation”
(Travers and Milgram, 1969). A related concept is network diameter which
measures the longest path length between any two nodes on the graph, and
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represents the minimum number of jumps needed to be guaranteed to be able
to travel between any two nodes. Lattices tend to have a high average path
length (growing with the square root of the number of nodes, or on the order of
√
n). Small world graphs are akin to lattices that have additional “shortcuts”
added between distant nodes, maintaining a high clustering coefficient while
having a lower average path length (on the order of ln(n)). In our simulations,
small world graphs were created following the Watts and Strogatz (1998) model
with the probability of reattachment set to p = .1.
The degree distribution represents how neighbourhood sizes (that is, how
many connections an individual has) are distributed. Many social networks
follow a power-law degree distribution, in which many nodes have a small
number of connections, while a few nodes have a large number of connections.
Small world graphs follow a Poisson degree distribution. Scale free graphs, on
the other hand, have a degree distribution that follows a power law distribution.
Scale free graphs were created using preferential attachment with γ = 3
(Barabasi and Albert, 1999).
Our choice of artificial networks span this complexity by considering the
simplest graph, a complete graph which represents a freely mixing population,
and building up increasingly more realistic graphical structures, from lattices,
to small world graphs, and finally to scale free graphs.
Although artificially generated graphs may mimic many of the properties
of real human social networks, they may not embody some of the peculiarities
that exist in certain realizations of social networks, like the star graphs of
Lieberman et al. (2005). Because of this, I also consider three empirically
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derived social networks taken from actual human and animal populations.
To capture small human social networks, I first consider the Karate Club
network of Zachary (1977), which records the friendships in a collegiate karate
club. I consider a larger human social network by examining the largest
connected component of Newman’s Network Scientists network (Newman,
2006), which was constructed by considering all papers published in several
journals about the study of networks and creating edges between individuals
who had co-authored a paper together. Last, I consider the dolphin social
network of Lusseau et al. (2003), which was built from the associations
between bottle nose dolphins in a stable community in Doubtful Sound, New
Zealand. The goal of including these networks is to ensure that the simulation
results found on the artificially created networks would generalize to specific
realizations of actual social networks, which may have their own peculiarities.
To explore how conformity biases and social structure might interact, I
ran simulations on each network, varying the relative preference for the novel
behaviour cbold/cbnovel = 0.25, 0.5, 1.0 and conformity bias a = 1/3, 1/2, 1, 2, 3.
For computational efficiency, cbnovel = 1 for all simulations. Lower values could
be used, representing that behaviours are not always adopted by learners, the
results would be identical, except that the generational scale would be extended
by a factor of 1
cbnovel
. Each simulation was initialized by assigning a single novel
behaviour to a random individual and repeating the birth death process until
there was only a single behavioural variant left in the population. On the
artificial graphs each population consisted of 30 individuals. All measures
were averaged over 30,000 simulations.
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Figure 5.2: The likelihood that a behaviour becomes fixed on the population based on the
degree of conformity bias (x-axis). The values for the complete graph are given in both the
artificial and real networks to provide a baseline for comparisons.
5.5 Results
I focus on how the population structure might influence the spread of novel
behaviours through the population and analyse three metrics, the likelihood
that a novel behaviour spreads through a population, the likelihood that both
behavioural variants exist in the population at a given time, and the likelihood
that the novel behaviour spreads through the population depending on the
degree of the initial, mutant node.
5.5.1 Probability of fixation
I first examine the likelihood that a novel behaviour becomes fixed within the
population. I found that that there were few between-network differences in
the likelihood for fixation, and that there was limited interaction between the
network structure and the degree of conformity bias.
When a novel behaviour enters into the population it will eventually either
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leave the population, or will become fixed, having been adopted by every
individual. In all cases the degree of conformity bias and the relative likelihood
of adoption were the primary determiners of whether or not a novel behaviour
successfully spread and became fixed in the population. I find that using a
strong conformity bias, ln(a) > 0, suppresses the likelihood that novel becomes
fixed in the population, and that a strong anti-conformity bias, ln(a) < 0,
enhances this likelihood. Unsurprisingly, I found that if the novel behaviour
was more likely to be adopted than the existing behaviour, it was more likely
to become fixed (i.e. in when cbold < cbnovel). However I were surprised by
the magnitude of this effect when learners used a strong conformity bias. In
the case of lattices, if learners used a strong conformity bias, a = 3, making
the novel behaviour twice as likely than the old behaviour leads to a fifty
fold increase in the likelihood that the novel behaviour becomes fixed in the
population. Similar, although less dramatic results hold for weaker conformity
biases. The same pattern of results holds for the Dolphin, Karate, and Network
Scientists networks.
Some of these trends are likely due to the initial spread of the novel
behaviour, which is readily understandable, unlike the long term dynamics. At
the beginning of the simulation, a single individual is using the novel variant.
That variant can only spread if one of their neighbours chooses to learn from
them. The likelihood that the individual with a mutant behaviour is chosen
as a teacher depends on the number of neighbours they have, and the number
of potential cultural parents their neighbours have. If selected, the likelihood
that a neighbour adopts the novel variant depends strongly on the learning
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rule they deploy; if they use a strong conformity biased learning rule, and
are learning from multiple cultural parents, the likelihood that they adopt the
novel behaviour will be small. However if they use an anti-conformity biased
learning rule, the likelihood that they adopt the novel behaviour will tend
to be much larger. These observations suggest that the likelihood that the
behaviour initially spreads through the population will depend strongly on the
learners’ learning rule, and on the number of neighbours of each individual. I
find good evidence for the former above, and I return to the later below.
Even though the qualitative trends across networks were the same, there
do appear to be some systematic biases caused by different network structures.
I illustrate the dynamics in Figure 5.2 for each network structure considered.
Looking at the four artificial networks, I found that when individuals used a
conformity bias, novel behaviours were more likely to spread on the small
world network, and less likely to spread on lattices, or scale free graphs.
However the reverse was true when individuals used an anti-conformity bias.
Consistent with previous findings on undirected graphs (Antal et al., 2006) I
found that under random copying the chance of a behaviour spreading through
the population was the same across all graphs.
I found small but consistent biases on the three real social networks as
well. However unlike with the artificial networks, I find limited evidence that
networks that suppress novel behaviours at a high conformity bias also support
novel behaviours at a high anti-conformity bias. This suggests that the effect
on the artificial networks, above, may be due to choice of networks, or to
simulation error. Interestingly, I find that for all networks the probability of
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Figure 5.3: The likelihood that the population contains both the original and the novel
behaviour on each generation. A generation consists of one time step for each learner in the
population.
invasion is similar even though the number of individuals in the network differs
greatly. In the artificial networks, the number of individuals in each network
was constant (n = 30), but with the real networks the number of individuals
spanned the range between 34 for the Karate network, 62 for the Dolphin
network, and 389 for the Network Scientists network.
5.5.2 Behavioural repertoire breadth
The theoretical literature on conformity biased transmission suggests that a
strong conformity bias (e.g. a large) will diminish the number of behavioural
variants that exist in the population (Henrich and Boyd, 1998). I find similar
results here by examining the number of behavioural variants in the population
at a given time. If individuals use a conformity biased learning strategy, then
one of the behaviours will rapidly leave the population as the new dominant
behaviour increases in frequency. If individuals use an anti-conformity biased
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learning strategy, then both behaviours may coexist in the population for some
time.
The social structure seems to have minimal impact on the rate at which
behaviours are lost. I analysed the likelihood that at each generation (a group
of n time steps) both behaviours existed in the population. The results of
this measure for when bnov/bold = 1 and a = 1/3, 1, 3, are illustrated in Figure
5.3. The results for other ratios and other degrees of conformity bias are
qualitatively similar. For the artificial networks, I find weak evidence that scale
free, and small world graphs may reduce the amount of behavioural diversity.
On the real social networks, I find that in the Karate network tends to increase
behavioural diversity. However, these differences are small in compared to the
differences caused by different degrees of conformity biases.
5.5.3 Effects of neighbourhood size on the likelihood of
fixation
Here I examine whether where the novel behaviour is initially placed changes
how likely it is to become fixed in the population. I examine this question
on scale free networks and the three real social networks. A graph of these
results when bc = 1, is given in Figure 5.4. I find that the probability that a
behaviour spreads through the population depends crucially of the degree of
the node where it is originally placed.
Consistent with past work on voter models, I find that for random
copying, the likelihood that a behaviour spreads through a network is linearly
determined by the degree of the node (Antal et al., 2006). This result holds for
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Figure 5.4: The likelihood of invasion given the initial mutant node’s degree and the
learning bias. Values are normalized for the average likelihood of invasion on that graph,
with that learning bias. Values are not shown either because there were no nodes of that
degree on the particular graph, or the simulations detected no successful invasions on a node
of that degree.
scale free networks and all three social networks. I find a similar trend when
individuals use an anti-conformity bias, although there is some evidence that
this relationship may be less than linear for high degree nodes. However, when
individuals learn with a strong conformity bias, the relationship seems to be
much greater than linear; individuals with a high degree are far more likely to
propagate the novel behaviour than those with a lower degree.
I do find substantial differences between networks using this measure. The
scale free network gives the cleanest results, showing clear linear, less than
linear, and greater than linear relationships. For the Karate network, the basic
trend is there for both random copying and anti-conformity biased copying,
however for conformity biased copying the trend appears to be greater than
linear, although it is noisy for high-degree nodes. Similar, noisy patterns
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hold for both the Dolphin network. The network of Network Scientists was
also analysed, but due to its size, many simulations did not converge when
learners used an anti-conformity biased transmission strategy, and only a
few behaviours successfully invaded the population when individuals used a
conformity biased transmission strategy.
5.6 General discussion
In this chapter I examined how novel behaviours spread through structured
populations when learners use frequency-dependent copying mechanisms. I
found that the spread of behaviours was only weakly influenced by the
population structure, both when learners used an anticonformity biased, or
a conformity biased copying mechanism.
In particular, I found that when looking at the probability that a novel
behaviour becomes fixed in the population, there was a strong interaction
between the degree of conformity bias, and the relatively likelihood of adopting
a new behaviour. I found, in line with previous models, that when individuals
used a conformity bias, the likelihood of adopting a novel behaviour was quite
low. Temporally, I found that when individuals used a strong conformity bias,
novel behaviours either quickly spread throughout the population, or were
eradicated from it. This would result in rapid and ’catastrophic’ changes in
chosen behaviours, even for large populations.
Combined, these two results confirm some previously established
characterizations of how behaviours spread in the context of conformity biased
transmission (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). Conformity bias transition can
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be thought of as a strong filter, preventing equally likely to be adopted
behaviours from spreading through a population, while allowing highly likely
to be adopted behaviours to spread quickly. If the learnability of a behaviour
reflects the benefit of the behaviour, than a conformity biased transmission
strategy can be seen as preventing less beneficial, and even mildly beneficial
behaviours from spreading, while allowing only highly beneficial behaviours
to spread. The key part of this strategy is that highly beneficial behaviours
will be disproportionately likely to spread compared to their less beneficial
counterparts. This would allow individuals to adapt to changes in the
environment while using a conformity biased copying mechanism; if the
environment changes the current behaviour may be noticeably less beneficial
than other novel behaviours.
A primary focus of this chapter was to examine how social structure
could interact with different learning strategies, and how it might change how
behaviours diffused through the population. I were surprised at how little
population structure changed the results of these simulations. Although there
did exist systematic differences when looking at the likelihood of invasion, and
the presence of multiple behavioural variants, these differences were on an
order of magnitude smaller than the influence of many of the other parameters
of the model. Given that quantitative estimates for many of these parameters
are lacking, it would be hard to predict the spread of behaviours based
on population structure alone. However this is not to say that population
structure does nothing; in the case of making a predictions population structure
may be used to fine tune the prediction. One encouraging implication of our
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findings is that the qualitative results found in unstructured populations are
likely to transfer to structured populations.
The results of this model differ from past analyses of evolutionary games
on networks, where a number of studies have found that network structure
can influence the outcomes of games, like promoting human cooperation, (see
Perc et al., 2013; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010, for a review), particularly when
combined with conformity biases (Szolnoki and Perc, 2015). These theoretical
studies are backed up by a recent string of experiments that have found that
network structure, particularly dynamic network structure, can influence the
spread of cooperation in laboratory settings (e.g. Rand et al., 2014, 2011). The
difference in dynamics between this study, and these recent studies are likely
due to two factors: first in our model I restrict our analysis to static networks
where individuals do not change the connections they have with others, in
contrast in many empirical studies individuals are able to alter who they are
connected to. In our model, the assumption of static network structure is a
simplifying assumption that seems reasonable in the context of the rapid time
scale over which I invasion this diffusion process operating. However on longer
time scales, particularly relevant to life-time or evolution settings, allowing for
dynamic, changing networks seems appropriate. Second, in many evolutionary
game theory settings, who an individual is connected to will alter their payoffs,
and their subsequent behaviour. This may increase the importance of network
structure, whereas in contrast, in our model individuals do not gain a payoff for
performing one behaviour or another, and once learned, the behaviour learner
performs does not alter the rate at which the learner changes their behaviour.
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Past work examining the role of social structures in the spread of behaviours
or opinions through a population has used random copying as a baseline
learning strategy, primarily for mathematical convenience (Castellano, 2012).
I find that the dynamics of a system where individuals use a non-linear copying
rule, either conformity or anti-conformity biased copying, can be quite different
than their linear counterparts, suggesting that the question of how individuals
copy, is an important question to study when looking at who they copy.
The strongest effect that social structure had was on determining where
a behaviour was most likely to spread from, and not the overall probability
of invasion. Previous work has emphasized the importance of high-degree
nodes in transmitting novel behaviours (Coussi-Korbel and Fragaszy, 1995).
When learners learn using random copying, the relative likelihood of invasion
scales linearly with the degree of a node. However I found that when learners
used a conformity biased copying mechanism the relative importance of high
degree nodes increased. This suggests that, in situations where it is likely that
individuals use a high degree of conformity bias, well placed individuals may
be disproportionately likely to spread novel behaviours, a result that may be
particularly important if the network degree of an individual is correlated with
other traits, such as innovativeness. Consistent with this reasoning, it has been
suggested that in primates innovations don’t spread because well-connected
(dominant) individuals tend not to be the innovators (Reader and Laland,
2001, 2003).
Although I found the same general pattern between degree distribution and
the spread of behaviours on real social networks as I did on artificial networks,
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the results on real networks were far noisier. A likely reason for the difference
between these networks are second-order effects: if an individuals degree
matters, it seems reasonable to assume that the degree of their neighbour
also matters. In the artificial network, the simulation was averaged over
30,000 different scale free networks, allowing for the degree distribution of
a high-degree node’s neighbours to change between simulations, and providing
a clear picture of the general relationship between degree and likelihood of
invasion. On the real networks, the degree distribution for the neighbours of
high degree nodes is fixed. Given the relative size of the network, and the small
number of high-degree nodes in them, the second-order effects may play a large
systematic role in determining which nodes are most effective in propagating a
behaviour. Although this result makes finding the general relationship between
average degree and likelihood of invasion harder to detect, it also highlights
the dangers of generalizing patterns observed on randomly generated artificial
networks to specific instances of a social network.
In sum, I set out to explore how individual’s learning strategies might
influence the spread of behaviours on networks. I found, contrary to my
initial expectations, that the overall role of population structure was modest,
but within a population a nodes degree could have large influences on the
spread of behaviours through the population. These results suggest that as a
first-order approximation, network structure may be safely ignored, but that
if fine-grained predictions are desired, network structure should be added to
control for small systematic biases.
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6.1 Principal findings
In this thesis I have explored how humans and animals integrate asocial and
social forms of information together (Chapters 2 and 3), how the presence of
social learning can be inferred from behavioural experiments (Chapter 4), and
the implications of fine-grained population structure on the spread of novel
behaviours through populations (Chapter 5). I review each chapter in more
detail below.
In Chapter 2, I explored how social information could be integrated
into a powerful asocial learning mechanism, namely temporal difference
learning. I found that learners who used even fairly limited social information
outperformed learners who used asocial learning alone. Although social
learning in this context was modelled as a “copy when uncertain” mechanism,
a key finding was that even if learners might only spend a short proportion
of their life time using social information (often only one or two rounds
out of fifty) and the majority of their time using asocial information, the
small amount of social information they use leads to substantial improvements
over learners who used asocial information alone. These results complement
previous work discussed in Chapter 1 that has found that integrating asocial
and social information together may be key for adaptive use of social
information (e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Enquist
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et al., 2007). The findings align with previous experimental work that suggests
that use of social learning in animals may occur only in a piecemeal fashion
(e.g. Stoinski and Whiten, 2003; Custance et al., 2001; Call and Tomasello,
1995; Custance et al., 1999). Even if animals only learn parts of an action
sequence through social information, this may be enough for social information
to play a substantial beneficial role in learning the entire action sequence. One
of the key advantages of Chapter 2 was the ability to consider the impact of
social information on substantially smaller time scales (i.e. over the course
of a number of learning bouts) than has been previously been theoretically
analysed. In contrast, many evolutionary models take a view of learning
over the course of a learners entire lifetime, and leave the specific details of
how individual behaviours might be learned alone. The examination of short
time scales in this context has two advantages. First, it allows the modelling
paradigm to be applied to experimental laboratory settings where researchers
may only have access to a small portion of a learner’s life, and second it makes
explicit the difficulty in specifying how social and asocial sources of information
can be integrated at an action by action level. I return to both of these points
in Sections 6.3 and 6.2 respectively.
In Chapter 3, I used a series of experiments to examine how humans
integrate social and asocial information in the context of a learning task.
The task examined how individuals learned from multiple demonstrators, with
the goal of exploring why individuals might use a conformity biased learning
strategy, both in the cultural evolutionary context of Boyd and Richerson
(1985) (discussed in more detail in Chapter 1), but also in the context of
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traditional psychological findings of conformity (as in e.g. Asch, 1951; Sherif,
1935). Learning from multiple demonstrators is a particularly important cue to
look at, given that theoretical models have established evolutionary advantages
to a conformity biased learning strategy (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich
and Boyd, 1998; Wakano and Aoki, 2007; Perreault et al., 2012). Although a
number of previous studies have examined conformity biased learning in both
children (Corriveau et al., 2009; Corriveau and Harris, 2010; Morgan et al.,
2015b) and adult humans (Efferson et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2011), I sought
to analyse in more detail how the presence of conformity bias transmission
changes depending on demonstrator accuracy. This cue is suggested by a
Bayesian model to be particularly relevant to evaluating social information
provided by multiple demonstrator. I found evidence for conformity biased
transmission in some cases (Experiments 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 for conformity
bias in the sense of Boyd and Richerson (1985), and Experiments 3 and 4 for
conformity bias in the sense of Asch (1951)), but the key finding of Chapter
3 was that individuals changed how they used a conformity bias and how
they evaluated social information based on external features of the task, or
based on past training with the task. In Experiments 1-4, I demonstrated
how individuals used knowledge of the structure of the task to infer how
reliable demonstrators were, which changed how reliable the majority was
as a whole. In Experiment 5, I replicated the findings of Experiments 1-4,
and demonstrated that explicit knowledge need not be given, but equivalent
knowledge of a demonstrator’s and a majority’s accuracy could be learned over
repeated trials. In Experiment 6, I then demonstrated that individuals could
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learn not only how much to trust but also when to seek out information. In
all six experiments, participant’s responses were well predicted by a simple
Bayesian model, which suggests that the way in which individuals use social
information may be consistent with a rational model in some cases. The
flexibility demonstrated by humans participants in Chapter 3 highlights the
importance of analysing how social information is used on individual learning
tasks. I found that use of social information, or presence of a conformity
bias, might substantially change between tasks, depending on how the learning
problem is shown to learners, and a learner’s past experience with the task.
These findings deviate from the previous theortic evolutionary models of social
learning (e.g. Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Enquist
et al., 2007; Perreault et al., 2012) that tend to assume a learner’s learning
strategy (e.g. degree of conformity bias) is fixed over a learner’s lifetime.
While this assumption is likely made in part for mathematical convenience, the
flexibility demonstrated by individuals suggests that in order to understand
human, and likely animal, social learning, a better understanding of how
animals use social information based on their developmental context and past
experience is needed. The results of these experiments closely align with those
of Chapter 2, and are discussed in more detail together in Section 6.2 below.
Although Chapter 3 explored human flexibility in social information use,
it leaves the question of animal social learning alone. There has been
historical difficulty in inferring the presence of social transmission from animal
behavioural data (Reader, 2004; Franz and Nunn, 2009; Hoppitt et al., 2010).
In Chapter 4, I present improvements on Network Based Diffusion Analysis
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(NBDA; Franz and Nunn, 2009; Hoppitt et al., 2010) which allows the method
to capture a broader number of individual-level parameters more readily, allows
for straightforward model selection, and expands the range of situations where
NBDA might be applied. The key results of Chapter 4 are methodological
and not experimental – although I do demonstrate the difficulty in inferring
social transmission with a case study of behavioural diffusion in populations
of budgerigars. The analysis revealed that in only two out of the four tasks
was evidence for social transmission found. One of the key advantages of the
Bayesian variant of NBDA presented in Chapter 4, was the ease at which
individual level co-variates and effects could be added to the model, allowing
for a greater range of models and factors to be considered. This expansion
also allows the possibility of more complex integrations of social and asocial
information, discussed in 6.3
Finally in Chapter 5, I expanded on previous work on the influence of
population structure on the spread of behaviours through populations (as in
Nakahashi et al., 2012; Aoki and Nakahashi, 2008; Rendell et al., 2010b),
and find that in the context of social learning, population structure has a
relatively limited influence on the spread of behaviours through populations,
at least compared to other model parameters. This result is surprising in the
context of previous models of biological evolution (Lieberman et al., 2005), and
cooperation (Perc et al., 2013) where population structure was found to have a
strong impact on the spread of behaviours. In Chapter 5, I also analysed how
conformity biased learning could change the rate at which novel behaviours
were able to enter a population, and found that the degree of conformity bias
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used could have a substantial impact on how likely different behaviours were to
enter the population. In the cases analysed, and consistent with past theory,
conformity bias transmission acted as a strong filter – with a strong conformity
bias very few behaviours were able to enter the population, and those that did,
tended to be strongly preferred, or learnable, compared to those that didn’t.
With a weak conformity bias the reverse was true – many behaviour were able
to enter the population, and relative rates of learnability had a reduced impact
on changing how likely novel behaviours were able to invade the population
successfully. I discuss the implications of these findings, particularly combined
with the flexibility in conformity biased learning demonstrated in Chapter 3,
in Section 6.4.
6.2 Modelling the integration of social learning on
individual learning problems
In Chapters 2 and 3 I analysed how individual learners might solve a series
of decision tasks. In Chapter 2, I carried out a theoretic investigation into
combining a small amount of social information with a powerful general
purpose learning mechanism. In Chapter 3, I used an experimental study
to investigate how humans’ use of social information changed depending on
demonstrator accuracy and reliability, and found a good qualitative fit between
a simple Bayesian model of learning and participants’ responses. In both
chapters the model used to investigate human and animal social learning are
powerful general purpose learning algorithms widely used in machine learning
(e.g. Mnih et al., 2015), animal behaviour (Seymour et al., 2004; Sutton and
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Barto, 1990; Glimcher, 2011), and understanding human cognition (Perfors
et al., 2011; Griffiths et al., 2010). This work, then suggests that in some
cases social learning can be easily integrated into already existing models of
individual decision making on fine temporal scales.
The time scales analysed in Chapters 2 and 3, on the order of minutes, or
hours, differ substantially from previous theoretic models on the evolution of
social learning. Such models analyse learner’s behaviours on evolutionary time
scales and assess the bulk impact of an individual’s learning strategy over the
course of their entire lifetime. The difference between the modelling approaches
is likely driven for practical reasons (although see Henrich and Boyd, 1998)
– individuals likely face hundreds, or thousands, of different learning tasks
over the course of their lifetime, and so in order to understand the evolution
of social learning it can be useful to abstract away from the specific nature
of the learning problems that individuals face and focus on more generic
learning problems. However by abstracting away it makes it substantially
more challenging to apply the learning strategies found in evolutionary models
to specific settings.
For example, Chapter 2 applies a version of a “copy when uncertain”
strategy (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Hoppitt and Laland, 2013), where
individuals use social information when unsure of what to do. This strategy on
an individual level could be implemented in many different ways when learning
an action sequence, e.g. learners could choose to copy all of the actions of a
single individual and if unsatisfied with the behaviour (as in Enquist et al.,
2007; Rendell et al., 2010b), completely ignore the social information and
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use pure asocial learning. By examining a specific learning problem we were
able to consider a single fine tuned implementation of “copy when uncertain”,
although other similar strategies would likely produce different results.
Similarly, in the context of Chapter 3, a large body of theoretic work
suggests that individuals should use a conformity bias when learning from
others (e.g. Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Perreault et al., 2012). However this
work does not suggest how such a bias may change in the context of individual
decision problems, or depending on demonstrator accuracy. This is likely due
to the fact that, for simplicity of analysis, only a single learning problem
is analysed, and limited information about specific demonstrators is given.
However when understanding individual’s behaviours in experimental settings,
I found that the degree of conformity bias that individuals use is highly context
dependent (Chapter 3), and that the way in which individual’s behaviour
changed was consistent with a general-purpose learning algorithm.
The results of both chapters suggest that although evolutionary models
may be able to provide broad descriptions of what types of social learning can
be used (e.g. “copy when uncertain”, “copy with conformity”) more work is
required to specify how exactly these types of models map onto individual level
behaviours. General purpose learning algorithms may help to fill some of that
gap by providing a well established model of learning which can, at least in
some cases, easily be adapted to capture the effects of social information.
The work provided in Chapters 2 and 3 also give insights into a question
posed by Cecilia Heyes, “what’s social about social learning?” (Heyes, 2012).
The question is, is social learning simply the product of a general purpose
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learning algorithm, or do animals and humans have a separate facility to
use social information. Although neither Chapter 2 or Chapter 3 specifically
address this issue, both chapters offer directions for future research into this
question.
In Chapter 3, I found that individual’s responses to social information
depended on the context that social information was produced in. If the
social information was produced in a context that would lead to low accuracy
demonstrators, individuals failed to express a conformity bias. However
if individuals learned in a context leading to high demonstrator accuracy
individuals often exhibited a conformity bias. This result suggests that
individuals are able to use external information to evaluate social information,
and the fact that they are able to integrate social and asocial information
smoothly to make decisions (Experiments 3-6 of Chapter 3) suggests that
the mechanism that individuals use to process social information is similar
to that used to process asocial information, although further exploration of
this question is needed.
Secondly, in Chapter 2, I used a fairly general model of reinforcement
learning to understand how individuals might use social information. Such
a model of learning might be able to “learn to learn” how to use social
information. Heyes (2012) argues that some social information use may simply
be the product of reinforcement learning in animals, e.g. if other birds flocking
is a good signal that there is food on the ground, a learner might learn
to associate groups of birds with a positive reward, which would lead them
preferentially to go to groups of birds, or areas where other birds were, the same
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as a local-enhancement strategy. Temporal difference (TD) learning offers a
powerful framework to examine how individuals are able to create associations
about the environment and generalize between situations (Mnih et al., 2015).
It may be possible to use TD learning to examine how plausible it is for an
individual to learn how to use social information in different ways, and see
if there exist some types of social learning (e.g. local, stimulus enhancement)
that may likely be the product of associative learning, and others (e.g. possibly
emulation or imitation) that likely are not.
6.3 Inferring social learning from action level data
In the previous section I focused on understanding how humans and animals
integrate social and asocial information in the context of specific learning tasks.
However in many cases, inferring the presence of social transmission in animal
populations is challenging, let alone determining the mechanisms that underlie
it (Hoppitt et al., 2010; Franz and Nunn, 2009; Reader, 2004). The results
of Chapter 2 and 4 provide new methodological advances that may make it
easier to interpret the results of animal experiments and better understand the
mechanisms that underlie animal social learning.
In Chapter 2 I presented a broad theoretic framework for thinking about
animal learning tasks, that of Markov decision processes and TD learning. This
framework has already achieved some success in describing animal behaviour
in a number of tasks, particularly two action tasks (Sutton and Barto, 1990;
Fantino et al., 1993; Grace, 1994), where learners must choose to make one of
two actions (e.g. push a green button or a red button) and receive a reward
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for doing so. The paradigm for two action tasks has also been used to explore
social learning in animals (e.g. Campbell and Heyes, 2002; Zentall and Hogan,
1976), and provides a useful framework for exploring the mechanisms that
underlie social learning. One of the key aspects of TD learning is a precise
specification of how the rewards that the learner receive lead to changes in the
likelihood of performing different actions. Research into animal behaviour has
found that the amount of change depends on a number of factors including the
magnitude of the reward, and the time between action and reward (Sutton and
Barto, 1990; Berg and Grace, 2006). A similar set of questions can be asked
of social stimuli – how might the performance of an action by a demonstrator
change the likelihood that the learner performs that action.
In this context we can ask a question of magnitude: how does the number
of demonstrations the learner observes change the likelihood the perform the
action, and how does the number of demonstrators the learner observes change
the likelihood of performing the same action? We can also ask questions of
time: how does the time between observing a social stimulus and performing
an action change the likelihood that the learner also performs the action, and
how does a learner’s own experience with the task change the influence of
observing demonstrations?
For many of these questions the answers to one or more of these questions
is already known in the context of an individual species (e.g. van Bergen et al.,
2004; Pike and Laland, 2010). However, more work is needed to piece together
how these factors inter-relate in a specific species before exploring differences
between species. In reality, many of the factors suggest above likely inter-relate
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with each other. TD learning may provide a framework for understanding how
different factors might interact with each other and provide qualitative and
quantitative predictions on how individuals might use social information to
make decisions.
Although experimental paradigms like a two action task may provide some
answers to how animals use social information in some settings it may obscure
effects of more natural uses of social information. In this context the expanded
version of NBDA presented in Chapter 4 may prove useful to examine social
learning mechanism in more natural settings, like open diffusion experiments
(e.g. Boogert et al., 2006; Nightingale et al., 2015; Hoppitt et al., 2012) In
such cases inferring fine grained details of social learning mechanisms may
be challenging (highlighted in Chapter 4 with distinguishing different rates of
influence hat social learning might have), or between different mechanisms of
social learning Hoppitt et al. (although see 2012).
However both the Time to Acquisition Diffusion Analysis and Order
of Acquisition Diffusion Analysis presented in Chapter 4, and the two
predominant versions of NBDA, use relatively little data to infer the presence
of social transmission, just the time, or order of the first time that each animal
in the population solves the task. In reality, researchers also have information
on how many times each animal solves the task, how many times they interact
with the task, and whether they are within visual access or proximal to the
learning task. Each of these additional sources of data can be used to perform
more complex inferences on the types of social information each animal is
using.
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The Bayesian inference framework presented in Chapter 4 is well suited
to perform many of these types of inference; it provides a generic framework
for analysing the results of diffusion experiments while allowing flexibility in
the dependent variable being measured, e.g. the time at which animals solve
the task, or the number of times in which they solve it, or the duration they
spend near the task, allowing NBDA to produce more fine grained inferences
on exactly how animals used social information to solve the task.
As an example, imagine the situation presented in Chapter 4 where a group
of birds was tasked to solve a “lid flipping” task. In Chapter 4, I found evidence
for social transmission in the task, but the exact mechanisms that underlay
that social transmission were left unclear. There are three questions about that
social transmission that are immediately apparent. Was the success in the task
driven primarily by local enhancement – i.e. the effect of social information
was simply to bring birds to the task area, wherein they used purely asocial
means to solve the task (as suggested might often be the case by Roper, 1986)?
If a bird is near the tasks, does the presence of other birds interacting with
(or solving) the task increase the rate at which the learner interacts with the
task (a form of stimulus enhancement)? And finally, when a bird is interacting
with the task, does the fact that other birds solve the task increase the rate at
which they also successfully solve the task/mechanism?
Answers to each one of these questions would help understand whether
or not the social transmission NBDA found present in solving the task was
driven by different forms of social information use, e.g. local, or stimulus
enhancement. The Bayesian version of NBDA presented in Chapter 4 provides
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a framework for using experimental data to explore each of these questions,
a task well suited for future research, and one I have already begun in the
context of starling, zebra finch and stickleback diffusion experiments.
6.4 Conformity biased transmission with dynamic
learning rules
In Chapters 3 and 5, I examined conformity bias transmission, both at an
individual level, and also at its population level impacts. One of the key
results of Chapter 3 was the flexibility with which individuals used social
information – and in particular used a conformity bias. Previous theoretic work
has assumed that how an individual uses a conformity bias is fixed over their
lifetime (e.g. Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Perreault et al., 2012; Wakano and Aoki,
2007) Although this is an assumption that is likely made for mathematical
convenience, such an assumption may alter the way we think that conformity
bias transmission influences how novel behaviours spread across populations.
In Chapter 5, I specificity analysed how behaviours might spread through
a population of learners using a conformity biased learning mechanism. In
the model I varied two factors related to learning the degree of conformity
bias, and the likelihood that a behaviour once learned would be adopted
by the learner (a third factor, population structure is discussed in more
detail in Chapter 5). I found, consistent with previous work (Henrich and
Boyd, 1998), that when individuals used a strong conformity bias, novel
behaviours were less likely to spread through a population. In contrast when
individuals used an anti-conformity bias novel behaviours were highly likely
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to spread through a population. There was also a strong interaction between
the degree of conformity bias and the relative likelihood of adoption of two
behaviours. If a behaviour was highly likely to be adopted – one thought
as being assessed as “good” by learners in the population, then it would
be disproportionately more likely adopted than low likelihood behaviours
if learners used a conformity biased transmission mechanism. In a sense
then, conformity biased transmission acts as a strong filter – lowering the
likelihood that any behaviour is adopted by individuals in the population but
disproportionately lowering the likelihood of behaviours with low adoption
rates.
The filtering effect of conformity biased transmission leads to its
evolutionary advantage, and disadvantage (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Wakano
and Aoki, 2007). Learners who use a conformity biased learning mechanism
are able to maintain a successfully behaviour in a population, particularly
when faced with high migration rates (Henrich and Boyd, 1998). However
conformity biased transmission can also hider the ability for a novel, adaptive
behaviour to spread through a population, particularly after an environmental
change (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Wakano and Aoki, 2007). Thus the amount of
conformity bias that learners should use to maximize their competitive success,
should thread the line between reducing the impact of high migration, while
maintaining robustness of the population to evolutionary change.
The results of Chapter 5, although not evolutionary in nature, suggest
one possible solution. If individual learners are able to assess the quality
of a behaviour, then high quality behaviours will have a higher likelihood
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of adoption than lower-quality behaviours. The strong filtering effect of
conformity biased transmission suggests that after an environmental change,
only high quality behaviours (relative to the current predominant behaviour)
will be able to enter into the population, meaning that if the environment
changes and the current behaviour becomes worse – or an alternative behaviour
becomes better – the new high-quality behaviour will have a higher chance of
invading the population (although the rate of invasion may still be lower than if
learners did not use a conformity biased learning mechanism). Thus suggesting
that including the individual’s assessment of a behaviour (in this case leading
to a differential likelihood of adoption for different behaviours) into analysis
may broaden the range of situations where social learning and a conformity
bias evolve.
The results of Chapter 3 present an alternative solution. If individual
learners flexibly use a conformity biased learning strategy (consistent with
our experimental results) the degree of conformity biased transmission
should increase when demonstrators are highly accurate, and decrease when
demonstrators are less accurate. In periods between environmental changes,
demonstrators provide accurate information about the state of the environment
– each demonstrator is using a high-payoff behaviour. Because of this,
individuals should use a high conformity bias, which will decrease the impact
a high migration rate will have on social learning. However when the
environment changes, individuals may be able to assess the change in quality
of their behaviour, compared to alternative behaviour, leading to a decrease in
perceived demonstrator accuracy. In this case, learners should lower the degree
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of conformity bias transmission they are using, allowing new behaviours to
quickly enter and spread through the population, before increasing the degree
of conformity bias transmission as a new, beneficial behaviour becomes fixed
in the population.
Both of these solutions would increase the usefulness of social information
in cases where there exists a high-migration rate between disjoint regions and
a high rate of environmental change, two domains thought to be particularly
difficult for social learning to evolve in (Rogers, 1988; Boyd and Richerson,
1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 1988). More work is
needed to formalize the arguments above into existing theoretic frameworks,
suggesting an exciting avenue for future research.
6.5 Conclusion
In this thesis I have provided an exploration of human and animal social
learning focusing on how learners might integrate social and asocial sources of
information together. This exploration has taken a number of forms, through
theoretic models, experiments, and statistical models. In combination research
provides several new frameworks for understanding animal and human social
learning at an individual level, and new methods for inferring the presence
of social learning in animal populations. This framework has already yielded
insights into human and animal social learning, by exploring how high-fidelity
transmission might be obtained from low-fidelity copying mechanisms, the
flexible use of a conformity bias in human social learning, and the presence
of social transmission in budgerigar diffusion experiments. I believe that
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the theoretic frameworks presented may prove useful for future research into
understanding social learning in animals and humans. In particular they may
impact our understanding the development and origins of human culture, a
critical factor in what makes humans human.
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